Thick Subtrees, Games and Experiments

Abstract. We relate the dynamic semantics (games, dealing with interactions) and the static semantics (dealing with results of interactions) of linear logic with polarities, in the spirit of Timeless Game

(Mechanical) Reasoning on Infinite Extensive Games

In order to better understand reasoning involved in analyzing infinite games in extensive form, we performed experiments in the proof assistant Coq that are reported here.Comment: 11

Behavior Trees in Robotics and AI: An Introduction

A Behavior Tree (BT) is a way to structure the switching between different tasks in an autonomous agent, such as a robot or a virtual entity in a computer game. BTs are a very efficient way of creating complex systems that are both modular and reactive. These properties are crucial in many applications, which has led to the spread of BT from computer game programming to many branches of AI and Robotics. In this book, we will first give an introduction to BTs, then we describe how BTs relate to, and in many cases generalize, earlier switching structures. These ideas are then used as a foundation for a set of efficient and easy to use design principles. Properties such as safety, robustness, and efficiency are important for an autonomous system, and we describe a set of tools for formally analyzing these using a state space description of BTs. With the new analysis tools, we can formalize the descriptions of how BTs generalize earlier approaches. We also show the use of BTs in automated planning and machine learning. Finally, we describe an extended set of tools to capture the behavior of Stochastic BTs, where the outcomes of actions are described by probabilities. These tools enable the computation of both success probabilities and time to completion

Collaboration in Social Networks

The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of others, in a strategic forward looking manner. Game theory of repeated games shows that these circumstances are conducive to the emergence of collaboration in simple games of two players. We investigate the extension of this concept to the case where players are engaged in a local contribution game and show that rationality and credibility of threats identify a class of Nash equilibria -- that we call "collaborative equilibria" -- that have a precise interpretation in terms of sub-graphs of the social network. For large network games, the number of such equilibria is exponentially large in the number of players. When incentives to defect are small, equilibria are supported by local structures whereas when incentives exceed a threshold they acquire a non-local nature, which requires a "critical mass" of more than a given fraction of the players to collaborate. Therefore, when incentives are high, an individual deviation typically causes the collapse of collaboration across the whole system. At the same time, higher incentives to defect typically support equilibria with a higher density of collaborators. The resulting picture conforms with several results in sociology and in the experimental literature on game theory, such as the prevalence of collaboration in denser groups and in the structural hubs of sparse networks

On Monte-Carlo tree search for deterministic games with alternate moves and complete information

We consider a deterministic game with alternate moves and complete information, of which the issue is always the victory of one of the two opponents. We assume that this game is the realization of a random model enjoying some independence properties. We consider algorithms in the spirit of Monte-Carlo Tree Search, to estimate at best the minimax value of a given position: it consists in simulating, successively, $n$ well-chosen matches, starting from this position. We build an algorithm, which is optimal, step by step, in some sense: once the $n$ first matches are simulated, the algorithm decides from the statistics furnished by the $n$ first matches (and the a priori we have on the game) how to simulate the $(n+1)$-th match in such a way that the increase of information concerning the minimax value of the position under study is maximal. This algorithm is remarkably quick. We prove that our step by step optimal algorithm is not globally optimal and that it always converges in a finite number of steps, even if the a priori we have on the game is completely irrelevant. We finally test our algorithm, against MCTS, on Pearl's game and, with a very simple and universal a priori, on the games Connect Four and some variants. The numerical results are rather disappointing. We however exhibit some situations in which our algorithm seems efficient

Glueability of Resource Proof-Structures: Inverting the Taylor Expansion

A Multiplicative-Exponential Linear Logic (MELL) proof-structure can be expanded into a set of resource proof-structures: its Taylor expansion. We introduce a new criterion characterizing those sets of resource proof-structures that are part of the Taylor expansion of some MELL proof-structure, through a rewriting system acting both on resource and MELL proof-structures