The Computational Complexity of Finding Stationary Points in Non-Convex Optimization

Finding approximate stationary points, i.e., points where the gradient is approximately zero, of non-convex but smooth objective functions $f$ over unrestricted $d$-dimensional domains is one of the most fundamental problems in classical non-convex optimization. Nevertheless, the computational and query complexity of this problem are still not well understood when the dimension $d$ of the problem is independent of the approximation error. In this paper, we show the following computational and query complexity results: 1. The problem of finding approximate stationary points over unrestricted domains is PLS-complete. 2. For $d = 2$, we provide a zero-order algorithm for finding $\varepsilon$-approximate stationary points that requires at most $O(1/\varepsilon)$ value queries to the objective function. 3. We show that any algorithm needs at least $\Omega(1/\varepsilon)$ queries to the objective function and/or its gradient to find $\varepsilon$-approximate stationary points when $d=2$. Combined with the above, this characterizes the query complexity of this problem to be $\Theta(1/\varepsilon)$. 4. For $d = 2$, we provide a zero-order algorithm for finding $\varepsilon$-KKT points in constrained optimization problems that requires at most $O(1/\sqrt{\varepsilon})$ value queries to the objective function. This closes the gap between the works of Bubeck and Mikulincer [2020] and Vavasis [1993] and characterizes the query complexity of this problem to be $\Theta(1/\sqrt{\varepsilon})$. 5. Combining our results with the recent result of Fearnley et al. [2022], we show that finding approximate KKT points in constrained optimization is reducible to finding approximate stationary points in unconstrained optimization but the converse is impossible.Comment: Full version of COLT 2023 extended abstrac

Finding Approximate Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games via Payoff Queries

We study the deterministic and randomized query complexity of finding approximate equilibria in a k × k bimatrix game. We show that the deterministic query complexity of finding an ϵ-Nash equilibrium when ϵ < ½ is Ω(k2), even in zero-one constant-sum games. In combination with previous results [Fearnley et al. 2013], this provides a complete characterization of the deterministic query complexity of approximate Nash equilibria. We also study randomized querying algorithms. We give a randomized algorithm for finding a (3-√5/2 + ϵ)-Nash equilibrium using O(k.log k/ϵ2) payoff queries, which shows that the ½ barrier for deterministic algorithms can be broken by randomization. For well-supported Nash equilibria (WSNE), we first give a randomized algorithm for finding an ϵ-WSNE of a zero-sum bimatrix game using O(k.log k/ϵ4) payoff queries, and we then use this to obtain a randomized algorithm for finding a (⅔ + ϵ)-WSNE in a general bimatrix game using O(k.log k/ϵ4) payoff queries. Finally, we initiate the study of lower bounds against randomized algorithms in the context of bimatrix games, by showing that randomized algorithms require Ω(k2) payoff queries in order to find an ϵ-Nash equilibrium with ϵ < 1/4k, even in zero-one constant-sum games. In particular, this rules out query-efficient randomized algorithms for finding exact Nash equilibria

Zeroth-Order Negative Curvature Finding: Escaping Saddle Points without Gradients

We consider escaping saddle points of nonconvex problems where only the function evaluations can be accessed. Although a variety of works have been proposed, the majority of them require either second or first-order information, and only a few of them have exploited zeroth-order methods, particularly the technique of negative curvature finding with zeroth-order methods which has been proven to be the most efficient method for escaping saddle points. To fill this gap, in this paper, we propose two zeroth-order negative curvature finding frameworks that can replace Hessian-vector product computations without increasing the iteration complexity. We apply the proposed frameworks to ZO-GD, ZO-SGD, ZO-SCSG, ZO-SPIDER and prove that these ZO algorithms can converge to $(\epsilon,\delta)$-approximate second-order stationary points with less query complexity compared with prior zeroth-order works for finding local minima

Query-Efficient Algorithms to Find the Unique Nash Equilibrium in a Two-Player Zero-Sum Matrix Game

We study the query complexity of identifying Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum matrix games. Grigoriadis and Khachiyan (1995) showed that any deterministic algorithm needs to query $\Omega(n^2)$ entries in worst case from an $n\times n$ input matrix in order to compute an $\varepsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium, where $\varepsilon<\frac{1}{2}$. Moreover, they designed a randomized algorithm that queries $\mathcal O(\frac{n\log n}{\varepsilon^2})$ entries from the input matrix in expectation and returns an $\varepsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium when the entries of the matrix are bounded between $-1$ and $1$. However, these two results do not completely characterize the query complexity of finding an exact Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum matrix games. In this work, we characterize the query complexity of finding an exact Nash equilibrium for two-player zero-sum matrix games that have a unique Nash equilibrium $(x_\star,y_\star)$. We first show that any randomized algorithm needs to query $\Omega(nk)$ entries of the input matrix $A\in\mathbb{R}^{n\times n}$ in expectation in order to find the unique Nash equilibrium where $k=|\text{supp}(x_\star)|$. We complement this lower bound by presenting a simple randomized algorithm that, with probability $1-\delta$, returns the unique Nash equilibrium by querying at most $\mathcal O(nk^4\cdot \text{polylog}(\frac{n}{\delta}))$ entries of the input matrix $A\in\mathbb{R}^{n\times n}$. In the special case when the unique Nash Equilibrium is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE), we design a simple deterministic algorithm that finds the PSNE by querying at most $\mathcal O(n)$ entries of the input matrix.Comment: 17 page

Extended Learning Graphs for Triangle Finding

We present new quantum algorithms for Triangle Finding improving its best previously known quantum query complexities for both dense and sparse instances. For dense graphs on n vertices, we get a query complexity of O(n^(5/4)) without any of the extra logarithmic factors present in the previous algorithm of Le Gall [FOCS\u2714]. For sparse graphs with m >= n^(5/4) edges, we get a query complexity of O(n^(11/12) m^(1/6) sqrt(log n)), which is better than the one obtained by Le Gall and Nakajima [ISAAC\u2715] when m >= n^(3/2). We also obtain an algorithm with query complexity O(n^(5/6) (m log n)^(1/6) + d_2 sqrt(n)) where d_2 is the variance of the degree distribution. Our algorithms are designed and analyzed in a new model of learning graphs that we call extended learning graphs. In addition, we present a framework in order to easily combine and analyze them. As a consequence we get much simpler algorithms and analyses than previous algorithms of Le Gall based on the MNRS quantum walk framework [SICOMP\u2711]

Connecting the dots: a multi-pivot approach to data exploration

The purpose of data browsers is to help users identify and query data effectively without being overwhelmed by large complex graphs of data. A proposed solution to identify and query data in graph-based datasets is Pivoting (or set-oriented browsing), a many-to-many graph browsing technique that allows users to navigate the graph by starting from a set of instances followed by navigation through common links. Relying solely on navigation, however, makes it difficult for users to find paths or even see if the element of interest is in the graph when the points of interest may be many vertices apart. Further challenges include finding paths which require combinations of forward and backward links in order to make the necessary connections which further adds to the complexity of pivoting. In order to mitigate the effects of these problems and enhance the strengths of pivoting we present a multi-pivot approach which we embodied in tool called Visor. Visor allows users to explore from multiple points in the graph, helping users connect key points of interest in the graph on the conceptual level, visually occluding the remainder parts of the graph, thus helping create a road-map for navigation. We carried out an user study to demonstrate the viability of our approach

Social welfare and profit maximization from revealed preferences

Consider the seller's problem of finding optimal prices for her $n$ (divisible) goods when faced with a set of $m$ consumers, given that she can only observe their purchased bundles at posted prices, i.e., revealed preferences. We study both social welfare and profit maximization with revealed preferences. Although social welfare maximization is a seemingly non-convex optimization problem in prices, we show that (i) it can be reduced to a dual convex optimization problem in prices, and (ii) the revealed preferences can be interpreted as supergradients of the concave conjugate of valuation, with which subgradients of the dual function can be computed. We thereby obtain a simple subgradient-based algorithm for strongly concave valuations and convex cost, with query complexity $O(m^2/\epsilon^2)$, where $\epsilon$ is the additive difference between the social welfare induced by our algorithm and the optimum social welfare. We also study social welfare maximization under the online setting, specifically the random permutation model, where consumers arrive one-by-one in a random order. For the case where consumer valuations can be arbitrary continuous functions, we propose a price posting mechanism that achieves an expected social welfare up to an additive factor of $O(\sqrt{mn})$ from the maximum social welfare. Finally, for profit maximization (which may be non-convex in simple cases), we give nearly matching upper and lower bounds on the query complexity for separable valuations and cost (i.e., each good can be treated independently)