Enhancing and Implementing Fully Transparent Internet Voting

Voting over the internet has been the focus of significant research with the potential to solve many problems. Current implementations typically suffer from a lack of transparency, where the connection between vote casting and result tallying is seen as a black box by voters. A new protocol was recently proposed that allows full transparency, never obfuscating any step of the process, and splits authority between mutually-constraining conflicting parties. Achieving such transparency brings with it challenging issues. In this paper we propose an efficient algorithm for generating unique, anonymous identifiers (voting locations) that is based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we extend the functionality of an election to allow for races with multiple winners, and we introduce a prototype of this voting system implemented as a multiplatform web application

Voting: You Can’t Have Privacy without Individual Verifiability

International audienceElectronic voting typically aims at two main security goals: vote privacy and verifiability. These two goals are often seen as antagonistic and some national agencies even impose a hierarchy between them: first privacy, and then verifiability as an additional feature. Verifiability typically includes individual verifiability (a voter can check that her ballot is counted); universal verifiability (anyone can check that the result corresponds to the published ballots); and eligibility verifiability (only legitimate voters may vote). We show that actually, privacy implies individual verifiability. In other words, systems without individual verifiability cannot achieve privacy (under the same trust assumptions). To demonstrate the generality of our result, we show this implication in two different settings, namely cryptographic and symbolic models, for standard notions of privacy and individual verifiability. Our findings also highlight limitations in existing privacy definitions in cryptographic settings

End-to-End Verifiable Elections in the Standard Model∗

We present the cryptographic implementation of DEMOS , a new e-voting system that is end-to-end verifiable in the standard model, i.e., without any additional setup assumption or access to a random oracle (RO). Previously known end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems required such additional assumptions (specifically, either the existence of a randomness beacon or were only shown secure in the RO model). In order to analyze our scheme, we also provide a modeling of end-to-end verifiability as well as privacy and receipt-freeness that encompasses previous definitions in the form of two concise attack games. Our scheme satisfies end-to-end verifiability information theoretically in the standard model and privacy/receipt-freeness under a computational assumption (subexponential Decisional Diffie Helman). In our construction, we utilize a number of techniques used for the first time in the context of e-voting schemes that include utilizing randomness from bit-fixing sources, zero-knowledge proofs with imperfect verifier randomness and complexity leveraging

Voting: You Can't Have Privacy without Individual Verifiability

Electronic voting typically aims at two main security goals: vote privacy and verifiability. These two goals are often seen as antagonistic and some national agencies even impose a hierarchy between them: first privacy, and then verifiability as an additional feature. Verifiability typically includes individual verifiability (a voter can check that her ballot is counted); universal verifiability (anyone can check that the result corresponds to the published ballots); and eligibility verifiability (only legitimate voters may vote). We show that actually, privacy implies individual verifiability. In other words, systems without individual verifiability cannot achieve privacy (under the same trust assumptions). To demonstrate the generality of our result, we show this implication in two different settings, namely cryptographic and symbolic models, for standard notions of privacy and individual verifiability. Our findings also highlight limitations in existing privacy definitions in cryptographic settings