Interventions in Digital Cultures: Technology, the Political, Methods

How to intervene? Interventions are in vogue in digital cultures as forms of critique or political actions into public spheres. By engaging in social, political, and economic contexts, interventions attempt to interrupt and change situations - often with artistic means. This volume maps methods of interventions under the specific conditions of the digital. How are interventions shaped by these conditions? And how can they contribute to altering them? In essays and interviews, this book interrogates modes of intervening in and through art, infrastructures, techno-ecological environments, bio-technology, and political protests to highlight their potentials as well as their ambivalences

Mobile Devices of Resistance: Victorian Inventors, Women Cyclists, and Convertible Cycle Wear

While middle- and upper-class Victorians were quick to embrace the bicycle, cycling proved materially and ideologically challenging for women. Conventional women’s fashions were vastly inappropriate for cycling: materials caught in wheels and tangled in pedals. Yet, looking too much like a cyclist in some contexts challenged established gender norms about how and in what ways women should move in public, to the point where cycling women suffered verbal and sometimes even physical abuse. This essay explores how some Victorians responded to challenges to women’s freedom of movement by patenting “convertible” cycle wear. These material interventions enabled women to resist social and physical limitations on their mobile bodies and identities. Drawing on feminist science and technology studies, archival research, and patents, this essay critically explores these unique garments as heterogeneous human and non-human devices and discusses how they operated as creative socio-technical mobile devices of resistance

The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age

UMD DissertationAmong the 5 states authorized under the NPT to possess nuclear weapons, China has the most restrained pattern of deployment: The People"s Republic of China (PRC) operationally deploys about 80 nuclear warheads exclusively for usewith land"based ballistic missiles. Its declaratory doctrine rejects the initiation of nuclear war under any circumstance. The PRC does not maintain tactical nuclear forces of any kind, and its strategic forces are kept off alert, with warheads in storage. This posture has been sustained over time and changes in threat perception, suggesting restraint is the result of choice and not expediency. The apparent implication of the sustained pattern of Chinese restraint implies a distinctly different strategic assessment from that developed by Russia and the US to justify and direct their larger and more actively deployed forces. As articulated in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States seeks credible options for the preventive use of strategic forces. Such options will presumably undermine confidence among Chinese leaders that a small strategic force provides adequate deterrence, and that vulnerability to preemption poses a less significant risk than the loss of control over alert forces. There is no evidence yet of a fundamental revision in the traditional deployment pattern of Chinese strategic forces, perhaps because China is likely to preserve a modest capability sufficient for its minimalist conception of deterrence. If China were subjected to a level of preemptive threat that Beijing judged intolerable, Chinese leaders would likely to reject, at least initially, the systematic emulation of US deployment patterns. Although the inner deliberations of China"s leadership are only barely perceptible, patterns in Chinese defense investments, strategic force deployments, and arms control behavior suggest China would consider asymmetric responses that targeted the vulnerable command, control and intelligence (C2I) systems essential to preventive operations. This dissertation attempts a systematic examination of Chinese policy statements and diplomatic actions for two purposes: To test the plausibility of China"s apparent strategic logic against the conflicting expectations of prevailing US assessments. To provide guidance for shaping both the specific security relationship with China and global security arrangements in general. Jeffrey Lewis is a graduate research fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland

Space-Praxis: Towards a Feminist Politics of Design

Outside of the academy and professionalized practice, design has long been central to the production of feminist, political projects. Taking what I have termed space-praxis as its central analytic, this project explores a suite of feminist interventions into the built environment—ranging from the late 1960s to present day. Formulated in response to Michel de Certeau’s theory of spatial practices, space-praxis collapses formerly bifurcated definitions of ‘tactic’/‘strategy’ and ‘theory’/‘practice.’ It gestures towards those unruly, situated undertakings that are embedded in an ever-evolving, liberative politics. In turning outwards, away from the so-called masters of architecture, this thesis orients itself toward everyday practitioners who are grounded in the environment-worlds they seek to reorganize and re-imagine. Though few of the space-practitioners discussed in this work would consider themselves architects, their work at the margin of design meaningfully expands contemporary definitions of architecture. Indeed, they exemplify the ways in which architecture could be retooled as a mode of activist engagement. The diverse array of spaces investigated include a handful of women’s centers in New York City, Cambridge, MA, and Los Angeles; the first feminist self-help gynecology clinic; an empty house in Oakland that was reclaimed by a group of Black mothers in 2019; and a series of pop-up block parties in Chicago. While this thesis in no way operates as an encyclopedia of feminist space-praxes, it highlights an array of such projects held together by their mutual investment in building feminist commons and infrastructures of care

CLASSIFYING AND RESPONDING TO NETWORK INTRUSIONS

Intrusion detection systems (IDS) have been widely adopted within the IT community, as passive monitoring tools that report security related problems to system administrators. However, the increasing number and evolving complexity of attacks, along with the growth and complexity of networking infrastructures, has led to overwhelming numbers of IDS alerts, which allow significantly smaller timeframe for a human to respond. The need for automated response is therefore very much evident. However, the adoption of such approaches has been constrained by practical limitations and administrators' consequent mistrust of systems' abilities to issue appropriate responses. The thesis presents a thorough analysis of the problem of intrusions, and identifies false alarms as the main obstacle to the adoption of automated response. A critical examination of existing automated response systems is provided, along with a discussion of why a new solution is needed. The thesis determines that, while the detection capabilities remain imperfect, the problem of false alarms cannot be eliminated. Automated response technology must take this into account, and instead focus upon avoiding the disruption of legitimate users and services in such scenarios. The overall aim of the research has therefore been to enhance the automated response process, by considering the context of an attack, and investigate and evaluate a means of making intelligent response decisions. The realisation of this objective has included the formulation of a response-oriented taxonomy of intrusions, which is used as a basis to systematically study intrusions and understand the threats detected by an IDS. From this foundation, a novel Flexible Automated and Intelligent Responder (FAIR) architecture has been designed, as the basis from which flexible and escalating levels of response are offered, according to the context of an attack. The thesis describes the design and operation of the architecture, focusing upon the contextual factors influencing the response process, and the way they are measured and assessed to formulate response decisions. The architecture is underpinned by the use of response policies which provide a means to reflect the changing needs and characteristics of organisations. The main concepts of the new architecture were validated via a proof-of-concept prototype system. A series of test scenarios were used to demonstrate how the context of an attack can influence the response decisions, and how the response policies can be customised and used to enable intelligent decisions. This helped to prove that the concept of flexible automated response is indeed viable, and that the research has provided a suitable contribution to knowledge in this important domain

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY FOR UNCONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE: A SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR ASYMMETRIC DEFENSE IN TAIWAN

Building partner capacity (BPC) is a vital strategic tool for the U.S. to compete with great power adversaries and deter aggression against partners and allies. But security partnerships and alliances are unique and complex adaptive systems; they display certain characteristics at the local level that lead to non-linear, system-wide emergent properties over time. Currently, the Joint Force and SOF enterprise lack a systems-based approach to develop and implement effective BPC strategies for great power competition (GPC). This thesis presents a systems approach to the trilateral relationship between Taiwan, China, and the U.S. in order to develop a common framework for BPC in the context of deterrence and GPC. Conventional "deterrence by punishment" strategies for Taiwan primarily focus on high-end arms sales, but an unconventional "deterrence by denial" strategy focused on civil resilience and threats of organized resistance could deter China by rendering its relative military superiority irrelevant, protracting a fait accompli indefinitely, and sabotaging its grand strategy. The Asymmetric Warfare Group's (AWG) advisory support in Taiwan as well as the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) and NSHQ's Comprehensive Defence Handbook (CDH) provide ready-made frameworks to build Taiwan's capacity for resilience, resistance, and asymmetric defense. Additionally, strategic communication and deception through a continued policy of "strategic ambiguity" are essential elements.Major, United States ArmyApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

Information Technology Service Continuity Practices in Disadvantaged Business Enterprises

Disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs) not using cloud solutions to ensure information technology (IT) service continuity may not withstand the impacts of IT disruption caused by human-made and natural disasters. The loss of critical IT resources leads to business closure and a resource loss for the community, employees, and families. Grounded in the technology acceptance model, the purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore strategies IT leaders in DBEs use to implement cloud solutions to minimize IT disruption. Participants included 16 IT leaders in DBEs in the U.S. state of Maryland. Data were generated through semi-structured interviews and reviews of 10 organizational documents. Data were analyzed using inductive analysis, and three themes were identified: alignment with business requirements, sustaining business growth, and trust in cloud services. One recommendation is for IT leaders in DBEs to ensure cloud-based IT service continuity practices are built into all aspects of small business operation. The implications for positive social change include the potential for economic stability for families and environments that rely on the DBEs for continuing business and employment

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

This report presents background information and issues for Congress concerning the Navy's ship force-structure goals and shipbuilding plans. Decisions that Congress makes on Navy shipbuilding programs can substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base

Nuclear weapons: the state of play

The Crawford School of Public Policy’s Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (CNND) this week launched in Geneva a major book-length report authoritatively documenting the unhappily diminishing global enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament, and the growing risks of nuclear proliferation. Co-edited by Centre Director Ramesh Thakur and ANU Chancellor and former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, the report is expected to be an important advocacy tool for governments and civil society organisations worldwide. By the end of 2009 hopes were higher than for many years that the world was at last seriously headed towards nuclear disarmament.  President Obama had promised “to put an end to Cold War thinking” by reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy, Russia and the United States had renewed nuclear arms reduction negotiations, and the approaching Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference seemed likely to advance both the disarmament and non-proliferation agendas. By the end of 2012, however, much of this sense of optimism had evaporated.  The New START Treaty was concluded, but it left stockpiles intact and disagreements about missile defence and conventional arms imbalances unresolved. The push for a conference on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had stalled; and the challenges posed by North Korea and Iran were no closer to resolution.  While nuclear weapons numbers had fallen overall, they were growing in Asia. The State of Play report fully assesses these and other developments, measuring progress – or more often lack of it – made as of the end of 2012 on the commitments and recommendations contained in the outcome documents of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and the 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits, and also the 2009 ICNND report. It documents small pockets of progress in each of the four areas it addresses (nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear security, and the security risks associated with peaceful uses of nuclear energy). The weakest of all these areas has been nuclear disarmament. Almost 18,000 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the nine nuclear-armed states, with a combined destructive capacity of around 120,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs. In addition, efforts are underway or planned in all of them to upgrade and modernise their nuclear stockpiles, and deployment strategies, with little enthusiasm evident for modifying the doctrines underpinning their use, or reducing their often dangerously high alert status (some 2,000 nuclear weapons are maintained at a level of readiness enabling them to be launched within minutes, maximising the chances of human or system error). While nuclear disarmament continues to be very strongly supported by the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-armed states, it remains for every nuclear-armed state at best an open-ended, incremental process, with broad and indeterminate links to global and regional stability. There is no appetite for a multilateral disarmament process and no disposition to discuss disarmament timelines. The goal of Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play is not to criticise and castigate, but to advance helpfully the global nuclear policy debate. The Centre’s report ensures that ANU and the Crawford School will be important players in that debate