When perfectionism becomes willpower

Perfectionism can be healthy: striving for perfection requires the ability to selfregulate, namely willpower. This paper formalizes the intuitive relation between healthy perfectionism and willpower in the presence of temptation. The value of a menu of options for an individual with limited willpower corresponds to the lower bound of the value assigned to the same menu by a perfectionist, when temptation and perfectionism intensities are free to vary. Moreover, the higher the perfectionism strive, the higher the willpower. The relation between overwhelming temptation and the Strotz model is a particular case of the result. When there is uncertainty about temptation, we generalize Dekel and Lipman (2012) providing conditions such that a preference is represented by a random willpower representation, if and only if, it has an equivalent random perfectionism representation

Enhancement of cooperation in highly clustered scale-free networks

We study the effect of clustering on the organization of cooperation, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma on scale-free networks with a tunable value of clustering. We find that a high value of the clustering coefficient produces an overall enhancement of cooperation in the network, even for a very high temptation to defect. On the other hand, high clustering homogeneizes the process of invasion of degree classes by defectors, decreasing the chances of survival of low densities of cooperator strategists in the network.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figure

Outcomes and expectations in dilemmas of trust

Rational trust decisions depend on potential outcomes and expectations of reciprocity. In the trust game, outcomes and expectations correspond to the structural factors of risk and temptation. Two experiments investigated how risk and temptation influenced information search and final decisions in the trust game. The central finding was that trustors underemphasized temptation relative to its effects on the expected value of trust. Instead, trustors made decisions egocentrically, focusing on potential outcomes. In Experiment 1, information search data revealed that trustors often made decisions without learning about the payoffs related to temptation. Experiment 2 investigated whether trustors were able to use temptation to form accurate expectations of reciprocity. Trustors understood, but underestimated, the relationship between temptation and the probability of reciprocity. Moreover, they did not fully consider expectations in their final trust decisions. Changes in potential outcomes had larger effects on trust than comparable changes in expectations. These results suggest that levels of trust are too high when the probability of reciprocity is low and too low when that probability is high

What Happens When You Let the Hunger Games Loose? An Evaluation of Temptation Bundling as a Behavior Change for Good Strategy in the StepUp Program

Temptation bundling, an intervention involving the coupling of instantly gratifying activities with activities that provide long-term benefits but require some exertion of willpower, is a novel behavior change strategy. To date, despite the short and long-term benefits of such an approach, only one study has evaluated its efficacy in the field. This work found that restricting participants’ listening of tempting audiobooks to the gym improved participants’ gym visitation rates. In a subsequent forthcoming mega-study, receipt of a free audiobook, even when participants received no explicit instruction on temptation bundling as a behavior change strategy, again drove improvements in participants’ gym visits. These mega-study results raise an important question regarding whether temptation bundle can be intuited and applied as a motivational strategy even without explicit instruction. Two online surveys were conducted in which participants reviewed content identical to that of the mega-study sign-up and assessed the audiobook’s motivational value (Study 1) and intended use (Study 2). Findings indicate the strategy of temptation bundling can both be deduced from the mere receipt of a free audiobook (Study 2), and viewed as a valuable motivator of gym attendance (Study 1). Both studies support the value of temptation bundling as a behavior change technique, and offer suggestive evidence of its use as a potentially scalable, low-cost intervention to promote behavior change for good

In Defense of the Land Residual Theory and the Absence of a Business Value Component for Retail Property

The temptation is strong for arguing that property values can be broken down into land, improvements, and business value, as only land and improvements are subject to property tax. As sympathetic as the authors are to this motivation, the notion of a long-run business value component for retail property is refuted and the land residual value theory reasserted, while at the same time admitting the possibility of first owner entrepreneurial or development-based value creation. It is argued that any excess property productivity will eventually become attached to the land, and last that option values are an important aspect of land values that would be affected when suggesting that the appropriate value of a given property is the cost of substituting adjacent property.

Does interactivity require multimedia? The case of SAKI

SAKI is a self‐adaptive touch‐typing tutor with a pedigree dating back to the mid‐1950s. Even in its most recent form it eschews the temptation to present itself with the trimmings now commonly associated with microcomputer products. This paper argues that while the absence of such features may be a limiting factor in the commercial success of the program, SAKI is nevertheless a prime example of the way in which a computer can successfully react to and interact with a user, and indeed one which would actually lose educational value if it were to undergo an interface‐lift

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice

A simplified prisoner's game is studied on a square lattice when the players interacting with their neighbors can follow only two strategies: to cooperate (C) or to defect (D) unconditionally. The players updated in a random sequence have a chance to adopt one of the neighboring strategies with a probability depending on the payoff difference. Using Monte Carlo simulations and dynamical cluster techniques we study the density $c$ of cooperators in the stationary state. This system exhibits a continuous transition between the two absorbing state when varying the value of temptation to defect. In the limits $c \to 0$ and 1 we have observed critical transitions belonging to the universality class of directed percolation.Comment: 6 pages including 6 figure

Promotion of cooperation induced by nonlinear attractive effect in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma game

We introduce nonlinear attractive effects into a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma game where the players located on a square lattice can either cooperate with their nearest neighbors or defect. In every generation, each player updates its strategy by firstly choosing one of the neighbors with a probability proportional to $\mathcal{A}^\alpha$ denoting the attractiveness of the neighbor, where $\mathcal{A}$ is the payoff collected by it and $\alpha$ ($\geq$0) is a free parameter characterizing the extent of the nonlinear effect; and then adopting its strategy with a probability dependent on their payoff difference. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we investigate the density $\rho_C$ of cooperators in the stationary state for different values of $\alpha$. It is shown that the introduction of such attractive effect remarkably promotes the emergence and persistence of cooperation over a wide range of the temptation to defect. In particular, for large values of $\alpha$, i.e., strong nonlinear attractive effects, the system exhibits two absorbing states (all cooperators or all defectors) separated by an active state (coexistence of cooperators and defectors) when varying the temptation to defect. In the critical region where $\rho_C$ goes to zero, the extinction behavior is power law-like $\rho_C$ $\sim$ $(b_c-b)^{\beta}$, where the exponent $\beta$ accords approximatively with the critical exponent ($\beta\approx0.584$) of the two-dimensional directed percolation and depends weakly on the value of $\alpha$.Comment: 7 pages, 4 figure

The Taming of Desire: Unspecific Postponement Reduces Desire for and Consumption of Postponed Temptations

The present investigation began with the conjecture that people may do better by saying “some other time” instead of “no, not ever” in response to temptations. Drawing from learning theories, we hypothesized that people interpret unspecific postponement (“I can have it some other time”) as a signal that they do not strongly value the postponed temptation. In this way, unspecific postponement may reduce desire for and consumption of postponed temptations, both in the present moment and over time. Four experiments tested those hypotheses. A multi-phase study using the free-choice paradigm supported the learning account for the effects of postponement: unspecific postponement reduced immediate desire for a self-selected temptation which in turn statistically accounted for diminished consumption during the week following the manipulation – but only when postponement was induced, not when it was imposed (Experiment 1). Supporting the hypothesis that unspecific but not specific postponement connotes weak valuation, only unspecific postponement reduced attention to (Experiment 2) and consumption of (Experiment 3) the postponed temptation. Additionally, unspecific postponement delayed consumption primarily among those who were highly motivated to forgo consumption of the temptation (Experiment 3). A final multi-phase experiment compared the effectiveness of unspecific postponement to the classic self-control mechanism of restraint, finding that unspecific postponement (vs. restraint) reduced consumption of the temptation in the heat of the moment and across one week post-manipulation (Experiment 4). The current research provides novel insight into self-control facilitation, the modification of desire, and the differential effects of unspecific and specific intentions for reducing unwanted behavior