190,810 research outputs found
Autonomia delle macchine e filosofia dell'intelligenza artificiale
Philosophical motives of interest for AI and robotic autonomous systems prominently stem from distinctive ethical concerns: in which circumstances are autonomous systems ought to be permitted or prohibited to perform tasks which have significant implications in the way of human responsibilities, moral duties or fundamental rights? Deontological and consequentialist approaches to ethical theorizing are brought to bear on these ethical issues in the context afforded by the case studies of autonomous vehicles and autonomous weapons. Local solutions to intertheoretic conflicts concerning these case studies are advanced towards the development of a more comprehensive ethical platform guiding the design and use of autonomous machinery
The Guilty (Silicon) Mind: Blameworthiness and Liability in Human-Machine Teaming
As human science pushes the boundaries towards the development of artificial
intelligence (AI), the sweep of progress has caused scholars and policymakers
alike to question the legality of applying or utilising AI in various human
endeavours. For example, debate has raged in international scholarship about
the legitimacy of applying AI to weapon systems to form lethal autonomous
weapon systems (LAWS). Yet the argument holds true even when AI is applied to a
military autonomous system that is not weaponised: how does one hold a machine
accountable for a crime? What about a tort? Can an artificial agent understand
the moral and ethical content of its instructions? These are thorny questions,
and in many cases these questions have been answered in the negative, as
artificial entities lack any contingent moral agency. So what if the AI is not
alone, but linked with or overseen by a human being, with their own moral and
ethical understandings and obligations? Who is responsible for any malfeasance
that may be committed? Does the human bear the legal risks of unethical or
immoral decisions by an AI? These are some of the questions this manuscript
seeks to engage with
Autonomous surgical robotic systems and the liability dilemma
Background: Advances in machine learning and robotics have allowed the development of increasingly autonomous robotic systems which are able to make decisions and learn from experience. This distribution of decisionmaking away from human supervision poses a legal challenge for determining liability. Methods: The iRobotSurgeon survey aimed to explore public opinion towards the issue of liability with robotic surgical systems. The survey included five hypothetical scenarios where a patient comes to harm and the respondent needs to determine who they believe is most responsible: the surgeon, the robot manufacturer, the hospital, or another party. Results: A total of 2,191 completed surveys were gathered evaluating 10,955 individual scenario responses from 78 countries spanning 6 continents. The survey demonstrated a pattern in which participants were sensitive to shifts from fully surgeon-controlled scenarios to scenarios in which robotic systems played a larger role in decision-making such that surgeons were blamed less. However, there was a limit to this shift with human surgeons still being ascribed blame in scenarios of autonomous robotic systems where humans had no role in decision-making. Importantly, there was no clear consensus among respondents where to allocate blame in the case of harm occurring from a fully autonomous system. Conclusions: The iRobotSurgeon Survey demonstrated a dilemma among respondents on who to blame when harm is caused by a fully autonomous surgical robotic system. Importantly, it also showed that the surgeon is ascribed blame even when they have had no role in decision-making which adds weight to concerns that human operators could act as “moral crumple zones” and bear the brunt of legal responsibility when a complex autonomous system causes harm
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Double elevation: Autonomous weapons and the search for an irreducible law of war
What should be the role of law in response to the spread of artificial intelligence in war? Fuelled by both public and private investment, military technology is accelerating towards increasingly autonomous weapons, as well as the merging of humans and machines. Contrary to much of the contemporary debate, this is not a paradigm change; it is the intensification of a central feature in the relationship between technology and war: Double elevation, above one's enemy and above oneself. Elevation above one's enemy aspires to spatial, moral, and civilizational distance. Elevation above oneself reflects a belief in rational improvement that sees humanity as the cause of inhumanity and de-humanization as our best chance for humanization. The distance of double elevation is served by the mechanization of judgement. To the extent that judgement is seen as reducible to algorithm, law becomes the handmaiden of mechanization. In response, neither a focus on questions of compatibility nor a call for a 'ban on killer robots' help in articulating a meaningful role for law. Instead, I argue that we should turn to a long-standing philosophical critique of artificial intelligence, which highlights not the threat of omniscience, but that of impoverished intelligence. Therefore, if there is to be a meaningful role for law in resisting double elevation, it should be law encompassing subjectivity, emotion and imagination, law irreducible to algorithm, a law of war that appreciates situated judgement in the wielding of violence for the collective
Philosophical Signposts for Artificial Moral Agent Frameworks
This article focuses on a particular issue under machine ethics—that is, the nature of Artificial Moral Agents. Machine ethics is a branch of artificial intelligence that looks into the moral status of artificial agents. Artificial moral agents, on the other hand, are artificial autonomous agents that possess moral value, as well as certain rights and responsibilities. This paper demonstrates that attempts to fully develop a theory that could possibly account for the nature of Artificial Moral Agents may consider certain philosophical ideas, like the standard characterizations of agency, rational agency, moral agency, and artificial agency. At the very least, the said philosophical concepts may be treated as signposts for further research on how to truly account for the nature of Artificial Moral Agents
The Jiminy Advisor: Moral Agreements Among Stakeholders Based on Norms and Argumentation
An autonomous system is constructed by a manufacturer, operates in a society
subject to norms and laws, and is interacting with end users. All of these
actors are stakeholders affected by the behavior of the autonomous system. We
address the challenge of how the ethical views of such stakeholders can be
integrated in the behavior of the autonomous system. We propose an ethical
recommendation component, which we call Jiminy, that uses techniques from
normative systems and formal argumentation to reach moral agreements among
stakeholders. Jiminy represents the ethical views of each stakeholder by using
normative systems, and has three ways of resolving moral dilemmas involving the
opinions of the stakeholders. First, Jiminy considers how the arguments of the
stakeholders relate to one another, which may already resolve the dilemma.
Secondly, Jiminy combines the normative systems of the stakeholders such that
the combined expertise of the stakeholders may resolve the dilemma. Thirdly,
and only if these two other methods have failed, Jiminy uses context-sensitive
rules to decide which of the stakeholders take preference. At the abstract
level, these three methods are characterized by the addition of arguments, the
addition of attacks among arguments, and the removal of attacks among
arguments. We show how Jiminy can be used not only for ethical reasoning and
collaborative decision making, but also for providing explanations about
ethical behavior
A Case for Machine Ethics in Modeling Human-Level Intelligent Agents
This paper focuses on the research field of machine ethics and how it relates to a technological singularity—a hypothesized, futuristic event where artificial machines will have greater-than-human-level intelligence. One problem related to the singularity centers on the issue of whether human values and norms would survive such an event. To somehow ensure this, a number of artificial intelligence researchers have opted to focus on the development of artificial moral agents, which refers to machines capable of moral reasoning, judgment, and decision-making. To date, different frameworks on how to arrive at these agents have been put forward. However, there seems to be no hard consensus as to which framework would likely yield a positive result. With the body of work that they have contributed in the study of moral agency, philosophers may contribute to the growing literature on artificial moral agency. While doing so, they could also think about how the said concept could affect other important philosophical concepts
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