AGM-Style Revision of Beliefs and Intentions from a Database Perspective (Preliminary Version)

We introduce a logic for temporal beliefs and intentions based on Shoham's database perspective. We separate strong beliefs from weak beliefs. Strong beliefs are independent from intentions, while weak beliefs are obtained by adding intentions to strong beliefs and everything that follows from that. We formalize coherence conditions on strong beliefs and intentions. We provide AGM-style postulates for the revision of strong beliefs and intentions. We show in a representation theorem that a revision operator satisfying our postulates can be represented by a pre-order on interpretations of the beliefs, together with a selection function for the intentions

Paradox, arithmetic and nontransitive logic

This dissertation is concerned with motivating, developing and defending nontransitive theories of truth over Peano Arithmetic. Its main goal is to show that such a nontransitive theory of truth is the only theory capable of maintaining all functional roles of the truth predicate: the substitutional and the quantificational roles. By the substitutional roles we mean that the theory ought to prove p iff it proves that p is true and that it proves all instances of the T-schema p iff 'p' is true. A theory fulfils the quantificational role if its axioms governing the truth-predicate are strong enough to mimick as much second-order quantification as possible. Where the literature on classical theories of truth has focused primarily on the fulfilment of the quantificational role, the nonclassical literature is very much obsessed with the substitutional roles. The problem of having a theory of truth fulfilling both the substitutional and quantificational (or already just the full substitutional) role are paradoxes of truth such as the Liar. Where the Liar is a sentence which informally says about itself that it is not true, we can show that it is both true and not true, which typically allows us to conclude any formula whatsoever. This problem is overcome in the current approach by blocking the use of transitivity principles under certain conditions

Proceedings of the IJCAI-09 Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Action and Change

Copyright in each article is held by the authors. Please contact the authors directly for permission to reprint or use this material in any form for any purpose.The biennial workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Action and Change (NRAC) has an active and loyal community. Since its inception in 1995, the workshop has been held seven times in conjunction with IJCAI, and has experienced growing success. We hope to build on this success again this eighth year with an interesting and fruitful day of discussion. The areas of reasoning about action, non-monotonic reasoning and belief revision are among the most active research areas in Knowledge Representation, with rich inter-connections and practical applications including robotics, agentsystems, commonsense reasoning and the semantic web. This workshop provides a unique opportunity for researchers from all three fields to be brought together at a single forum with the prime objectives of communicating important recent advances in each field and the exchange of ideas. As these fundamental areas mature it is vital that researchers maintain a dialog through which they can cooperatively explore common links. The goal of this workshop is to work against the natural tendency of such rapidly advancing fields to drift apart into isolated islands of specialization. This year, we have accepted ten papers authored by a diverse international community. Each paper has been subject to careful peer review on the basis of innovation, significance and relevance to NRAC. The high quality selection of work could not have been achieved without the invaluable help of the international Program Committee. A highlight of the workshop will be our invited speaker Professor Hector Geffner from ICREA and UPF in Barcelona, Spain, discussing representation and inference in modern planning. Hector Geffner is a world leader in planning, reasoning, and knowledge representation; in addition to his many important publications, he is a Fellow of the AAAI, an associate editor of the Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research and won an ACM Distinguished Dissertation Award in 1990

Deductive Systems in Traditional and Modern Logic

The book provides a contemporary view on different aspects of the deductive systems in various types of logics including term logics, propositional logics, logics of refutation, non-Fregean logics, higher order logics and arithmetic

Investigations in Belnap's Logic of Inconsistent and Unknown Information

Nuel Belnap schlug 1977 eine vierwertige Logik vor, die -- im Gegensatz zur klassischen Logik -- die Faehigkeit haben sollte, sowohl mit widerspruechlicher als auch mit fehlender Information umzugehen. Diese Logik hat jedoch den Nachteil, dass sie Saetze der Form 'wenn ..., dann ...' nicht ausdruecken kann. Ausgehend von dieser Beobachtung analysieren wir die beiden nichtklassischen Aspekte, Widerspruechlichkeit und fehlende Information, indem wir eine dreiwertige Logik entwickeln, die mit widerspruechlicher Information umgehen kann und eine Modallogik, die mit fehlender Information umgehen kann. Beide Logiken sind nicht monoton. Wir untersuchen Eigenschaften, wie z.B. Kompaktheit, Entscheidbarkeit, Deduktionstheoreme und Berechnungkomplexitaet dieser Logiken. Es stellt sich heraus, dass die dreiwertige Logik, nicht kompakt und ihre Folgerungsmenge im Allgemeinen nicht rekursiv aufzaehlbar ist. Beschraenkt man sich hingegen auf endliche Formelmengen, so ist die Folgerungsmenge rekursiv entscheidbar, liegt in der Klasse $\Sigma_2^P$ der polynomiellen Zeithierarchie und ist DIFFP-schwer. Wir geben ein auf semantischen Tableaux basierendes, korrektes und vollstaendiges Berechnungsverfahren fuer endliche Praemissenmengen an. Darueberhinaus untersuchen wir Abschwaechungen der Kompaktheitseigenschaft. Die nichtmonotone auf S5-Modellen basierende Modallogik stellt sich als nicht minder komplex heraus. Auch hier untersuchen wir eine sinnvolle Abschwaechung der Kompaktheitseigenschaft. Desweiteren studieren wir den Zusammenhang zu anderen nichtmonotonen Modallogiken wie Moores autoepistemischer Logik (AEL) und McDermotts NML-2. Wir zeigen, dass unsere Logik zwischen AEL und NML-2 liegt. Schliesslich koppeln wir die entworfene Modallogik mit der dreiwertigen Logik. Die dabei enstehende Logik MKT ist eine Erweiterung des nichtmonotonen Fragments von Belnaps Logik. Wir schliessen unsere Betrachtungen mit einem Vergleich von MKT und verschiedenen informationstheoretischen Logiken, wie z.B. Nelsons N und Heytings intuitionistischer Logik ab