1,552 research outputs found
Against Preservation
Bradley offers a quick and convincing argument that no Boolean semantic theory for conditionals can validate a very natural principle concerning the relationship between credences and conditionals. We argue that Bradleyâs principle, Preservation, is, in fact, invalid; its appeal arises from the validity of a nearby, but distinct, principle, which we call Local Preservation, and which Boolean semantic theories can non-trivially validate
Conditionals, Individual Variation, and the Scorekeeping Task
In this manuscript we study individual variation in the
interpretation of conditionals by establishing individual
profiles of the participants based on their behavioral responses
and reflective attitudes. To investigate the participantsâ
reflective attitudes we introduce a new experimental paradigm
called the Scorekeeping Task, and a Bayesian mixture model
tailored to analyze the data. The goal is thereby to identify the
participants who follow the Suppositional Theory of conditionals
and Inferentialism and to investigate their performance
on the uncertain and-to-if inference task
A Probabilistic Defense of Proper De Jure Objections to Theism
A common view among nontheists combines the de jure objection that theism is epistemically unacceptable with agnosticism about the de facto objection that theism is false. Following Plantinga, we can call this a âproperâ de jure objectionâa de jure objection that does not depend on any de facto objection. In his Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga has produced a general argument against all proper de jure objections. Here I first show that this argument is logically fallacious (it makes subtle probabilistic fallacies disguised by scope ambiguities), and proceed to lay the groundwork for the construction of actual proper de jure objections
Disjunctive antecedent conditionals
Disjunctive antecedent conditionals âconditionals of the form if A or B, Câsometimes seem to entail both of their simplifications and sometimes seem not to. I argue that this behavior reveals a genuine ambiguity in DACs. Along the way, I discuss a new observation about the role of focal stress in distinguishing the two interpretations of DACs. I propose a new theory, according to which the surface form of a DAC underdetermines its logical form: on one possible logical form, if A or B, C does entail both of its simplifications, while on the other, it does not
If P, Then P!
The Identity principle says that conditionals with the form 'If p, then p' are logical truths. Identity is overwhelmingly plausible, and has rarely been explicitly challenged. But a wide range of conditionals nonetheless invalidate it. I explain the problem, and argue that the culprit is the principle known as Import-Export, which we must thus reject. I then explore how we can reject Import-Export in a way that still makes sense of the intuitions that support it, arguing that the differences between indicative and subjunctive conditionals play a key role in solving this puzzle
ImportâExport and âAndâ
Import-Export says that a conditional 'If p, if q, r' is always equivalent to the conditional 'If p and q, r'. I argue that Import-Export does not sit well with a classical approach to conjunction: given some plausible and widely accepted principles about conditionals, Import-Export together with classical conjunction leads to absurd consequences. My main goal is to draw out these surprising connections. In concluding I argue that the right response is to reject Import-Export and adopt instead a limited version which better fits natural language data; accounts for all the intuitions that motivate Import-Export in the first place; and fits better with a classical conjunction
The Big Four - Their Interdependence and Limitations
Four intuitions are recurrent and influential in theories about conditionals: the Ramseyâs test, the Adamsâ Thesis, the Equation, and the robustness requirement. For simplicityâs sake, I call these intuitions âthe big fourâ. My aim is to show that: (1) the big four are interdependent; (2) they express our inferential dispositions to employ a conditional on a modus ponens; (3) the disposition to employ conditionals on a modus ponens doesnât have the epistemic significance that is usually attributed to it, since the acceptability or truth conditions of a conditional is not necessarily associated with its employability on a modus ponens
Indicative Conditionals Without Iterative Epistemology
This paper argues that two widely accepted principles about the indicative conditional jointly presuppose the falsity of one of the most prominent arguments against epistemological iteration principles. The first principle about the indicative conditional, which has close ties both to the Ramsey test and the âor-to-ifâ inference, says that knowing a material conditional suffices for knowing the corresponding indicative. The second principle says that conditional contradictions cannot be true when their antecedents are epistemically possible. Taken together, these principles entail that it is impossible to be in a certain kind of epistemic state: namely, a state of ignorance about which of two partially overlapping bodies of knowledge corresponds to oneâs actual one. However, some of the more popular âmargin for errorâ style arguments against epistemological iteration principles suggest that such states are not only possible, but commonplace. I argue that the tension between these views runs deep, arising just as much for non-factive attitudes like belief, presupposition, and certainty. I also argue that this is worse news for those who accept the principles about the indicative conditional than it is for those who reject epistemological iteration principles
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