52,202 research outputs found
Evaluative conditioning as a symbolic phenomenon: on the relation between evaluative conditioning, evaluative conditioning via instructions, and persuasion
Evaluative conditioning (EC) is sometimes portrayed as a primitive way of changing attitudes that is fundamentally different from persuasion via arguments. We provide a new perspective on the nature of EC and its relation to persuasion by exploring the idea that stimulus pairings can function as a symbol that conveys the nature of the relation between stimuli. We put forward the concept of symbolic EC to refer to changes in liking that occur because stimulus pairings function as symbols. The idea of symbolic EC is consistent with at least some current theories of persuasion. It clarifies what EC research can add to the understanding of the origins of our preferences and has implications for how (symbolic and non-symbolic) EC can be established, the boundaries of EC research, and cognitive and functional models of EC
Univocity, Duality, and Ideal Genesis: Deleuze and Plato
In this essay, we consider the formal and ontological implications of one specific and intensely contested dialectical context from which Deleuzeās thinking about structural ideal genesis visibly arises. This is the formal/ontological dualism between the principles, į¼ĻĻĪ±ĪÆ, of the One (į¼Ī½) and the Indefinite/Unlimited Dyad (į¼ĻĻĪ¹ĻĻĪæĻ Ī“Ļ
Ī¬Ļ), which is arguably the culminating achievement of the later Platoās development of a mathematical dialectic.3 Following commentators including Lautman, Oskar Becker, and Kenneth M. Sayre, we argue that the duality of the One and the Indefinite Dyad provides, in the later Plato, a unitary theoretical formalism accounting, by means of an iterated mixing without synthesis, for the structural origin and genesis of both supersensible Ideas and the sensible particulars which participate in them. As these commentators also argue, this duality furthermore provides a maximally general answer to the problem of temporal becoming that runs through Platoās corpus: that of the relationship of the flux of sensory experiences to the fixity and order of what is thinkable in itself. Additionally, it provides a basis for understanding some of the famously puzzling claims about forms, numbers, and the principled genesis of both attributed to Plato by Aristotle in the Metaphysics, and plausibly underlies the late Platoās deep considerations of the structural paradoxes of temporal change and becoming in the Parmenides, the Sophist, and the Philebus. After extracting this structure of duality and developing some of its formal, ontological, and metalogical features, we consider some of its specific implications for a thinking of time and ideality that follows Deleuze in a formally unitary genetic understanding of structural difference. These implications of Platoās duality include not only those of the constitution of specific theoretical domains and problematics, but also implicate the reflexive problematic of the ideal determinants of the form of a unitary theory as such. We argue that the consequences of the underlying duality on the level of content are ultimately such as to raise, on the level of form, the broader reflexive problem of the basis for its own formal or meta-theoretical employment. We conclude by arguing for the decisive and substantive presence of a proper āPlatonismā of the Idea in Deleuze, and weighing the potential for a substantive recuperation of Platoās duality in the context of a dialectical affirmation of what Deleuze recognizes as the āonlyā ontological proposition that has ever been uttered. This is the proposition of the univocity of Being, whereby ābeing is said in the same sense, everywhere and always,ā but is said (both problematically and decisively) of difference itself
Critical Foundations of the Contextual Theory of Mind
The contextual mind is found attested in various usages of the term complement, in the background of Kant. The difficulties of Kant's intuitionism are taken up through Quine, but referential opacity is resolved as semantic presence in lived context. A further critique of rationalist linguistics is developed from Jakobson, showing generic functions in thought supporting abstraction, binding and thereby semantic categories. Thus Bolzano's influential philosophy of mathematics and science gives way to a critical view of the ancient heritage acknowledged by Plato.\ud
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The propositional nature of human associative learning
The past 50 years have seen an accumulation of evidence suggesting that associative learning depends oil high-level cognitive processes that give rise to propositional knowledge. Yet, many learning theorists maintain a belief in a learning mechanism in which links between mental representations are formed automatically. We characterize and highlight the differences between the propositional and link approaches, and review the relevant empirical evidence. We conclude that learning is the consequence of propositional reasoning processes that cooperate with the unconscious processes involved in memory retrieval and perception. We argue that this new conceptual framework allows many of the important recent advances in associative learning research to be retained, but recast in a model that provides a firmer foundation for both immediate application and future research
An Ordinal View of Independence with Application to Plausible Reasoning
An ordinal view of independence is studied in the framework of possibility
theory. We investigate three possible definitions of dependence, of increasing
strength. One of them is the counterpart to the multiplication law in
probability theory, and the two others are based on the notion of conditional
possibility. These two have enough expressive power to support the whole
possibility theory, and a complete axiomatization is provided for the strongest
one. Moreover we show that weak independence is well-suited to the problems of
belief change and plausible reasoning, especially to address the problem of
blocking of property inheritance in exception-tolerant taxonomic reasoning.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Tenth Conference on Uncertainty in
Artificial Intelligence (UAI1994
Numerical Representations of Acceptance
Accepting a proposition means that our confidence in this proposition is
strictly greater than the confidence in its negation. This paper investigates
the subclass of uncertainty measures, expressing confidence, that capture the
idea of acceptance, what we call acceptance functions. Due to the monotonicity
property of confidence measures, the acceptance of a proposition entails the
acceptance of any of its logical consequences. In agreement with the idea that
a belief set (in the sense of Gardenfors) must be closed under logical
consequence, it is also required that the separate acceptance o two
propositions entail the acceptance of their conjunction. Necessity (and
possibility) measures agree with this view of acceptance while probability and
belief functions generally do not. General properties of acceptance functions
are estabilished. The motivation behind this work is the investigation of a
setting for belief revision more general than the one proposed by Alchourron,
Gardenfors and Makinson, in connection with the notion of conditioning.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Eleventh Conference on Uncertainty in
Artificial Intelligence (UAI1995
Literal Perceptual Inference
In this paper, I argue that theories of perception that appeal to Helmholtzās idea of unconscious inference (āHelmholtzianā theories) should be taken literally, i.e. that the inferences appealed to in such theories are inferences in the full sense of the term, as employed elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary discourse.
In the course of the argument, I consider constraints on inference based on the idea that inference is a deliberate acton, and on the idea that inferences depend on the syntactic structure of representations. I argue that inference is a personal-level but sometimes unconscious process that cannot in general be distinguished from association on the basis of the structures of the representations over which itās defined. I also critique arguments against representationalist interpretations of Helmholtzian theories, and argue against the view that perceptual inference is encapsulated in a module
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