70,069 research outputs found
The determinants of successful partnering: a transaction cost perspective
Support is emerging for the assertion that partnering can have a significant beneficial influence on project relationships and project outcomes. However, not all of the evidence bears this out: there are some examples of less-than-successful experiments with partnering approaches. Questions quite naturally arise as to whether any particular elements or aspects of partnering have differed in some of the documented examples, thus giving rise to their relative success or failure. In order to answer such questions there is a need for a theoretical framework against which to analyse the relative performance of partnering projects. In this paper, the authors propose an approach based upon aspects of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory. It is argued that two main factors, contractual incompletedness and opportunism, are fundamental in determining whether project relationships are adversarial or not. The validity of the approach is examined by applying it retrospectively to a strategic partnering agreement involving more than 80 individual building projects. This agreement had been the subject of a four-year study and had been found to produce benefits in a number of areas, not least in the avoidance of conflict and disputes. After analysis, evidence for the reduction of contractual incompletedness was mixed, however the opportunistic inclinations of the participants (specifically, the contractors) were effectively attenuated by a clearly observable combination of factors, which included preselection criteria, and the use of appropriate management and commercial frameworks in which to operate. The case study suggests a prima facie validity to the analytical approach that was adopted, which merits further testing: the next stages being to develop and refine the framework, and to carry out comparative multi-case research on a number of different partnering projects
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What drives contract design in strategic alliances? Taking stock and how to proceed
We collect and assess prior empirical evidence on contract design in alliances that has been published since Parkhe’s (1993) seminal study on inter-firm contracts. We elaborate on the effects of transaction-related factors, experience gained from prior relationships, and deliberate learning efforts on contracts. Our paper offers three contributions. First, we systematically review the existing literature on alliance contracts and summarize our findings. Second, while prior research has traditionally focused on contractual complexity, we place the content of contracts center stage and identify three contractual functions. While existing studies on contractual functions predominantly refer to safeguarding as a response to appropriation concerns, we also consider coordination and contingency adaptability as outcomes of adaptation concerns. Third, we disentangle the differential influences of previous experiences on distinct contractual functions and show that experience gained from prior relationships has different effects on safeguarding and contingency adaptability than on coordination. Overall, we add to the systematization of the current debate on alliance contract design and trace promising avenues for future research on the impact of transaction- and experience-related factors on the complexity and content of alliance contracts
Asset management and governance: an analysis of fleet management process issues in an asset-intensive organization
Efficient asset management is a key performance driver for asset-intensive organizations. Achieving high utilization and return on investment on physical assets are central corporate objectives for public and private organisations alike. Current approaches on asset management include the engineering and governance perspectives. Both perspectives offer valuable but incomplete insights on the management of asset performance: experience demonstrates that an exclusive focus on one or the other may lead to sub-optimal asset and organizational performance. In this paper, we investigate how an integrated approach to asset management can be constructed in the context of vehicle fleets. Beginning with an analysis of how the asset management process is operated through the asset lifecycle, we identify key engineering and organizational factors influencing asset performance. The relationships between factors are analyzed to provide an integrated fleet asset management approach
Which governs - the relationship or the contract?
According to the transaction cost economics literature, a firm’s external contractual relationships must be ‘fit for purpose’. What is a ‘fit for purpose’ contractual relationship should not be a normative decision, but an objective one, to be made with regard to achieving transaction cost efficiency, while defending the core competencies of the firm. Data from a Hong Kong case study is used to examine whether or not the client’s choice of contractual relationship is ‘fit for purpose’ and also to evaluate the impact of such a choice. The findings suggest that maintaining a relationship of high quality as a strategic policy not only reduces recourse to the contract but, also improves the quality and predictability of project performance and, is an antidote to ill-aligned contractual elements. These findings lend support to the growing trend towards relationship or relational contracting in construction
Visor
A visor is a piece of plastic object that can protect or cover the eyes area. Visor is designed transparent to protect the face and eyes. Therefore, the visors can disguise as a mask. For example, some of helmet in suit of the armour can protect our eyes and in automobile, the driver or front passenger can lower the part of windshield to block the sun. In the year 1924, Hathway has invented the car visor. Originally, he calls it as the glare shield because its function to block out the harmful sun’s x-ray. Therefore, Henry Ford from the creator of the Ford company patented the Hathway’s invention in 1938 that led many innovations to Ford Corp. The main of this purpose is to reduce the direct sunlight to driver’s eyes
Capabilities and the Theory of the Firm
The recent decade has witnessed a strong expansion of work on the firm, both from a capabilities perspective and from a contractual perspective. These two bodies of theories are often thought to be fundamentally different, because their domains of applications are different (knowledge-accumulation vs contracts and incentives). However, we need to integrate propositions from capabilities perspectives with ideas about economic organization (markets, hybrids, firms). This is because only a more unified theory will allow us to understand such issues as the dynamics of the modern corporation, and, more topically, the costs and benefits of outsourcing. I discuss the relations between these two bodies of theories. It is possible to argue in favor of a relation of complementarity between the two and pursue a research strategy on this basis. However, it is also possible two claim that they are rivals. Along this line, it is argued that the capabilities perspective contains propositions about economic organization that are not to be found within the modern Coasian approach to economic organization, and thus may be seen as a distinct emerging perspective on economic organization.Economic organization, capability, tacit knowledge
The effects of contract detail and prior ties on contract change : a learning perspective
Despite the large literature on alliance contract design, we know little about how transacting parties change and amend their underlying contracts during the execution of strategic alliances. Drawing on existing research in the alliance contracting literature, we develop the empirical question of how contract detail and prior ties influence the amount, direction, and type of change in such agreements during the collaboration. We generated a sample of 115 joint ventures (JVs) by distributing a survey to JV board members or top managers and found that the amount of contract change is negatively associated with the level of detail in the initial contract but is positively associated with the number of prior ties between alliance partners. In relation to the direction of contract change, we find that the level of detail of the initial agreements negatively correlates with the likelihood of removing or weakening existing provisions and that prior collaborative experience positively correlates with the likelihood of strengthening of existing provisions or adding of new ones. We also find that prior ties affect the type of change in that JV parents prefer to change enforcement provisions more so than the coordination provisions in the contract. Our paper generates new insights on the complementarities between relational governance and transaction cost economics perspectives on alliance contracting
A Political Economy of Privatization Contracts : The Case of Water and Sanitation in Ghana and Argentina
This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: Hulya Dagdeviren, Simon A. Robertson, 'A Political Economy of Privatization Contracts: The Case of Water and Sanitation in Ghana and Argentina', Competition & Change, Vol. 18 (2): 150-163, April 2014. The final, published version is available online at DOI: https://doi.org/10.1179/1024529414Z.00000000053. Published by SAGE.In general, the process and outcomes of privatization have been studied from the point of view of efficiency. In this article, we consider issues in the course of contract design, implementation, management and enforcement in privatized public services and utilities. The study is based on two case studies, involving several water concessions in Argentina and a management contract in the urban water sector in Ghana. Three key arguments are presented on the basis of these case studies. The first is that an individualistic analytical framework is often utilized by the mainstream economic perspectives, but these are inadequate for a comparative assessment of private versus public provision in public services where there are distinct collective or group interests and hence a wider socio-economic context and representation of different interests becomes highly important. Instead, the article proposes a political economy perspective, which pays due attention to distributional issues, group interests, ideology of states and power relations for the assessment of privatization contracts. Second, the administrative capacity of states and their resources play a key role for the outcomes of privatization. Finally, while some contractual issues could be resolved through resourcing and experience over time, others are inherent to the contractual relations with little prospect of remedy.Peer reviewe
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