Data analytics and algorithms in policing in England and Wales: Towards a new policy framework

RUSI was commissioned by the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) to conduct an independent study into the use of data analytics by police forces in England and Wales, with a focus on algorithmic bias. The primary purpose of the project is to inform CDEI’s review of bias in algorithmic decision-making, which is focusing on four sectors, including policing, and working towards a draft framework for the ethical development and deployment of data analytics tools for policing. This paper focuses on advanced algorithms used by the police to derive insights, inform operational decision-making or make predictions. Biometric technology, including live facial recognition, DNA analysis and fingerprint matching, are outside the direct scope of this study, as are covert surveillance capabilities and digital forensics technology, such as mobile phone data extraction and computer forensics. However, because many of the policy issues discussed in this paper stem from general underlying data protection and human rights frameworks, these issues will also be relevant to other police technologies, and their use must be considered in parallel to the tools examined in this paper. The project involved engaging closely with senior police officers, government officials, academics, legal experts, regulatory and oversight bodies and civil society organisations. Sixty nine participants took part in the research in the form of semi-structured interviews, focus groups and roundtable discussions. The project has revealed widespread concern across the UK law enforcement community regarding the lack of official national guidance for the use of algorithms in policing, with respondents suggesting that this gap should be addressed as a matter of urgency. Any future policy framework should be principles-based and complement existing police guidance in a ‘tech-agnostic’ way. Rather than establishing prescriptive rules and standards for different data technologies, the framework should establish standardised processes to ensure that data analytics projects follow recommended routes for the empirical evaluation of algorithms within their operational context and evaluate the project against legal requirements and ethical standards. The new guidance should focus on ensuring multi-disciplinary legal, ethical and operational input from the outset of a police technology project; a standard process for model development, testing and evaluation; a clear focus on the human–machine interaction and the ultimate interventions a data driven process may inform; and ongoing tracking and mitigation of discrimination risk

Human Perceptions of Fairness in Algorithmic Decision Making: A Case Study of Criminal Risk Prediction

As algorithms are increasingly used to make important decisions that affect human lives, ranging from social benefit assignment to predicting risk of criminal recidivism, concerns have been raised about the fairness of algorithmic decision making. Most prior works on algorithmic fairness normatively prescribe how fair decisions ought to be made. In contrast, here, we descriptively survey users for how they perceive and reason about fairness in algorithmic decision making. A key contribution of this work is the framework we propose to understand why people perceive certain features as fair or unfair to be used in algorithms. Our framework identifies eight properties of features, such as relevance, volitionality and reliability, as latent considerations that inform people's moral judgments about the fairness of feature use in decision-making algorithms. We validate our framework through a series of scenario-based surveys with 576 people. We find that, based on a person's assessment of the eight latent properties of a feature in our exemplar scenario, we can accurately (> 85%) predict if the person will judge the use of the feature as fair. Our findings have important implications. At a high-level, we show that people's unfairness concerns are multi-dimensional and argue that future studies need to address unfairness concerns beyond discrimination. At a low-level, we find considerable disagreements in people's fairness judgments. We identify root causes of the disagreements, and note possible pathways to resolve them.Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of the Web Conference (WWW 2018). Code available at https://fate-computing.mpi-sws.org/procedural_fairness

Algorithmic Complexity for Short Binary Strings Applied to Psychology: A Primer

Since human randomness production has been studied and widely used to assess executive functions (especially inhibition), many measures have been suggested to assess the degree to which a sequence is random-like. However, each of them focuses on one feature of randomness, leading authors to have to use multiple measures. Here we describe and advocate for the use of the accepted universal measure for randomness based on algorithmic complexity, by means of a novel previously presented technique using the the definition of algorithmic probability. A re-analysis of the classical Radio Zenith data in the light of the proposed measure and methodology is provided as a study case of an application.Comment: To appear in Behavior Research Method

The purpose of rating quality of evidence differs in an overview, as compared to guidelines or recommendations

No abstract available

Slave to the Algorithm? Why a \u27Right to an Explanation\u27 Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For

Algorithms, particularly machine learning (ML) algorithms, are increasingly important to individuals’ lives, but have caused a range of concerns revolving mainly around unfairness, discrimination and opacity. Transparency in the form of a “right to an explanation” has emerged as a compellingly attractive remedy since it intuitively promises to open the algorithmic “black box” to promote challenge, redress, and hopefully heightened accountability. Amidst the general furore over algorithmic bias we describe, any remedy in a storm has looked attractive. However, we argue that a right to an explanation in the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is unlikely to present a complete remedy to algorithmic harms, particularly in some of the core “algorithmic war stories” that have shaped recent attitudes in this domain. Firstly, the law is restrictive, unclear, or even paradoxical concerning when any explanation-related right can be triggered. Secondly, even navigating this, the legal conception of explanations as “meaningful information about the logic of processing” may not be provided by the kind of ML “explanations” computer scientists have developed, partially in response. ML explanations are restricted both by the type of explanation sought, the dimensionality of the domain and the type of user seeking an explanation. However, “subject-centric explanations (SCEs) focussing on particular regions of a model around a query show promise for interactive exploration, as do explanation systems based on learning a model from outside rather than taking it apart (pedagogical versus decompositional explanations) in dodging developers\u27 worries of intellectual property or trade secrets disclosure. Based on our analysis, we fear that the search for a “right to an explanation” in the GDPR may be at best distracting, and at worst nurture a new kind of “transparency fallacy.” But all is not lost. We argue that other parts of the GDPR related (i) to the right to erasure ( right to be forgotten ) and the right to data portability; and (ii) to privacy by design, Data Protection Impact Assessments and certification and privacy seals, may have the seeds we can use to make algorithms more responsible, explicable, and human-centered

Why do less creative student writers write longer texts?

When teaching academic writing in English the issue of creativity understood as experimenting, exploring and transforming language and ideas within the required writing task while keeping the audience and purpose in mind is rarely, if ever, considered. Still, there seems to be a relationship between the creative potential of a writer and the quality and quantity of their writing. The main aim of this article is to ponder upon the results of a small scale study on the relationship between students’ creativity as measured by KANH questionnaire and their lexical fluency in academic writing. The results seem to suggest that student writers who appear less creative write longer texts. The author discusses possible reasons for such a case, finding answers in research on creativity as such and creativity in writing specifically

A literature review of expert problem solving using analogy

We consider software project cost estimation from a problem solving perspective. Taking a cognitive psychological approach, we argue that the algorithmic basis for CBR tools is not representative of human problem solving and this mismatch could account for inconsistent results. We describe the fundamentals of problem solving, focusing on experts solving ill-defined problems. This is supplemented by a systematic literature review of empirical studies of expert problem solving of non-trivial problems. We identified twelve studies. These studies suggest that analogical reasoning plays an important role in problem solving, but that CBR tools do not model this in a biologically plausible way. For example, the ability to induce structure and therefore find deeper analogies is widely seen as the hallmark of an expert. However, CBR tools fail to provide support for this type of reasoning for prediction. We conclude this mismatch between experts’ cognitive processes and software tools contributes to the erratic performance of analogy-based prediction

The Measure and Mismeasure of Fairness: A Critical Review of Fair Machine Learning

The nascent field of fair machine learning aims to ensure that decisions guided by algorithms are equitable. Over the last several years, three formal definitions of fairness have gained prominence: (1) anti-classification, meaning that protected attributes---like race, gender, and their proxies---are not explicitly used to make decisions; (2) classification parity, meaning that common measures of predictive performance (e.g., false positive and false negative rates) are equal across groups defined by the protected attributes; and (3) calibration, meaning that conditional on risk estimates, outcomes are independent of protected attributes. Here we show that all three of these fairness definitions suffer from significant statistical limitations. Requiring anti-classification or classification parity can, perversely, harm the very groups they were designed to protect; and calibration, though generally desirable, provides little guarantee that decisions are equitable. In contrast to these formal fairness criteria, we argue that it is often preferable to treat similarly risky people similarly, based on the most statistically accurate estimates of risk that one can produce. Such a strategy, while not universally applicable, often aligns well with policy objectives; notably, this strategy will typically violate both anti-classification and classification parity. In practice, it requires significant effort to construct suitable risk estimates. One must carefully define and measure the targets of prediction to avoid retrenching biases in the data. But, importantly, one cannot generally address these difficulties by requiring that algorithms satisfy popular mathematical formalizations of fairness. By highlighting these challenges in the foundation of fair machine learning, we hope to help researchers and practitioners productively advance the area