Embedding Small Digraphs and Permutations in Binary Trees and Split Trees

We investigate the number of permutations that occur in random labellings of trees. This is a generalisation of the number of subpermutations occurring in a random permutation. It also generalises some recent results on the number of inversions in randomly labelled trees (Cai et al. in Combin Probab Comput 28(3):335-364, 2019). We consider complete binary trees as well as random split trees a large class of random trees of logarithmic height introduced by Devroye (SIAM J Comput 28(2):409-432, 1998. 10.1137/s0097539795283954). Split trees consist of nodes (bags) which can contain balls and are generated by a random trickle down process of balls through the nodes. For complete binary trees we show that asymptotically the cumulants of the number of occurrences of a fixed permutation in the random node labelling have explicit formulas. Our other main theorem is to show that for a random split tree, with probability tending to one as the number of balls increases, the cumulants of the number of occurrences are asymptotically an explicit parameter of the split tree. For the proof of the second theorem we show some results on the number of embeddings of digraphs into split trees which may be of independent interest

Provable Security of (Tweakable) Block Ciphers Based on Substitution-Permutation Networks

Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPNs) refer to a family of constructions which build a wn-bit block cipher from n-bit public permutations (often called S-boxes), which alternate keyless and “local” substitution steps utilizing such S-boxes, with keyed and “global” permu- tation steps which are non-cryptographic. Many widely deployed block ciphers are constructed based on the SPNs, but there are essentially no provable-security results about SPNs. In this work, we initiate a comprehensive study of the provable security of SPNs as (possibly tweakable) wn-bit block ciphers, when the underlying n-bit permutation is modeled as a public random permutation. When the permutation step is linear (which is the case for most existing designs), we show that 3 SPN rounds are necessary and sufficient for security. On the other hand, even 1-round SPNs can be secure when non-linearity is allowed. Moreover, 2-round non-linear SPNs can achieve “beyond- birthday” (up to 2 2n/3 adversarial queries) security, and, as the number of non-linear rounds increases, our bounds are meaningful for the number of queries approaching 2 n . Finally, our non-linear SPNs can be made tweakable by incorporating the tweak into the permutation layer, and provide good multi-user security. As an application, our construction can turn two public n-bit permuta- tions (or fixed-key block ciphers) into a tweakable block cipher working on wn-bit inputs, 6n-bit key and an n-bit tweak (for any w ≥ 2); the tweakable block cipher provides security up to 2 2n/3 adversarial queries in the random permutation model, while only requiring w calls to each permutation, and 3w field multiplications for each wn-bit input