Selfish Routing on Dynamic Flows

Selfish routing on dynamic flows over time is used to model scenarios that vary with time in which individual agents act in their best interest. In this paper we provide a survey of a particular dynamic model, the deterministic queuing model, and discuss how the model can be adjusted and applied to different real-life scenarios. We then examine how these adjustments affect the computability, optimality, and existence of selfish routings.Comment: Oberlin College Computer Science Honors Thesis. Supervisor: Alexa Sharp, Oberlin Colleg

The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing is Two

We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that the price of anarchy is at most two, when the network is a ring and the link latencies are linear. Our bound is tight. This is the first sharp bound for the maximum latency objective.Comment: Full version of WINE 2012 paper, 24 page

Price and Capacity Competition

We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria in a model where firms compete over capacities and prices. The motivating example is a communication network where service providers invest in capacities and then compete in prices. Our model economy corresponds to a two-stage game. First, firms (service providers) independently choose their capacity levels. Second, after the capacity levels are observed, they set prices. Given the capacities and prices, users (consumers) allocate their demands across the firms. We first establish the existence of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria (oligopoly equilibria) and characterize the set of equilibria. These equilibria feature pure strategies along the equilibrium path, but off-the-equilibrium path they are supported by mixed strategies. We then investigate the efficiency properties of these equilibria, where "efficiency" is defined as the ratio of surplus in equilibrium relative to the first best. We show that efficiency in the worst oligopoly equilibria of this game can be arbitrarily low. However, if the best oligopoly equilibrium is selected (among multiple equilibria), the worst-case efficiency loss has a tight bound, approximately equal to 5/6 with 2 firms. This bound monotonically decreases towards zero when the number of firms increases. We also suggest a simple way of implementing the best oligopoly equilibrium. With two firms, this involves the lower-cost firm acting as a Stackelberg leader and choosing its capacity first. We show that in this Stackelberg game form, there exists a unique equilibrium corresponding to the best oligopoly equilibrium. We also show that an alternative game form where capacities and prices are chosen simultaneously always fails to have a pure strategy equilibrium. These results suggest that the timing of capacity and price choices in oligopolistic environments is important both for the existence of equilibrium and for the extent of efficiency losses in equilibrium.

Boltzmann meets Nash: Energy-efficient routing in optical networks under uncertainty

Motivated by the massive deployment of power-hungry data centers for service provisioning, we examine the problem of routing in optical networks with the aim of minimizing traffic-driven power consumption. To tackle this issue, routing must take into account energy efficiency as well as capacity considerations; moreover, in rapidly-varying network environments, this must be accomplished in a real-time, distributed manner that remains robust in the presence of random disturbances and noise. In view of this, we derive a pricing scheme whose Nash equilibria coincide with the network's socially optimum states, and we propose a distributed learning method based on the Boltzmann distribution of statistical mechanics. Using tools from stochastic calculus, we show that the resulting Boltzmann routing scheme exhibits remarkable convergence properties under uncertainty: specifically, the long-term average of the network's power consumption converges within $\varepsilon$ of its minimum value in time which is at most $\tilde O(1/\varepsilon^2)$, irrespective of the fluctuations' magnitude; additionally, if the network admits a strict, non-mixing optimum state, the algorithm converges to it - again, no matter the noise level. Our analysis is supplemented by extensive numerical simulations which show that Boltzmann routing can lead to a significant decrease in power consumption over basic, shortest-path routing schemes in realistic network conditions.Comment: 24 pages, 4 figure

Mean-Field Stochastic Differential Game for Fine Alignment Control of Cooperative Optical Beam Systems

The deployment of autonomous optical link communication platforms that benefit from mobility and optical data rates is essential in public safety communications. However, maintaining an accurate line-of-sight and perfect tracking between mobile platforms or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in free-space remains challenging for cooperative optical communication due to the underlying mechanical vibration and accidental shocks. Indeed, a misalignment can result in optical channel disconnection, leading to connectivity loss. To address this challenge, we propose a two-way optical link that coordinates mobile UAVs' closed-loop fine beam tracking operation in a swarm architecture to enhance terrestrial public safety communication systems. We study a dynamic of the optical beam tracking games in which each agent's dynamic and cost function are coupled with the other optical beam transceiver agents' states via a mean-field term. We describe a line-of-sight stochastic cooperative beam tracking communication through a mean field game paradigm that can provide reliable network structure and persistent distributed connectivity and communicability. We derive two optimal mean-field beam tracking control frameworks through decentralized and centralized strategies. The solutions of these strategies are derived from forward-backward ordinary differential equations and rely on the linearity Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Fokker-Planck (HJB-FP) equations and stochastic maximum principle. Furthermore, we numerically compute the solution pair to the two joint equations using Newton and fixed point iterations methods to verify the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium that drives the control to a Nash equilibrium for both differential games

Equilibrium of Heterogeneous Congestion Control: Optimality and Stability

When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the same network, the current theory based on utility maximization fails to predict the network behavior. The pricing signals can be different types of signals such as packet loss, queueing delay, etc, or different values of the same type of signal such as different ECN marking values based on the same actual link congestion level. Unlike in a homogeneous network, the bandwidth allocation now depends on router parameters and flow arrival patterns. It can be non-unique, suboptimal and unstable. In Tang et al. (“Equilibrium of heterogeneous congestion control: Existence and uniqueness,” IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 824–837, Aug. 2007), existence and uniqueness of equilibrium of heterogeneous protocols are investigated. This paper extends the study with two objectives: analyzing the optimality and stability of such networks and designing control schemes to improve those properties. First, we demonstrate the intricate behavior of a heterogeneous network through simulations and present a framework to help understand its equilibrium properties. Second, we propose a simple source-based algorithm to decouple bandwidth allocation from router parameters and flow arrival patterns by only updating a linear parameter in the sources’ algorithms on a slow timescale. It steers a network to the unique optimal equilibrium. The scheme can be deployed incrementally as the existing protocol needs no change and only new protocols need to adopt the slow timescale adaptation