Are Preferences for Environmental Quality Sensitive to Financial Funding Schemes? Evidence from a Marine Restoration Programme in the Black Sea

This paper uses a non-market valuation study to elicit consumers’ preferences for a marine restoration programme in the Black Sea aiming to reduce the level of public health risk from bathing and improve water quality and the overall level of marine biodiversity. In this context, we administer a stated choice experiment in coastal settlements in Ukraine and Turkey and employ two tax revenue reallocation schemes as payment vehicles. One proposes the financing of the marine restoration programme by the reduction of the public budget for renewable energy and the second by the reduction of the public budget on training for civil servants. We examine the stated preferences and the subsequently derived economic value estimates in the two treatments with the aim to investigate whether the trade-off implied by the funding scheme has implications for the valuation outcome. Results reveal that preferences and marginal rates of substitution between the non-price attributes under consideration differ significantly. In the civil servants’ budget reallocation scheme, the reallocation coefficient is positive, implying that ceteris paribus redistribution of public financial resources from this source is utility-enhancing. The magnitude of the results differs in the two considered countries mirroring their heterogeneity in political and cultural dimensions.Non-Market Valuation; Stated Choice Experiment, Payment Vehicle, Tax Revenues Reallocation, Marine Resources, Black Sea, Marine Biodiversity, Developing Countries

Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms.

We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms – the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction (SPA), and the random nth-price auction (NPA) – in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show that the endowment effect is lower with the BDM mechanism. In this market mechanism, the effect disappears after a few repetitions. Yet, on a logarithmic scale, the random nth-price auction yields the highest speed of convergence towards equality of welfare indices. We also observe that subjects value public goods in reference to their private subjective benefit derived from their public good funding.auction mechanisms; WTP-WTA disparity; private provisions; public goods;

Attributes and weights in health care priority setting: a systematic review of what counts and to what extent

In most societies resources are insufficient to provide everyone with all the health care they want. In practice, this means that some people are given priority over others. On what basis should priority be given? In this paper we are interested in the general public's views on this question. We set out to synthesis what the literature has found as a whole regarding which attributes or factors the general public think should count in priority setting and what weight they should receive. A systematic review was undertaken (in August 2014) to address these questions based on empirical studies that elicited stated preferences from the general public. Sixty four studies, applying eight methods, spanning five continents met the inclusion criteria. Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) and Person Trade-off (PTO) were the most popular standard methods for preference elicitation, but only 34% of all studies calculated distributional weights, mainly using PTO. While there is heterogeneity, results suggest the young are favoured over the old, the more severely ill are favoured over the less severely ill, and people with self-induced illness or high socioeconomic status tend to receive lower priority. In those studies that considered health gain, larger gain is universally preferred, but at a diminishing rate. Evidence from the small number of studies that explored preferences over different components of health gain suggests life extension is favoured over quality of life enhancement; however this may be reversed at the end of life. The majority of studies that investigated end of life care found weak/no support for providing a premium for such care. The review highlights considerable heterogeneity in both methods and results. Further methodological work is needed to achieve the goal of deriving robust distributional weights for use in health care priority setting.12 page(s

Social Europe. ENEPRI Occasional Paper No. 5, November 2003

[From the Introduction and Summary]. Building a Social Europe has received due attention since the founding of the European Community in Rome. The European summit in Lisbon in 2000 was an important milestone in this process. European leaders committed themselves to working together through the 'open coordination' method to develop a policy to combat poverty and social exclusion. The open coordination approach means that countries exchange information and encourage each other to pursue policies geared to their social objectives. The European Union does not itself play an active role in the way in which individual member states set about achieving those objectives. It has however been agreed that member states will draw up a National Action Plan every two years setting out the way in which they plan to realise their objectives

Experiments in Distributive Justice and Their Limits

Mark Pennington argues political systems should be decentralized in order to facilitate experimental learning about distributive justice. Pointing out the problems with Pennington's Hayekian formulation, I reframe his argument as an extension of the Millian idea of 'experiments in living.' However, the experimental case for decentralization is limited in several ways. Even if decentralization improves our knowledge about justice, it impedes the actual implementation of all conceptions of justice other than libertarianism. I conclude by arguing for the compatibility of egalitarian redistribution with the epistemic virtues of markets pointed out by Hayek

Environmental valuation, ecosystem services and aquatic species

The thesis consists of an introduction and four articles that can be read independently of each other. The common topic is environmental valuation and cost-benefit analysis. The applications relates to the growing concern of invasive species, and to waterpower externalities. In broad terms, all of the articles relates to water management. Article 1: "A Cost-Benefit analysis of introducing a non-native species: the case of signal crayfish in Sweden", assesses the economic impact of introducing the signal crayfish into a Swedish lake. Two scenarios are set up and compared. The first one assumes that there is no introduction of signal crayfish, so that the noble crayfish is preserved. In the second scenario, the signal crayfish is introduced, which immediately wipes out the entire stock of noble crayfish. The values of noble- and signal crayfish populations are measured as present values of their net future revenues. The values are than compared and net benefit of an introduction is calculated. The result indicate that net benefit of an introduction is positive if the intrinsic growth rate or the carrying capacity of the noble crayfish is below 40 % that of the signal crayfish. Article 2: "Assessing management options for weed control with demanders and non-demanders in a choice experiment", estimates the benefits of having a weed management program for a lake in Sweden, and then compares them with corresponding costs. The policy recommendation from a simple cost-benefit rule is to control the weed at some specific sites of the lake. This paper also suggest how to distinguish those that have a positive WTP for at least one of the attributes (demanders) from those that have zero WTP for all attributes (non-demanders). The advantage of the suggested approach is that it facilitates to more clearly distinguish between conditional and unconditional willingness to pay. The suggested approach could also overcome some of the problems in the literature with negative welfare measures. Article 3: "Assessing transfer errors in the benefit transfer method: An application of invasive weed management using choice experiment", tests the accuracy of transferring benefits of a weed management program from one lake to another using choice experiment. The transfer errors are assessed and the convergent validity hypothesis is tested. Estimating the accuracy of benefit transfer for weed management is policy relevant as there are a number of lakes in Sweden infested with the water weed. The convergent validity was rejected for three out of five welfare estimates with a ten per cent significance level. Article 4: "Willingness to pay for environmental improvements in hydropower regulated rivers", assesses the benefits of environmental improvements along hydropower regulated rivers using choice experiments. Remedial measures that improve the conditions for fish, benthic invertebrates and river-margin vegetation were found to have a significant welfare increasing impact. The results can be of value for the implementation of the Water Framework Directives in Sweden, which aims to reform the use of all surface water and ground water in the member states

Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment

We devise a new experimental game by nesting a voluntary contributions mechanism in a broader spectrum of incentive schemes. With it, we study tensions between egalitarianism, equity concerns, self-interest, and the need for incentives. In a 2x2 design, subjects either vote on or exogenously encounter incentive settings while assigned unequal incomes that are either task-determined or random. We find subjects’ voting to be mainly self-interested but also influenced by egalitarian and equity concerns, which sometimes cut in opposite directions. Contributions, which seem mainly determined by boundedly rational responses to incentives, are influenced by egalitarian, equity and strategic considerations.equality, efficiency, voluntary contribution mechanism, incentives, experiment

Preferences for Redistribution and Pensions. What can we Learn from Experiments?

Redistribution is an inevitable feature of collective pension schemes. Nevertheless, it is still an open question what people’s preferences are regarding this form of redistribution. This paper reviews experimental evidence on preferences regarding redistribution and asks what this evidence tells us about preferences for redistribution through pension schemes. We distinguish between three fundamentally different types of situations. The first deals with distributional preferences behind a veil of ignorance. What type of income distribution do people prefer when they do not know whether they will end up in an advantaged or disadvantaged position? The evidence shows that, contrary to John Rawls' suggestion, people do not prefer the maximin rule, but rather favor a utilitarian justice concept appended with a safety net for the poorest. Furthermore, people are willing to accept income inequalities when they are due to choices for which people can be held responsible. In the second type of situation, individuals make choices in front of the veil of ignorance and know their position. Here the evidence shows that preferences for redistribution are strongly dependent on a person’s own position. Disadvantaged people want more redistribution than those who are relatively advantaged, indicating that preferences for redistribution are biased by self-interest. Still, even many of those in an advantaged position display a preference for redistribution. Finally, we discuss situations in which income is determined by interdependent rather than individual choices. Here experiments show that behavioral factors such as trust and reciprocity play a crucial role, and that these factors are strongly affected by the institutional setting. In the closing parts of the paper we discuss whether and how these experimental results speak to the redistribution issues of pensions.redistribution, fairness, pension, insurance, experiment

Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment

We devise a new experimental game by nesting a voluntary contributions mechanism in a broader spectrum of incentive schemes. With it, we study tensions between egalitarianism, equity concerns, self-interest, and the need for incentives. In a 2x2 design, subjects either vote on or exogenously encounter incentive settings while assigned unequal incomes that are either task-determined or random. We find subjects’ voting to be mainly self-interested but also influenced by egalitarian and equity concerns, which sometimes cut in opposite directions. Contributions, which seem mainly determined by boundedly rational responses to incentives, are influenced by egalitarian, equity and strategic considerations.equality; efficiency; voluntary contribution mechanism; incentives; experiment