1,592 research outputs found

    Real Islamic Logic

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    Four options for assigning a meaning to Islamic Logic are surveyed including a new proposal for an option named "Real Islamic Logic" (RIL). That approach to Islamic Logic should serve modern Islamic objectives in a way comparable to the functionality of Islamic Finance. The prospective role of RIL is analyzed from several perspectives: (i) parallel distributed systems design, (ii) reception by a community structured audience, (iii) informal logic and applied non-classical logics, and (iv) (in)tractability and artificial intelligence

    String Diagrammatic Trace Theory

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    Categories in Control

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    Control theory uses "signal-flow diagrams" to describe processes where real-valued functions of time are added, multiplied by scalars, differentiated and integrated, duplicated and deleted. These diagrams can be seen as string diagrams for the symmetric monoidal category FinVect_k of finite-dimensional vector spaces over the field of rational functions k = R(s), where the variable s acts as differentiation and the monoidal structure is direct sum rather than the usual tensor product of vector spaces. For any field k we give a presentation of FinVect_k in terms of the generators used in signal flow diagrams. A broader class of signal-flow diagrams also includes "caps" and "cups" to model feedback. We show these diagrams can be seen as string diagrams for the symmetric monoidal category FinRel_k, where objects are still finite-dimensional vector spaces but the morphisms are linear relations. We also give a presentation for FinRel_k. The relations say, among other things, that the 1-dimensional vector space k has two special commutative dagger-Frobenius structures, such that the multiplication and unit of either one and the comultiplication and counit of the other fit together to form a bimonoid. This sort of structure, but with tensor product replacing direct sum, is familiar from the "ZX-calculus" obeyed by a finite-dimensional Hilbert space with two mutually unbiased bases.Comment: 42 pages LaTe

    Experience and Content: Consequences of a Continuum Theory

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    This thesis is about experiential content: what it is; what kind of account can be given of it. I am concerned with identifying and attacking one main view - I call it the inferentialist proposal. This account is central to the philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of science and perception. I claim, however, that it needs to be recast into something far more subtle and enriched, and I attempt to provide a better alternative in these pages. The inferentialist proposal holds that experiential content is necessarily under¬pinned by sophisticated cognitive influences. My alternative, the continuum theory, holds that these influences are relevant to experience only at certain levels of organisation and that at other levels there are contents which such features do not capture at all. Central to my account is that there are degrees to which cognitive influences affect experiential content; indeed, for the most part, experience is an amalgam of both inferential and non-inferential features. I claim that the inferentialist proposal is fundamentally flawed and deserves replacement, and I argue that my alternative fills the hollow that remains. The thesis is divided into four sections. In Part I, Chapter 1, I introduce two traditionally rival views of experiential content. In Chapter 2, I develop my continuum alternative. Chapter 3 assesses the relationship between experience and language, while Chapter 4 explores the relationship between beliefs and experience. The overall argument is that it has been a mistake to understand experience simply in inferential or non-inferential terms. In Part II, I examine the structure of mental content. Chapter 5 is concerned with the kinds of experiences which escape the inferentialist analysis. Chapter 6 considers Kant’s metaphysic of experience counterpointed to Lorenz’s reading of his work in the light of evolutionary biology. Chapter 7 treats animal experience in relation to the continuum view I am developing, while Chapter 8 reviews Fodor’s contribution to perceptual psychology. It is argued that the view of experiential content being developed is both consistent with empirical data on informationally local perceptual sub-systems, but also accords well with evolutionary theory and a naturalist interpretation of Kant’s taxonomy. Part III deals with inferentialism in the philosophy of science. In Chapter 9, I assess the theory dependence of observation thesis as it is advanced by Paul Feyerabend. I bring out of his account a subtle confusion concerning the importance of inference in the context of scientific inquiry. Part IV deals with the issue of experience in the philosophy of mind. In Chapter 10, I look at Wilfred Sellars’s attack on sense data theories. Chapter 11 confronts Paul Churchland’s treatment of ‘folk psychology’ while Chapter 12 isolates the issue of experiential qualia and the position of property dualism. I offer a critical review of Thomas Nagel’s work in this chapter and claim that his position can be read in a way which is consistent with the continuum account I am developing. I conclude the thesis in the usual fashion with a summary of the central claims

    Toward a formal theory for computing machines made out of whatever physics offers: extended version

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    Approaching limitations of digital computing technologies have spurred research in neuromorphic and other unconventional approaches to computing. Here we argue that if we want to systematically engineer computing systems that are based on unconventional physical effects, we need guidance from a formal theory that is different from the symbolic-algorithmic theory of today's computer science textbooks. We propose a general strategy for developing such a theory, and within that general view, a specific approach that we call "fluent computing". In contrast to Turing, who modeled computing processes from a top-down perspective as symbolic reasoning, we adopt the scientific paradigm of physics and model physical computing systems bottom-up by formalizing what can ultimately be measured in any physical substrate. This leads to an understanding of computing as the structuring of processes, while classical models of computing systems describe the processing of structures.Comment: 76 pages. This is an extended version of a perspective article with the same title that will appear in Nature Communications soon after this manuscript goes public on arxi
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