Criminal Procedure Within the Firm

It seems improbable that the theoretical and doctrinal framework of criminal procedure, developed mostly through a binary model of the individual and the state, would fit without modification in the tripartite model of the state, the firm, and the individual that characterizes the investigation and sanctioning of criminal conduct within legal entities. This intuition—which has been underexplored in spite of heated public debate about the state’s practices in this area—proves correct. I develop some components of a framework for understanding procedure for individual cases of criminal wrongdoing within firms and generating insights to guide reform. The process of pursuing individual cases within firms (as opposed to firm cases against firms) is distinctive for at least three reasons: in terms of causation and incentives, the presence of an organization materially alters the incidence of individual misconduct ex ante and the efficiency and efficacy of investigating and prosecuting that conduct ex post; the nature of the applicable substantive criminal violations (white collar crimes) causes such cases to ripen into criminal cases more slowly than those outside business firms; and lawyers have multiple roles in such cases not only ex post but also ex ante. I evaluate two current practices in light of these structural differences: state use of the fruits of employer coercion of employees’ waivers of the right to silence; and state negotiation with firms over the scope of firms’ indemnification of their agents for litigation costs. I conclude that some reforms of current practices in these areas would be beneficial but that calls for abolition of those practices are misguided

The Factors That Influence the Firm Performance in the Furniture Industry Jepara

Furniture industryinJeparais one ofIndonesias main commoditiesto be proud ofandbe maintainedevenif itneeds to be improved. The industryoccupiesa strategicpositionof being ableto contributeto regional revenueby 26% byvalue ofexports ofU.S.$130million ormorethanRp1trillionin 2010andin 2011reachedU.S.$ 111.65million. However,exportsfromJeparafurnitureislikely to declinedue toa variety of things. This study aimstoanalyze firm performance through, market orientation, learning orientation, and innovationin furnitureindustryinJepara. The samplesin this study were110smallandmedium-sizedenterprises. Sixthhypothesis with SEManalysis resultsof the researchare: (1) learningorientationhave a significant effecton firm performance, (2) learningorientationsignificant effect oninnovation, (3) marketorientation havea significant effect oninnovation, (4) marketorientationsignificantly influence on firms performance, (5) innovationno significant effect on firm performance. Indicatorvariablesthatneed to be consideredinlearningorientationisopen-mindednessandsharingof knowledge, whiletheindicatorvariable of themarket-orientation is competitororientationasa significant effect oninnovationandfirm performance

PENGARUH STRUKTUR KEPEMILIKAN DARI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PADA BADAN USAHA PUBLIK YANG TERDIVERSIFIKASI DAN TIDAK TERDIVERSIFIKASI DALAM HUBUNGANNYA DENGAN LAYANAN BAGI PIHAK INTERNAL DAN EKSTERNAL BADAN USAHA

The stakeholders of the firm have the same objective to the survival of the firm. In order to survive, the firm can diversify its line of business. Through diversification the firm gets several benefit, such as financial synergy, increasing debt capacity, and earning stability. However, there are possibilities that the managers do the diversification for their personal intention, such as prestige, higher compensation, and risk-shelter. Since there is a difference between the goal of shareholders and managers, then it will induce the agency conflict. Therefore diversification could have positive and negative side to the firm. The strategy of doing diversification is influenced by ownership structure and corporate governance. The proxy for corporate governance are leverage, size of the firm, growth opportunity, and financial performance. This research try to test the influence of both factors above by using logit regression model. The result is that only size of the firm gives a siginifcant influence to the diversification strategy. The possible explanations are still few public firms do diversification, many firms are owned by family member, and there are nonfinancial factors, such as the composition of board of directors

Credit within the Firm

We exploit time variation in the degree of development of local credit markets and matched workers-firm data with workers histories to assess the role of the firm as an internal loans market. By tilting the workers wage-tenure profile around their tenure-productivity profile, the firm can generate borrowing flows from workers to the firm (when the earnings profile is steeper than the productivity profile) or vice versa from the firm to the workers (when the earnings profile is fatter), thus compensating for the imperfect functioning of the loans market. We find that firms located in less financially developed areas offer wages that are lower at the beginning of tenure and higher at the end than those offered by firms in more financially developed markets, which helps firms finance their operations by raising funds from workers. This effect does not reflect unobserved local factors that systematically affect wage tenure profiles, since we control for local market effects and only exploit variation time variation in the degree of local financial development induced by effects of exogenous liberalization. The credit generated by implicit lending within the firm is economically important and can be as large as 30% of bank lending. Implicit contracts help more those firms that have a problematic access to the loans market and funds come more from workers with a stronger willingness to lend. Consistent with credit market imperfections opening a trade opportunity within the firm we find that the internal rate of return of implicit loans lies between the rate at which workers savings are remunerated and the rate firms pay on their loans from banks.Implicit contracts, financial frictions, tenure profile, wage setting

Insurance within the Firm

The full insurance hypothesis states that shocks to the firm's performance do not affect workers' compensation. In principal-agent models withmoral hazard, firms trade off insurance and incentives to induce workers to supply the optimal level of effort. We use a long panel of matched employer-employee data to test the theoretical predictions of principal-agent models of wage determination in a general context where all types of workers, not only CEOs, are present. We allow for both transitory and permanent shocks to firm performance and find that firms are willing to fully absorb transitory fluctuations in productivity but insure workers only partially against permanent shocks. Risk-sharing considerations can account for about 10 percent of overall earnings variability, the remainder originating in idiosyncratic shocks. Finally, we show that the amount of insurance varies by type of worker and firm in ways that are consistent with principal-agent models but are hard to reconcile with competitive labor market models, with or without frictions.insurance, incentive contracts, matched employer-employees data

The Firm-Level Credit Multiplier

We study the effect of asset tangibility on corporate financing and investment decisions. Financially constrained firms benefit the most from investing in tangible assets because those assets help relax constraints, allowing for further investment. Using a dynamic model, we characterize this effect – which we call firm-level credit multiplier – and show how asset tangibility increases the sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s Q for financially constrained firms. Examining a large sample of manufacturers over the 1971-2005 period as well as simulated data, we find support for our theory’s tangibility–investment channel. We further verify that our findings are driven by firms’ debt issuance activities. Consistent with our empirical identification strategy, the firm-level credit multiplier is absent from samples of financially unconstrained firms and samples of financially constrained firms with low spare debt capacity.

Managerial Control inside the Firm

This paper proposes an implicit control mechanism of managers inside the firm. We argue that the need to motivate workers may make it beneficial for a self-interested, short-sighted manager to pursue long-run viability of the firm. When the firm is in a stable environment, this implicit control mechanism may not contradict shareholder value maximization. However, when the firm needs restructuring, this mechanism damages firm value. We discuss when external governance is desirable, and when it is not. Our model also offers economic explanations for some related issues in managerial behavior such as restructuring aversion, survival motive, and excessive risk aversion.

Separations at the Firm Level

This paper analyzes the determinants of lay-offs, job-to-job movements and total separations with a unique data set that combines information on individual firms and their workers. We are in particular interested in whether the lay-off policy of firms can explain the relatively high level of unemployment amongst lower educated workers and the relatively strong sensitivity of their unemployment rate to the business cycle. We find that lay-off rates decrease with education but that the change over the cycle in the lay-off rate of workers with a lower level of education compared to that of workers with a higher level of education can not explain the stronger cyclicality of the unemployment rate for lower educated workers. We conclude that this stronger cyclicality is not due to the personnel policy of firms.unemployment;mobility;layoffs

Consistency in Organization (updated)

Internal organization relies heavily on psychological consistency requirements. This thought has been emphasized in modern compensation theory, but has not been extended to organization theory. The perspective sheds new light on several topics in the theory of the firm, like the boundaries of the firm, the importance of fairness concerns within firms, the attenuation of incentives, or the role of routines and incentives. It implies a perceptional theory of the firm that is realistic in the sense advocated by Ronald Coase (1937).disruptive technologies, skunkworks, ownership effect, fairness, employment relationship, Simon, theory of the firm, hierarchy, evolutionary theory of the firm, perceptional theory of the firm, consistency, small numbers, Williamson’s puzzle, centralization paradox, compensation, boundaries of the firm, fairness, idiosyncratic exchange, entitlements, obligations, routines, framing, Tayloristic organization, holistic organization