Modeling and Evaluating Pilot Performance in NextGen: Review of and Recommendations Regarding Pilot Modeling Efforts, Architectures, and Validation Studies

NextGen operations are associated with a variety of changes to the national airspace system (NAS) including changes to the allocation of roles and responsibilities among operators and automation, the use of new technologies and automation, additional information presented on the flight deck, and the entire concept of operations (ConOps). In the transition to NextGen airspace, aviation and air operations designers need to consider the implications of design or system changes on human performance and the potential for error. To ensure continued safety of the NAS, it will be necessary for researchers to evaluate design concepts and potential NextGen scenarios well before implementation. One approach for such evaluations is through human performance modeling. Human performance models (HPMs) provide effective tools for predicting and evaluating operator performance in systems. HPMs offer significant advantages over empirical, human-in-the-loop testing in that (1) they allow detailed analyses of systems that have not yet been built, (2) they offer great flexibility for extensive data collection, (3) they do not require experimental participants, and thus can offer cost and time savings. HPMs differ in their ability to predict performance and safety with NextGen procedures, equipment and ConOps. Models also vary in terms of how they approach human performance (e.g., some focus on cognitive processing, others focus on discrete tasks performed by a human, while others consider perceptual processes), and in terms of their associated validation efforts. The objectives of this research effort were to support the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in identifying HPMs that are appropriate for predicting pilot performance in NextGen operations, to provide guidance on how to evaluate the quality of different models, and to identify gaps in pilot performance modeling research, that could guide future research opportunities. This research effort is intended to help the FAA evaluate pilot modeling efforts and select the appropriate tools for future modeling efforts to predict pilot performance in NextGen operations

Human-centred design for next generation of air traffic management systems.

Designing and deploying air traffic management systems requires an understanding of cognitive ergonomics, system integration, and human-computer interactions. The aim of this research is to develop an effective Human-centred design for Air Navigation Services Providers to permit more effective air traffic controller training and regulations. Therefore, this research consists of both evaluating human-computer interactions on COOPANS Air Traffic Management system and multiple remote tower operations. The COOPANS Alliance is an international cooperation among the air navigation service providers of Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden with Thales as the industry supplier. The findings of this project indicate that the context-specified design of semantic alerts could improve ATCO’s situational awareness and significantly reduce response time when responding to aircraft conflict resolution alerts. Civil Aviation Authorities, Air Navigation Service Providers and Air Traffic Management System Providers could all benefit from the findings of this research with a view to ensuring that Air Traffic Controllers are provided with the optimal context-specified alerting schemes to increase their situational awareness during both training and operations. The EU Single European Sky initiative was introduced to restructure European airspace and propose innovative measures for air traffic management to achieve the objectives of enhanced cost-efficiency and improved airspace design and airport capacity whilst simultaneously improving safety performance. There is potential to save approximately €2.21 million Euro per annum per installation of remote tower versus traditional control towers. However, ATCO’s visual attention and monitoring performance can be affected by how information is presented, the complexity of the information presented, and the operating environment in the remote tower centre. To achieve resource-efficient and sustainable air navigation services, there is a need to improve the design of human-computer interactions in multiple remote tower technology deployment. These must align with high technology-readiness levels, operators’ practices, industrial developments, and the certification processes of regulators. From a regulatory perspective the results of this project may contribute to European Aviation Safety Agency rulemaking activity for future Air Traffic Management Systems. Overall, the results of this research are in line with the requirements of Single European Sky and facilitate the harmonisation of European ATM systems.PhD in Transport System

Aerospace medicine and biology: A continuing bibliography with indexes (supplement 292)

This bibliography lists 192 reports, articles and other documents introduced into the NASA scientific and technical information system in December, 1986

Twentieth Annual Conference on Manual Control, Volume 1

The 48 papers presented were devoted to humanopeator modeling, application of models to simulation and operational environments, aircraft handling qualities, teleopertors, fault diagnosis, and biodynamics

Behavioural markers for the assessment of competence in crisis management

A lack of competence in crisis management has been shown to be a causal factor in a number of recent maritime accidents. In safety critical industries other than commercial shipping, such as civil aviation, nuclear and petrochemical, research is being undertaken to identify behavioural markers that can be used to assess competence in crisis management. Although there is now a general acceptance of the core concepts for the non-technical or resource management skills required for competence in crisis management, there is also an acceptance that the behaviours associated with these skills are context specific. This research programme improves the understanding of how a behavioural marker system can be used to assess the competence in crisis management of merchant marine engineering officers within the context of a merchant vessel engine control room. This research reviews the current practice in using behavioural markers for the assessment of competence in crisis management within safety critical industries and the military. The differences between the assessment frameworks and environments in which behavioural markers are currently being used for this assessment of competence are discussed. The influences of these differences on the use of behavioural markers for the assessment of competence in crisis management within the context of a merchant vessel engine room control room are investigated. Through the use of ethnographic study, the research presents a set of behavioural markers that can be used to assess competence in crisis management within the context of a simulated merchant vessel's engine room control room. The research concludes that these behavioural markers can be used as a valid objective assessment framework for the assessment of ocompetence in crisis management of merchant navy engineering officers

Cockpit task management errors : a design issue for intelligent pilot-vehicle interfaces

In conformity with advanced cockpit automation technology, modern pilots have become airborne system managers and have to satisfactorily manage complex sets of tasks to complete a flight mission safely. Funk's (1991) normative cockpit task management (CTM) theory defines CTM functions as the initiation, monitoring, prioritization, allocating of resources to, and termination of multiple and concurrent tasks. Though pilots are equipped with highly sophisticated, automated devices, human error is still cited as the major cause in 60 to 90 percent of past air incidents and accidents. Among the different types of human errors in this setting, this study identified and classified the CTM errors appearing in past air incidents and accidents using the following methods: 1) study of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) air accident reports, 2) study of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incident reports, and (3) experiments using a generic two-engine, low-to-moderate-fidelity 3-D flight simulator. The study of NTSB air accident reports indicated that CTM errors were present in 25 percent of 300 reviewed accidents, and errors in the CTM task initiation category constituted the largest relative portion (37%). In the 144 ASRS incident reports extracted from a special request (ASRS, 1991), and from studies by Monan (1979) and Porter (1981), 15 percent revealed prominent CTM errors, and the largest portion of errors fell into the CTM task monitoring category (45%) . Laboratory experimentation based on simulation indicated that resource requirement of task context was the most significant factor that influenced subjects' CTM performance for the following two dependent variables: time to initiate a task and task prioritization score. A qualitative pattern analysis of the subjects' performances revealed that subjects performed salient tasks first in a serial manner. Based upon these three error studies, design guidelines for a Pilot-Vehicle Interface with consideration of CTM functions were provided

Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT and E) Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems

A team directed by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) collected methodologies for how best to develop safe and reliable human rated systems and how to identify the drivers that provide the basis for assessing safety and reliability. The team also identified techniques, methodologies, and best practices to assure that NASA can develop safe and reliable human rated systems. The results are drawn from a wide variety of resources, from experts involved with the space program since its inception to the best-practices espoused in contemporary engineering doctrine. This report focuses on safety and reliability considerations and does not duplicate or update any existing references. Neither does it intend to replace existing standards and policy

Human factors of advanced technology (glass cockpit) transport aircraft

A three-year study of airline crews at two U.S. airlines who were flying an advanced technology aircraft, the Boeing 757 is discussed. The opinions and experiences of these pilots as they view the advanced, automated features of this aircraft, and contrast them with previous models they have flown are discussed. Training for advanced automation; (2) cockpit errors and error reduction; (3) management of cockpit workload; and (4) general attitudes toward cockpit automation are emphasized. The limitations of the air traffic control (ATC) system on the ability to utilize the advanced features of the new aircraft are discussed. In general the pilots are enthusiastic about flying an advanced technology aircraft, but they express mixed feelings about the impact of automation on workload, crew errors, and ability to manage the flight

Accident analysis and hazard analysis for human and organizational factors

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Aeronautics and Astronautics, February 2011."October 2010." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 275-283).Pressures and incentives to operate complex socio-technical aerospace systems in a high-risk state are ever present. Without consideration of the role humans and organizations play in system safety during the development of these systems, accidents will occur. Safe design of the "socio" parts of the sociotechnical system is challenging. Even if the system, including the human and organizational aspects of the system, are designed to be safe for anticipated system needs and operating environments, without consideration of pressures for increased performance and efficiency and shifting system goals, the system will migrate to a high-risk operating regime and safety can be compromised. Accident analysis is conducted to discover the reasons why an accident occurred and to prevent future accidents. Safety professionals have attributed 70-80% of aviation accidents to human error. Investigators have long known that the human and organizational aspects of systems are key contributors to accidents, yet they lack a rigorous approach for analyzing their impacts. Many safety engineers strive for blame-free reports that will foster reflection and learning from the accident, but struggle with methods that require direct technical causality, do not consider systemic factors, and seem to leave individuals looking culpable. An accident analysis method is needed that will guide the work, aid in the analysis of the role of human and organizations in accidents and promote blame-free accounting of accidents that will support learning from the events. Current hazard analysis methods, adapted from traditional accident models, are not able to evaluate the potential for risk migration, or comprehensively identify accident scenarios involving humans and organizations. Thus, system engineers are not able to design systems that prevent loss events related to human error or organizational factors. State of the art methods for human and organization hazard analysis are, at best, elaborate event-based classification schemes for potential errors. Current human and organization hazard analysis methods are not suitable for use as part of the system engineering process. Systems must be analyzed with methods that identify all human and organization related hazards during the design process, so that this information can be used to change the design so that human error and organization errors do not occur. Errors must be more than classified and categorized, errors must be prevented in design. A new type of hazard analysis method that identifies hazardous scenarios involving humans and organizations is needed for both systems in conception and those already in the field. This thesis contains novel new approaches to accident analysis and hazard analysis. Both methods are based on principles found in the Human Factors, Organizational Safety and System Safety literature. It is hoped that the accident analysis method should aid engineers in understanding how human actions and decisions are connected to the accident and aid in the development of blame-free reports that encourage learning from accidents. The goal for the hazard analysis method is that it will be useful in: 1) designing systems to be safe; 2) diagnosing policies or pressures and identifying design flaws that contribute to high-risk operations; 3) identifying designs that are resistant to pressures that increase risk; and 4) allowing system decision-makers to predict how proposed or current policies will affect safety. To assess the accident analysis method, a comparison with state of the art methods is conducted. To demonstrate the feasibility of the method applied to hazard analysis; it is applied to several systems in various domains.by Margaret V. Stringfellow.Ph.D

Aeronautical Engineering: A continuing bibliography with indexes, supplement 137, July 1981

This bibliography lists 483 reports, articles, and other documents introduced into the NASA scientific and technical information system in June 1981