Towards Self-Awareness Privacy Protection for Internet of Things Data Collection

The Internet of Things (IoT) is now an emerging global Internet-based information architecture used to facilitate the exchange of goods and services. IoT-related applications are aiming to bring technology to people anytime and anywhere, with any device. However, the use of IoT raises a privacy concern because data will be collected automatically from the network devices and objects which are embedded with IoT technologies. In the current applications, data collector is a dominant player who enforces the secure protocol that cannot be verified by the data owners. In view of this, some of the respondents might refuse to contribute their personal data or submit inaccurate data. In this paper, we study a self-awareness data collection protocol to raise the confidence of the respondents when submitting their personal data to the data collector. Our self-awareness protocol requires each respondent to help others in preserving his privacy. The communication (respondents and data collector) and collaboration (among respondents) in our solution will be performed automatically

Realistic Threats to Self-Enforcing Privacy

A recent privacy protocol for secure e-polls aims at en-suring the submitting individuals that the pollster will pre-serve the privacy of their submitted preferences. Otherwise the individuals can indict the pollster, provided that the poll-ster participates actively in this phase. The analysis of the protocol in a realistic threat model denounces that a ma-licious pollster that abuses the private preferences by dis-closure will arguably not help out during its own indict-ment. Therefore, the protocol ensures insufficient fairness among their participants because it gives the pollster some advantage over the individuals. Two variant protocols are introduced and analysed in the same threat model — one is found to move the advantage over the individuals, the other is found to achieve a satisfactory level of fairness

Is There Anybody Out There? Analyzing the Regulation of Children’s Privacy Online in the United States of America and the European Union According to the TBGI Analytical Framework by Eberlein et al

This article analyzes the regulation of children’s privacy online, especially in the context of personal information collection as a commodity, in the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU) according to the Transnational Business Governance Interactions analytical framework proposed by Eberlein et al. This article reviews the regulatory structure of the field in these two jurisdictions, including global organizations, according to Elberlein et al components and questions. In the analysis, a map of the regulatory interactions within this global realm will be presented and discussed. Analysis of the influence of each interacting party and the degree of interaction between parties demonstrates that there is a clear dominance of the industry in the regulatory realm of children’s privacy protection online. Therefore it is suggested to include an analysis of the regulatory interactions (e.g., using the TBGI analytical framework by Eberlein et al.) when discussing new or amended regulatory measures in each one of the levels described in this article. This will allow a better understanding of the overall regulatory picture and may prevent a bias towards more powerful actors, such as the industry

Prosecuting Dark Net Drug Marketplace Operators Under the Federal Crack House Statute

Over 70,000 Americans died as the result of a drug overdose in 2017, a record year following a record year. Amidst this crisis, the popularity of drug marketplaces on what has been called the “dark net” has exploded. Illicit substances are sold freely on such marketplaces, and the anonymity these marketplaces provide has proved troublesome for law enforcement. Law enforcement has responded by taking down several of these marketplaces and prosecuting their creators, such as Ross Ulbricht of the former Silk Road. Prosecutors have typically leveled conspiracy charges against the operators of these marketplaces—in Ulbricht’s case, alleging a single drug conspiracy comprising Ulbricht and the thousands of vendors on the Silk Road. This Note argues that the conspiracy to distribute narcotics charge is a poor conceptual fit for the behavior of operators of typical dark net drug marketplaces, and that the federal “crack house” statute provides a better charge. Though charging these operators under the crack house statute would be a novel approach, justice is best served when the crime accurately describes the behavior, as the crack house statute does in proscribing what dark net drug marketplace operators like Ulbricht do

Private Ordering and Commercial Arbitration: Lasting Lessons from Mentschikoff

“Private ordering” is an important concept and commonly-used phrase in legal scholarship. At least three “ordering” activities often performed by governments can be privatized: lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement of adjudicators’ decisions. Distinguishing among these activities and offering lasting lessons on their privatization—but nowadays not often credited for doing so—is Soia Mentschikoff’s seminal 1961 article, Commercial Arbitration. This short piece reconsiders Mentschikoff’s classic article in light of contemporary scholarship on private ordering and credits Commercial Arbitration with teaching us lasting lessons about commercial arbitration and even about commerce itself. Key to these lessons is Mentschikoff’s empirical study of trade association arbitration and her comparison of such industry-specific arbitration with the more general commercial arbitration exemplified by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). This comparison shows arbitration’s ability—especially in the “core commercial” context of trade associations—to privatize all three of the aforementioned “ordering” activities: lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement of adjudicators’ decisions. Mentschikoff thus builds impressively from the humble context of routine sales disputes to enduring insights about the role of private ordering in the production, application, and enforcement of law