PREDICTORS OF LAND VALUE SOLD AT AUCTION IN RICHLAND, EDWARDS, AND LAWRENCE ILLINOIS COUNTIES

With increasing land prices and high inputs prices, it is essential for farmers and investors to understand the land-specific determinants that drive value. A growing population and less farmable acres increases the need for a better understanding of the variables that may impact selling price. By implementing the auction method to sell land, the landowner is thought to receive the market price for the land sold on a specific time, date, and location. However, there has been very little research that describes the relationship between land variables and selling price when land is sold at auction. This study explores the potential relationship between land variables and the selling price of the land sold at live auction. With the results, farmers, investors, and auctioneers may be able to better understand the determinants of land value for land sold at auction. Investors and farmers might have more information available to them for valuing land when land is sold at live auction

EXPLAINING THE BREADTH OF EXPERT ESTIMATE RANGES IN AUCTIONS OF RARE BOOKS

This paper uses data from 3144 rare book auctions to study the breadth of auctioneers’ estimate ranges. The ‘information hypothesis’ proposes that wider ranges reflect greater uncertainty. The ‘reserve hypothesis’ proposes that a narrower range indicates a higher reserve price. The information hypothesis is tested by seeing whether estimate breadths are related to the presence of greater information about likely prices. The reserve hypothesis is tested by seeing whether narrower estimate ranges predict ‘no sales’. Evidence is found in support of the information hypothesis but not the reserve hypothesis. The paper identifies differences between the auction houses Christie’s and Sotheby’s in the estimate strategies they adopt.

Costless Discrimination and Unequal Achievements in a Labour Market Experiment

We investigate the emergence of discrimination in an experiment where individuals affiliated to different groups compete for a monetary prize, submitting independent bids to an auctioneer. The auctioneer receives perfect information about the bids (i.e. there is no statistical discrimination), and she has no monetary incentive to favour the members of her own group (the bidders are symmetric). We observe nonetheless some discrimination by auctioneers, who tend to assign the prize more frequently to a member of their own group when two or more players put forward the highest bid. Out-group bidders react to this bias and reduce significantly their bids, causing an average decay of their earnings throughout the game, with cumulative effects that generate strongly unequal outcomes. Because the initial bias is costless, such mechanism can survive even in competitive market, providing a rationale for a well-known puzzle in the literature, i.e. the long-run persistence of discrimination.discrimination, tournament, groups, experiment

To be or not to be an auctioneer: Some thoughts on the legal nature of online eBay auctions and the protection of consumers

This paper discusses the legal classification of online “eBay” auctions. The discussion has key implications on the scope of consumer protection law as sale by auctions are, for example, excluded from the scope of the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000. The paper uncovers that online “eBay” auctions cannot always be considered as traditional auctions and that eBay, as an intermediary, is not to be considered as an auctioneer. This creates difficulties associated with a distributive application of consumer protection laws such as the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000. Another set of difficulties is associated with a lenient legal regime applicable to the liability of eBay under the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 . The paper concludes that there is an urgent need to clarify the legal classification of online auctions and to rethink the liability of online auction sites to better protect consumers

PRICES IN SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS: PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM AUSTRALIAN RARE BOOK AUCTIONS

This paper examines price paths in sequential ascending auctions of identical rare books in Australia. Economic theory is inconclusive but suggests prices in sequential auctions of identical objects should follow flat or rising paths. The empirical literature is in several ways unsatisfactory, but points most commonly to falling price paths. Data from rare book auctions promise to overcome some of the problems in the empirical literature. A preliminary examination of rare book auction data from Australia indicates prices tended to be equal in sequential auctions of identical books in the 1980's and 1990's, and unequal in the 1970's. These results are consistent with the conjecture that more mature auction markets feature flatter price paths in sequential auctions of identical assets. Rare book auctions are a context in which further progress on sequential auctions is likely.

An Agent Based Market Design Methodology for Combinatorial Auctions

Auction mechanisms have attracted a great deal of interest and have been used in diverse e-marketplaces. In particular, combinatorial auctions have the potential to play an important role in electronic transactions. Therefore, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed to satisfy market needs. These combinatorial auction types have diverse market characteristics, which require an effective market design approach. This study proposes a comprehensive and systematic market design methodology for combinatorial auctions based on three phases: market architecture design, auction rule design, and winner determination design. A market architecture design is for designing market architecture types by Backward Chain Reasoning. Auction rules design is to design transaction rules for auctions. The specific auction process type is identified by the Backward Chain Reasoning process. Winner determination design is about determining the decision model for selecting optimal bids and auctioneers. Optimization models are identified by Forward Chain Reasoning. Also, we propose an agent based combinatorial auction market design system using Backward and Forward Chain Reasoning. Then we illustrate a design process for the general n-bilateral combinatorial auction market. This study serves as a guideline for practical implementation of combinatorial auction markets design.Combinatorial Auction, Market Design Methodology, Market Architecture Design, Auction Rule Design, Winner Determination Design, Agent-Based System