An Intuitionistic Formula Hierarchy Based on High-School Identities

We revisit the notion of intuitionistic equivalence and formal proof representations by adopting the view of formulas as exponential polynomials. After observing that most of the invertible proof rules of intuitionistic (minimal) propositional sequent calculi are formula (i.e. sequent) isomorphisms corresponding to the high-school identities, we show that one can obtain a more compact variant of a proof system, consisting of non-invertible proof rules only, and where the invertible proof rules have been replaced by a formula normalisation procedure. Moreover, for certain proof systems such as the G4ip sequent calculus of Vorob'ev, Hudelmaier, and Dyckhoff, it is even possible to see all of the non-invertible proof rules as strict inequalities between exponential polynomials; a careful combinatorial treatment is given in order to establish this fact. Finally, we extend the exponential polynomial analogy to the first-order quantifiers, showing that it gives rise to an intuitionistic hierarchy of formulas, resembling the classical arithmetical hierarchy, and the first one that classifies formulas while preserving isomorphism

On Affine Logic and {\L}ukasiewicz Logic

The multi-valued logic of {\L}ukasiewicz is a substructural logic that has been widely studied and has many interesting properties. It is classical, in the sense that it admits the axiom schema of double negation, [DNE]. However, our understanding of {\L}ukasiewicz logic can be improved by separating its classical and intuitionistic aspects. The intuitionistic aspect of {\L}ukasiewicz logic is captured in an axiom schema, [CWC], which asserts the commutativity of a weak form of conjunction. This is equivalent to a very restricted form of contraction. We show how {\L}ukasiewicz Logic can be viewed both as an extension of classical affine logic with [CWC], or as an extension of what we call \emph{intuitionistic} {\L}ukasiewicz logic with [DNE], intuitionistic {\L}ukasiewicz logic being the extension of intuitionistic affine logic by the schema [CWC]. At first glance, intuitionistic affine logic seems very weak, but, in fact, [CWC] is surprisingly powerful, implying results such as intuitionistic analogues of De Morgan's laws. However the proofs can be very intricate. We present these results using derived connectives to clarify and motivate the proofs and give several applications. We give an analysis of the applicability to these logics of the well-known methods that use negation to translate classical logic into intuitionistic logic. The usual proofs of correctness for these translations make much use of contraction. Nonetheless, we show that all the usual negative translations are already correct for intuitionistic {\L}ukasiewicz logic, where only the limited amount of contraction given by [CWC] is allowed. This is in contrast with affine logic for which we show, by appeal to results on semantics proved in a companion paper, that both the Gentzen and the Glivenko translations fail.Comment: 28 page

Five Observations Concerning the Intended Meaning of the Intuitionistic Logical Constants

This paper contains five observations concerning the intended meaning of the intuitionistic logical constants: (1) if the explanations of this meaning are to be based on a non-decidable concept, that concept should not be that of 'proof'; (2) Kreisel's explanations using extra clauses can be significantly simplified; (3) the impredicativity of the definition of → can be easily and safely ameliorated; (4) the definition of → in terms of 'proofs from premises' results in a loss of the inductive character of the definitions of ∨ and ∃; and (5) the same occurs with the definition of ∀ in terms of 'proofs with free variables

Logic of Intuitionistic Interactive Proofs (Formal Theory of Perfect Knowledge Transfer)

We produce a decidable super-intuitionistic normal modal logic of internalised intuitionistic (and thus disjunctive and monotonic) interactive proofs (LIiP) from an existing classical counterpart of classical monotonic non-disjunctive interactive proofs (LiP). Intuitionistic interactive proofs effect a durable epistemic impact in the possibly adversarial communication medium CM (which is imagined as a distinguished agent), and only in that, that consists in the permanent induction of the perfect and thus disjunctive knowledge of their proof goal by means of CM's knowledge of the proof: If CM knew my proof then CM would persistently and also disjunctively know that my proof goal is true. So intuitionistic interactive proofs effect a lasting transfer of disjunctive propositional knowledge (disjunctively knowable facts) in the communication medium of multi-agent distributed systems via the transmission of certain individual knowledge (knowable intuitionistic proofs). Our (necessarily) CM-centred notion of proof is also a disjunctive explicit refinement of KD45-belief, and yields also such a refinement of standard S5-knowledge. Monotonicity but not communality is a commonality of LiP, LIiP, and their internalised notions of proof. As a side-effect, we offer a short internalised proof of the Disjunction Property of Intuitionistic Logic (originally proved by Goedel).Comment: continuation of arXiv:1201.3667; extended start of Section 1 and 2.1; extended paragraph after Fact 1; dropped the N-rule as primitive and proved it derivable; other, non-intuitionistic family members: arXiv:1208.1842, arXiv:1208.591