Watermark: The Alumni Magazine of the Center for Homeland Defense and Security Center for Information Systems. Spring 2014

Watermark is published semiannually for the alumni of Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS).Topics in this issue: Boston Alumni Discuss Marathon Bombings; Evans Named Boston Police Commissioner; Oso Landslide; Response Bolstered with CHDS Alumni; Cadre of CHDS Alumni at Seattle Fire; Cowboy Cop Rounds Up Career as Terrorism Specialist; Wearable Technology Tested in CHDS; Center Expands Educational Portfolio with Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program; Fusion Centers Critical to Nation's Intelligence Network; Criswell Leads FEMA IMAT East; Zambri Steers L.A.’s Unique Cyber Intrusion Command Center; Former FEMA Associate Administrator Carwile Shares Homeland Security Expertise With PEL

No Cause of Action: Video Surveillance in New York City

In 2010, New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly announced a new network of video surveillance in the City. The new network would be able to prevent future terrorist attacks by identifying suspicious behavior before catastrophic events could take place. Kelly told reporters, If we\u27re looking for a person in a red jacket, we can call up all the red jackets filmed in the last 30 days, and [w]e\u27re beginning to use software that can identify suspicious objects or behaviors. Gothamist later made a witticism of Kelly\u27s statement, remarking, Note to terrorists: red jackets are not a good look for you. This small joke captured a real concern for New Yorkers: what if you\u27re not a terrorist, but you do happen to wear a red jacket in the subway on a day when the New York City Police Department is looking for red-jacketed terrorists? And what if you happen to have brown skin? Or pray at a mosque? Should these attributes be captured on video, are they sufficient for the NYPD to bring you in for questioning, or even to arrest you? Surveillance cameras have been present in New York City for decades, installed and monitored by both the NYPD and private business owners. After September 11th and the PATRIOT Act, their numbers surged. The number of cameras that capture the images of New Yorkers each day remains dwarfed by those in London, where there is one camera for every fourteen residents, under the much-celebrated and equally controversial ring of steel. However, the numbers in New York are in the thousands, particularly since the launch of the system announced by Commissioner Kelly in 2010: the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative and the Midtown Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI and MMSI, respectively). The NYPD touts the LMSI and MMSI as unique: they form a completely networked system, such that all video camera feeds can be monitored from a single location, in real time. This type of program is anticipated to be more effective in stopping crime and terror attacks than London\u27s static system, which provides only playback capabilities and not real-time monitoring. Despite their reach, however, neither the New York nor the London program has yet been proven effective in preventing either crime or terrorist attacks. Any surveillance program clearly raises privacy concerns for the monitored population. This Note weighs some of those concerns for New Yorkers, not against national security interests, the validity of which this Note largely concedes, but rather against the lack of legal accountability built into the LMSI and MMSI. That is, this Note asks whether the possible encroachments on privacy and the risks of abuse can be justified by a system that was implemented with no legally binding process for accountability to the public, thus bearing the risk of serious privacy violations and abuses. This Note takes the position that, while a surveillance program like New York City\u27s may be justified and needed in the modern world, it cannot be allowed to operate outside of any legally enforceable systems of accountability. Part I of this Note will offer an overview of video surveillance programs and the conflicting information regarding their efficacy in preventing and solving crime. Part II examines the present state of the City and the law regarding video surveillance in New York City. It also contrasts the NYPD\u27s privacy guidelines for the LMSI and MMSI with the laws governing video surveillance in the United Kingdom, where video surveillance was adopted early and has been used extensively, in London and in other cities and villages. Part III seeks to understand why Chris Dunn, Associate Legal Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU), is convinced that there is no legal argument that could directly challenge the presence of surveillance cameras in New York City. It will identify the types of problems that may stem from New York City\u27s current system, demonstrating very real concerns about privacy invasion and other possible abuses. Part IV will make projections as to where law and practice is heading on this issue, and will posit recommendations and hopes for future practice

No Cause of Action: Video Surveillance in New York City

In 2010, New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly announced a new network of video surveillance in the City. The new network would be able to prevent future terrorist attacks by identifying suspicious behavior before catastrophic events could take place. Kelly told reporters, If we\u27re looking for a person in a red jacket, we can call up all the red jackets filmed in the last 30 days, and [w]e\u27re beginning to use software that can identify suspicious objects or behaviors. Gothamist later made a witticism of Kelly\u27s statement, remarking, Note to terrorists: red jackets are not a good look for you. This small joke captured a real concern for New Yorkers: what if you\u27re not a terrorist, but you do happen to wear a red jacket in the subway on a day when the New York City Police Department is looking for red-jacketed terrorists? And what if you happen to have brown skin? Or pray at a mosque? Should these attributes be captured on video, are they sufficient for the NYPD to bring you in for questioning, or even to arrest you? Surveillance cameras have been present in New York City for decades, installed and monitored by both the NYPD and private business owners. After September 11th and the PATRIOT Act, their numbers surged. The number of cameras that capture the images of New Yorkers each day remains dwarfed by those in London, where there is one camera for every fourteen residents, under the much-celebrated and equally controversial ring of steel. However, the numbers in New York are in the thousands, particularly since the launch of the system announced by Commissioner Kelly in 2010: the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative and the Midtown Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI and MMSI, respectively). The NYPD touts the LMSI and MMSI as unique: they form a completely networked system, such that all video camera feeds can be monitored from a single location, in real time. This type of program is anticipated to be more effective in stopping crime and terror attacks than London\u27s static system, which provides only playback capabilities and not real-time monitoring. Despite their reach, however, neither the New York nor the London program has yet been proven effective in preventing either crime or terrorist attacks. Any surveillance program clearly raises privacy concerns for the monitored population. This Note weighs some of those concerns for New Yorkers, not against national security interests, the validity of which this Note largely concedes, but rather against the lack of legal accountability built into the LMSI and MMSI. That is, this Note asks whether the possible encroachments on privacy and the risks of abuse can be justified by a system that was implemented with no legally binding process for accountability to the public, thus bearing the risk of serious privacy violations and abuses. This Note takes the position that, while a surveillance program like New York City\u27s may be justified and needed in the modern world, it cannot be allowed to operate outside of any legally enforceable systems of accountability. Part I of this Note will offer an overview of video surveillance programs and the conflicting information regarding their efficacy in preventing and solving crime. Part II examines the present state of the City and the law regarding video surveillance in New York City. It also contrasts the NYPD\u27s privacy guidelines for the LMSI and MMSI with the laws governing video surveillance in the United Kingdom, where video surveillance was adopted early and has been used extensively, in London and in other cities and villages. Part III seeks to understand why Chris Dunn, Associate Legal Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU), is convinced that there is no legal argument that could directly challenge the presence of surveillance cameras in New York City. It will identify the types of problems that may stem from New York City\u27s current system, demonstrating very real concerns about privacy invasion and other possible abuses. Part IV will make projections as to where law and practice is heading on this issue, and will posit recommendations and hopes for future practice

Perceived Effectiveness of the Chicago Crime Commission, 1980-1985: Insiders and Outsiders

This study examines the perceived effectiveness of the oldest and most famous citizens\u27 crime commission in the United States--the Chicago Crime Commission.l The commission\u27s effectiveness is measured by the perceptions of influential criminal justice decisionmakers and policymakers

Feminism and International Law: An Opportunity for Transformation

In this essay, the author wants to outline briefly both some of the ways in which the assumptions and categories of international law can be damaging to women, and also some of the ways in which creative feminists could use international law to transform both international policy and the domestic political and legal discourse. In the wake of September 11, a robust feminist engagement with international law and policy is more urgent than ever before

Judge Parker and the Public Service State

The work described in this thesis is part of the Open Space project, a collaboration between Linköping University, NASA and the American Museum of Natural History. The long-term goal of Open Space is a multi-purpose, open-source scientific visualization software. The thesis covers the research and implementation of a pipeline for preparing and rendering volumetric data. The developed pipeline consists of three stages: A data formatting stage which takes data from various sources and prepares it for the rest of the pipeline, a pre-processing stage which builds a tree structure of of the raw data, and finally an interactive rendering stage which draws a volume using ray-casting. The pipeline is a fully working proof-of-concept for future development of Open Space, and can be used as-is to render space weather data using a combination of suitable data structures and an efficient data transfer pipeline. Many concepts and ideas from this work can be utilized in the larger-scale software project