Governmental Positions on European Treaty Reforms: Towards a Dynamic Approach.

Governmental positions are a powerful predictor of European treaty reforms. Yet, few empirical studies analyze the conditionalies between positions over different issues or conflict dimensions. If governmental positions are conditional upon the real or expected outcome on other issues, the sequence of decisions becomes increasingly important for our understanding of European treaty reforms. So far, not many studies analyze the sequence of intergovernmental decisions. In the present paper, I argue that governmental preferences over the reform of the EU decision rule dependent on the delegation of competences to the EU and vice versa. Moreover, I present a statistical model which allows for estimating this conditionality. Subsequently, I apply this model to an extensive data set of reform positions revealed by national governments at the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) 2003/4. Next, I analyze the sequence of decision taken by this particular IGC in chronological order. For this purpose, I predict the change of governmental position in response to the decisions over subsets of issues and I compare these predictions to public statements issued by governmental leaders at the time. Finally, I discuss the implications for our understanding of the intergovernmental bargaining outcome

The European Commission – Appointment, Preferences, and Institutional Relations

The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate the policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules still prevent the Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is predicted a priori that Commission policies are on average more in accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament than that of the Council. This prediction is confirmed for a data set covering 66 dossiers with 162 controversial EU legislative proposals passed between 1999 and 2002.European Commission, investiture procedure, voting rules, Council of Ministers, European Parliament

The European Parliament : leadership and 'followership'

The weakened European Commission and the increasingly assertive European Council and Council of Ministers have contended for control of agenda-setting but it is in the sphere of foreign and security policy that the EU's logic of leaderlessness has been most conspicuous

The External Dimension of EU Citizenship: Arguing for Effective Protection of Citizens Abroad. CEPS Policy Brief No. 136, 3 July 2007

[From the Introduction]. This Policy Brief is the edited and extended version of CEPS’ contribution to the Commission’s Green Paper consultation. While acknowledging that the Green Paper addresses a wide range of issues, this document focuses mainly on the following themes: 1) the material scope of Art. 20 TEC, 2) its legal character as regards individual entitlement and 3) its enforceability and justiciability. The last sections deal with the questions of harmonisation as well as a possible involvement of Commission delegations in the exercise of consular assistance and diplomatic protection

On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union

We study indirect democracy in which countries, states, or districts each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf. We show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each district's vote and then sticking with the status quo unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast for change. We analyze how the weights relate to the population size of a country and the correlation structure of agents' preferences, and then we compare the voting weights in the Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed Constitution

The Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing the Institutional Innovations. CEPS Special Reports, November 2007

After a long period of internal introspection and deadlock over the Constitutional Treaty, the EU can now see some light at the end of the tunnel. If successfully ratified, the new European Treaty agreed by the Head of States and Government in Lisbon may provide the appropriate institutional tools for the EU to function with 27 member states. However, the success of institutional innovations depends not only on legal provisions, but also on the way in which the provisions are implemented. Indeed, even a cursory examination indicates that the implementation of the new proposals is unlikely to be easy, and in some cases could be a source of serious difficulties in the future. In the absence of serious analysis aimed at this latter question, three Brussels-based think-tanks have joined forces in a collaborative effort to fill this gap. Our aim is to highlight potential problems and, where possible, to suggest ways to avoid or attenuate their negative effects. The analysis has focused on seven main institutional and policy domains: the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Presidency of the Council, the qualified majority voting in the Council, the role of national Parliaments, enhanced cooperation and foreign policy. These issues have been intensively debated in working groups composed of researchers, external experts, and practitioners in the field. This report reflects the substance of that collective effort

"The Myths of Turkish Influence in the European Union". University of Illinois EUC Working Paper Volume 6, No. 2, 2006

Among the many objections to Turkish membership in the European Union lie claims that Turkey will be a powerful actor in the future EU, with a population as large as or larger than Germany. Many also claim that this power will have negative effects on the EU. We examine such claims analytically, influenced strongly by spatial models of EU policy-making. We find that Turkey's preferences lie sufficiently outside the EU mainstream so that it will have little influence in day-to-day policy-making under the assent, codecision, consultation, and cooperation procedures (or the common procedure in the rejected constitutional treaty). Its influence may be more evident in areas such as the CFSP or JHA, where unanimity remains the normal procedure. Still, Turkey's veto power here is no different from that of other, much smaller countries. Furthermore, veto power can only block changes and cannot be used to pull the EU into undesirable new directions. Even this veto power can be avoided if the EU-25 establishes whatever policies they desire prior to Turkish membership, forcing Turkey to accept a fait accompli. Despite these limitations to its power, Turkey may have some influence in purely intergovernmental settings such as negotiations over new treaties that might occur some decades hence

Social Citizenship and Institution Building: EU-Enlargement and the Restructuring of Welfare States in East Central Europe, CES Germany & Europe Working Paper no. 01.2, April 2001

With the EU-enlargement process well underway, this paper focuses on social citizenship as a conceptual frame for analyzing the restructuring of social institutions in applicant countries in East Central Europe. So far, comparative welfare state analysis has concentrated mainly on the developed economies of the OECD-countries; there is little systematic analytical work on the transitions in post-communist Europe. Theoretically, this paper builds on comparative welfare state analysis as well as on new institutionalism. The initial hypothesis is built on the assumption that emerging patterns of social support and social security diverge from the typology described in the comparative welfare state literature inasmuch as the transformation of postcommunist societies is distinctly different from the building of welfare states in Europe. The paper argues that institutionbuilding is shaped by and embedded in the process of European integration and part of governance in the EU. Anticipating full membership in the European Union, the applicant countries have to adapt to the rules and regulations of the EU, including the "social acquis." Therefore, framing becomes an important feature of institutional changes. The paper seeks to identify distinct patterns and problems of the institutionalization of social citizenship

European Identity in International Society — A Constructivist Analysis of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

In public discourse, the drawing up of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was frequently linked to the hope that this project contributes to forging a European identity. This paper's argument starts form the tension inherent in this idea: On the one hand, identity-building implies the visualisation of what is specific for the European Community and its members. On the other hand, human rights are anchored in supposedly universal rules and global regimes, constituting the "international society" belonging to which is a crucial feature of the Union's identity as an actor. paper develops two-dimensional model European and differentiates two types human rights discourse capture this tension. It then provides detailed empirical analysis debate in around Convention drew up EU Charter. demonstrates that while dimension was not at centre Charter project beginning, globally-oriented discourse, stresses Europe commitments responsibilities, gained prominence during significantly shaped discursive space for defining fundamental polity.constitution building; European identity; fundamental/human rights; international agreements; asylum policy; social policy