The Role of Power and Negotiation in Online Deception

The purpose of this paper is to advance theoretical understanding of the important role of both power and negotiation during online deception. By so doing, the paper provides insight into the relationship between perpetrator and victim in Internet fraud. The growing prevalence of Internet Fraud continues to be a burden to both society and individuals. In an attempt to better understand Internet fraud and online deception, this article attempts to build an interactive model, based upon the dimensions of power and negotiation from the management and psychology literature. Using the model presented, the article examines the effects of the Internet on the communication process that takes place between perpetrator and victim. Finally, the article discusses some of the major tactics employed to appeal to each power type in predominant fraud forms, as well exploring future types of fraud

Online Dispute Resolution Through the Lens of Bargaining and Negotiation Theory: Toward an Integrated Model

[Excerpt] In this article we apply negotiation and bargaining theory to the analysis of online dispute resolution. Our principal objective is to develop testable hypotheses based on negotiation theory that can be used in ODR research. We have not conducted the research necessary to test the hypotheses we develop; however, in a later section of the article we suggest a possible methodology for doing so. There is a vast literature on negotiation and bargaining theory. For the purposes of this article, we realized at the outset that we could only use a small part of that literature in developing a model that might be suitable for empirical testing. We decided to use the behavioral theory of negotiation developed by Richard Walton and Robert McKersie, which was initially formulated in the 1960s. This theory has stood the test of time. Initially developed to explain union-management negotiations, it has proven useful in analyzing a wide variety of disputes and conflict situations. In constructing their theory, Walton and McKersie built on the contributions and work of many previous bargaining theorists including economists, sociologists, game theorists, and industrial relations scholars. In this article, we have incorporated a consideration of the foundations on which their theory was based. In the concluding section of the article we discuss briefly how other negotiation and bargaining theories might be applied to the analysis of ODR

Exploring mischief and mayhem in social computing or: how we learned to stop worrying and love the trolls

In this paper, we explore the role of mischief as borderline socially acceptable behaviour within social computing applications. Mischievous activity pushes the boundaries of the implicit social contract present in all online social systems, and, we argue, is of vital importance understanding online social interactions. Using examples from games and other applications, we explore mischief as an act of appropriation, which reinterprets mechanics defined by developers in unexpected and sometimes upsetting ways. Although frequently interpreted as negative and anti-social behaviour, we argue that mischief serves a vital social role, and find surprising richness in the chaos

No Grice: Computers that Lie, Deceive and Conceal

In the future our daily life interactions with other people, with computers, robots and smart environments will be recorded and interpreted by computers or embedded intelligence in environments, furniture, robots, displays, and wearables. These sensors record our activities, our behavior, and our interactions. Fusion of such information and reasoning about such information makes it possible, using computational models of human behavior and activities, to provide context- and person-aware interpretations of human behavior and activities, including determination of attitudes, moods, and emotions. Sensors include cameras, microphones, eye trackers, position and proximity sensors, tactile or smell sensors, et cetera. Sensors can be embedded in an environment, but they can also move around, for example, if they are part of a mobile social robot or if they are part of devices we carry around or are embedded in our clothes or body. \ud \ud Our daily life behavior and daily life interactions are recorded and interpreted. How can we use such environments and how can such environments use us? Do we always want to cooperate with these environments; do these environments always want to cooperate with us? In this paper we argue that there are many reasons that users or rather human partners of these environments do want to keep information about their intentions and their emotions hidden from these smart environments. On the other hand, their artificial interaction partner may have similar reasons to not give away all information they have or to treat their human partner as an opponent rather than someone that has to be supported by smart technology.\ud \ud This will be elaborated in this paper. We will survey examples of human-computer interactions where there is not necessarily a goal to be explicit about intentions and feelings. In subsequent sections we will look at (1) the computer as a conversational partner, (2) the computer as a butler or diary companion, (3) the computer as a teacher or a trainer, acting in a virtual training environment (a serious game), (4) sports applications (that are not necessarily different from serious game or education environments), and games and entertainment applications

Cyberpsychology and Human Factors

The online environment has become a significant focus of the everyday behaviour and activities of individuals and organisations in contemporary society. The increasing mediation of communication has led to concerns about the potential risks and associated negative experiences which can occur to users, particularly children and young people. This is related to the emergence of the online environment as a location for criminal and abusive behaviour (e.g., harassment, sexual exploitation, fraud, hacking, malware). One of the key aspects of understanding online victimisation and engagement in criminal behaviours is the characteristics of online communication that are related to the affordances of the technologies, services and applications which constitute digital environments. The aim of this paper is to examine the influence of these characteristics on individual and group behaviour, as well as the associated opportunities for victimisation and criminal behaviour. These issues are of relevance for those involved in the design and implementation of technologies and services, as the ability to assess their potential use in this way can enhance strategies for improving the security of systems and users. It can also inform educational strategies for increasing user understanding of potential informational, privacy and personal risks, and associated steps to improve their security and privacy. Each of the main characteristics of mediated communication is examined, as well as their potential impact on individual and group behaviour, and associated opportunities for victimisation and offending. The article ends by considering the importance of recognising these issues when designing and implementing new technologies, services and applications

Another negotiator\u27s dilemma: Negotiating against a counterpart with a bad reputation

Since the publication of Albert Carr’s controversial article from 1968, “Is Business Bluffing Ethical?” there has been a flurry of interest, both from researchers and practitioners, into the use of deception in negotiation. Far from being a hypothetical question, the use of deception in negotiation has been shown to be a common negotiation tactic. Aquino and Becker (2005) suggest that deception occurs in 55% of negotiations. Deception has been used in negotiation contexts as wide-ranging as supply chain management, contracts, use car sales, mergers and acquisitions, and trade agreements between sovereign nations. Scholarly research has thus far established two streams of research to explain when deception is likely to occur. The first line of inquiry claims that negotiator characteristics are the proximal cause of unethical behavior, such as deception. Such authors point to personality characteristics, tendencies, and traits that are unique to the individuals who use deception. This group of scholars point to evidence that certain individuals, regardless of the situation, rely on deception to achieve their goals. A second line of research has emerged that claims that the predominant factor is the negotiation situation. Thus, departing from an individual characteristics angle, these authors have argued that certain negotiations, such as when the stakes are high or when one negotiator is far more powerful than the other, present dynamics in which deception is more likely to take place. When considered together, these two research streams give a rich account of deception in negotiation. However, in this series of three essays, I argue that a third, equally valid perspective ought to be explored: the role of a counterpart’s reputation. I explain that the characteristics of one’s negotiation counterpart could be important factors in explaining why someone might resort to deception. I argue that the most relevant characteristic is that of a negative or bad reputation. To make these theoretical contributions, I draw on equity theory and prisoner’s dilemma. I argue that a negative reputation will lead a negotiator to believe that his or her counterpart might act in a deceptive manner and that to restore this inequity, the negotiator might be more likely to use deception. Further, I argue for important mediators and moderators in this process. The first essay is a theoretical exploration of the relationship between a counterpart’s reputation, the use of deception and negotiation outcomes. I look at the role that deception plays in negotiation and how the threat of a counterpart’s use of deception might impact how a negotiator thinks of deception. In this paper, I develop propositions that will be tested empirically in the second and third essay. One of the main contributions of the theoretical piece is the movement away from the two current theories that belie the current deception literature, negotiator characteristics and negotiation situation. In this essay, I draw on equity theory to suggest that the drive to make a negotiation equitable might best explain the phenomena. Further, I lay the theoretical foundation for propositions that recommend that deception might lead to positive distributive outcomes but negative integrative outcomes. The second essay looks specifically at a model that tests the relationship between counterpart reputation and the use of deception. In this essay, I develop a moderated mediation model, in which counterpart reputation leads to the assessment of unfairness and that this assessment leads to the use of deception. In my model, the relationship between counterpart reputation and negotiator use of deception is moderated by prosocial motivation, negotiation self-efficacy, Machiavellianism, and Schwartz values. I report two different studies to test this model. The third essay hones in on the relationship between principal use of deception and negotiation outcomes. I use leakage theory, which suggests that some who use deception inadvertently “leak” clues to the fact that they are acting deceptively, as a basis to look at the relationship between the constructs. I argue that political skill and emotional intelligence are key moderators of this process. I use a negotiation experiment to test this model. This three-essay dissertation achieves the goal of exploring a very important aspect of deception in negotiation. As it stands, this gap in the literature presents a picture of deception that is potentially missing an entire branch of causality: the role of the counterpart in a negotiator’s use of deception. This project will hopefully spur new research and interest into understanding, more broadly, how a counterpart impacts ethical or unethical decision making in negotiation. For practitioners, these studies might be able to illustrate that the use of deception is not only about the one who deceives. Rather, a negotiator must also understand how other people might illicit behavior from the negotiator, both behaviors that are honest and deceptive. In addition, the practitioner might be in a better position to understand how his or her own reputation might impact a counterpart’s use of deception

The Paradox of Deception: Lawyers, Negotiation, and an Appeal for Regulation

The use of deception in negotiations has spurred much debate in the legal ethics arena. Ethics are concerned with upholding principles of honesty, fairness and good faith. A lawyer’s use of deceptive negotiation tactics would therefore seem to violate the principles of legal ethics. However, certain deceptive tactics in legal negotiations are viewed as not only acceptable, but even expected as part of the negotiation process. This presents a paradox: how can a lawyer act deceptively but also ethically? This paper explores the degree of deception in negotiations that legal professionals are willing to permit on both an ethical and strategic basis. This paper draws on the rules of legal ethics from different jurisdictions as well as the literature on lying and negotiation, to help demonstrate why reform is needed. Reform of the law society rules would not only to improve the public perception of the legal profession, but better serve individuals who rely on negotiation as a primary means of access to justice