Pandoras Box: Does Electronic Commerce Increase the Optimal Amount of Fraud?

Close business relationships are important in the food industry. However, the introduction of electronic commerce has emerged as a fundamental challenge to these relationships. In particular, retailers who start procuring private label food products in electronic auctions risk the termination of the relationships with their suppliers thus losing the value derived from these relationships. Instead, they move their focal interest towards single, unrelated transactions. The authors argue that this development increases the optimal amount of fraud in electronic commerce. In this context, they analyze the occurrence of opportunism.Relationships, information asymmetry, auctions, opportunism, economics of information, Marketing,

Constitutional economics

A version of this paper was published as chapter 13 of the 2005 second edition of The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (ed. J. Backhaus). This paper is the sequel of chapter 7 of the first edition.

Constitutional economics II

This paper is the sequel to chapter 7 (Constitutional economics) of the 1999 first edition of The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (ed. J. Backhaus).Law and Economics, Constitutional Economics

IT governance in SMEs: trust or control?

It is believed by many scholars that a small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) cannot be seen through the lens of a large firm. Theories which explain IT governance in large organizations and methodologies used by practitioners can therefore not be extrapolated to SMEs, which have a completely different economic, cultural and managerial environment. SMEs suffer from resource poverty, have less IS experience and need more external support. SMEs largely contribute to the failure of many IS projects. We define an out-sourced information system failure (OISF) as a failure of IT governance in an SME environment and propose a structure for stating propositions derived from both agency theory and theory of trust. The theoretical question addressed in this paper is: how and why do OISFs occur in SMEs? We have chosen a qualitative and positivistic IS case study research strategy based on multiple cases. Eight cases of IS projects were selected. We found that trust is more important than control issues like output-based contracts and structured controls for eliminating opportunistic behaviour in SMEs. We conclude that the world of SMEs is significantly different from that of large companies. This necessitates extra care to be taken on the part of researchers and practitioners when designing artefacts for SMEs

Social Capital, Institutions and Trust

This paper analyzes the relations between social capital, institutions and trust.These concepts are full of ambiguity and confusion.This paper attempts to dissolve some of the confusion, by distinguishing trust and control, and analyzing institutional and relational conditions of trust.It presents a tool for the analysis of the foundations of trust and a diagnosis of its strength and viability.social capital;institutions;trust;economic systems

Can the administration be trusted? An analysis of the concept of trust, applied to the public sector

In the first part of this paper, we present the various academic debates and, where applicable, questions that remain open in the literature, particularly regarding the nature of trust, the distinction between trust and trustworthiness, its role in specific relationships and its relationship to control. We then propose a way of demarcating and operationalizing the concepts of trust and trustworthiness. In the second part, on the basis of the conceptual clarifications we present, we put forward a number of "anchor points" regarding how trust is apprehended in the public sector with regard to the various relations hips that can be studied. Schematically, we distinguish between two types of relations hips in the conceptual approach to trust: on one hand, the trust that citizens, or third parties, place in the State or in various public sector authorities or entities, and on the other hand, trust within the State or the public sector, between its various authorities, entities, and actors. While studies have traditionally focused on citizens' trust in their institutions, the findings, limitations and problems observed in public - sector coordination following the reforms associated with New Public Management have also elicited growing interest in the study of trust in the relationships between the various actors within the public sector. Both the theoretical debates we present and our propositions have been extracted and adapted from an empirical comparative study of coordination between various Swiss public - service organizations and their politico - administrative authority. Using the analysis model developed for this specific relationship, between various actors within the public service, and in the light of theoretical elements on which development of this model was based, we propose some avenues for further study - questions that remain open - regarding the consideration and understanding of citizens' trust in the public sector

Public Choice, Constitutional Political Economy and Law and Economics

The various subdisciplines within the emerging ‘new institutionalism’ in economics all draw special attention to the legal-political constraints within which economic and political agents choose and therefore represent a return of economics to its appropriate legal foundations. By changing the name of his research program to constitutional political economy Buchanan distanced himself from those parts of the public choice literature that remained too close to the traditional welfare economics approach. This chapter draws lessons for law and economics from recent developments in the re-emerging field of constitutional political economy. CPE compares alternative sets of institutional arrangements, in markets and the polity, and their outcomes, using ‘democratic consent’ as an internal standard of comparison. The chapter discusses the methodological foundation of the CPE approach, presents Buchanan’s reconstruction of the Coase theorem along subjectivist-contractarian lines and gives an overview of recent contributions to the literature. JEL classification: B41, D70, H10, K; Keywords: Constitutional Economics, Constitutional Political Economy, Public Choice, James M. Buchanan, Methodological FoundationLaw and Economics, Constitutional Economics

Understanding and Managing Behavioural Risks -The Case of Food Risks Caused by Malpractice in Poultry Production

The probability that actors in economic relationships break rules increases with the profits they thus expect to earn. It decreases with the probability and level of short- and long-term losses resulting from disclosure. It also decreases with the level of social context factors and intrinsic values which shield actors from yielding to economic temptations. This paper assesses the relative merits of various scientific approaches concerned with risks in economic relationships and outlines their contribution to the study of opportunistic rule-breaking. Since the identification of (misdirected) economic incentives faced by firms and individuals represents the starting point for a systematic analysis of opportunism in any field, we also outline a microeconomic approach that systematically provides this crucial information. The approach is applied to the problem of food quality and safety threatened by opportunistic malpractice of food business operators. Its essentials are illustrated through a study which systematically searches for the temptations to break production-related rules in the poultry industries.asymmetric information, control theories, economic misconduct, game theory, moral hazard, principal-agent model, opportunism, protective factors, relational risks, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, A13, K32, K42,

Monitoring, Motivation and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment

Economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of motivation. Employees are 'rational cheaters,' who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk when the perceived marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost. Managers respond to this decision calculus by implementing monitoring and incentive pay practices that lessen the attraction of shirking. This 'rational cheater model' is not the only model of opportunistic behavior, and indeed is viewed skeptically by human resource practitioners and by many non-economists who study employment relationships. We investigate the 'rational cheater model' using data from a double-blind field experiment that allows us to observe the effect of experimentally-induced variations in monitoring on employee opportunism. The experiment is unique in that it occurs in the context of an ongoing employment relationship, i.e., with the firm's employees producing output as usual under the supervision of their front-line managers. The results indicate that a significant fraction of employees behave roughly in ccordance with the 'rational cheater model.' We also find, however, that a substantial proportion of employees do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate. This heterogeneity is related to employee assessments about their general treatment by the emp loyer.