Clubbing and Digitalization of Government ID Proofs

Clubbing and Digitalization of Government ID Proofs is a software system for organizing and storing different kinds of documents required for a person�s identity proof. This software system handles digital documents, rather than paper documents, although in some instances, this system may also handle digital scanned versions of original paper documents. This system includes important legal documents like Birth Certificate, Aadhaar Card, PAN Card, Driving Licence, Passport, etc, a more general type of storage system that helps users to organize and store paper or digital documents. Each and every user can access by logging into the application using their username and password. This centralized system would help in providing the user to store a large volume of data and efficiently retrieve their data. This system will also help the users to update or edit any changes in their previously added information conveniently

Governance Models for Interoperable Electronic Identities

Current implementations of electronic identity in Europe are rather diverse; they include state-driven identity management frameworks as well as private sector frameworks and different forms of public-private collaborations. This diversity may represent a major challenge for the deployment of information society services addressed towards the European internal market. This raises the question: How can we achieve interoperability of electronic identities across Europe, and potentially beyond Europe’s borders? This paper argues that the interoperability of electronic identity could be governed by a multi-stakeholder governance framework that brings together different parties with interests in the provision and use of electronic identities. Such a governance framework could, for example, consist in designing and operating a portal with common functionalities that allows interoperable authentication across multiple domains and contexts. Inspiration for the governance of such a portal could come both from existing successful implementations of electronic identity and from multi-stakeholder institutions that have proven useful in Internet governance.

Social Justice, Social Norms and the Governance of Social Media

This article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly addresses the theoretical arguments regarding the pros and cons of various governance strategies, focusing on the advantages, disadvantages and pitfalls of reliance on private parties. In Part III, the article describes, in general terms, the above-mentioned empirical study, explaining its methodology, the specific challenges to its design and implementation, and how these were met. The discussion specifically centers on a survey taken to establish the nature of social norms. Part IV presents a specific test case: whether pseudonymity should be permitted in social media or should “real names” be mandatory. Part V briefly discusses insights that the “real names” test case might provide for the broader questions regarding justice and fairness in social media governance. The article concludes with yet another context, the “right to be forgotten,” which might provide additional insights into the important research questions this project and others begin to address. It further notes additional extensions of the methodological design this article introduces. An important caveat is due. While the article strives to argue a normative point as to the fair, just and proper way to govern social media, it draws on empirical findings regarding users’ actual social norms. Clearly, however, there are numerous examples of situations demonstrating descriptive social norms to which can hardly be considered a normative baseline to aspire. In fact social norms embraced by the majority might reflect prejudice, errors and the inability to adapt to social changes. In some instances, especially those pertaining to information privacy, the “crowd” might not be wise at all. For these reasons, the policy implications and recommendations to be derived from the discussion that follows are noted carefully, and must be subjected to additional considerations and scrutiny. Nevertheless, establishing whether governance methods, as applied in these innovative settings, are objectively fair and just, is extremely difficult if not impossible. Thus, reliance on imperfect proxies such as the nature of “social norms” will surely prove constructive. Therefore, examining the differences between these four subsets of governance (“code,” “contract,” “law,” and “social norms”) can provide us with insights into the “justice” of the governance administered by the platform provider and address the nuances of this intriguing reality

myIdP - The Personal Attribute Hub: Prototype and Quality of Claims

Abstract—The myIdP service is an extension to the Swiss eID infrastructure with the aim to provide a service that handles personal attributes (like address, telephone number, email), which are neither part of the SuisseID identity providers nor of a Claim Assertion Service (CAS), because there is no official authority owning and certifying these data. The myIdP service is a CAS that can reuse data which a user has already given to an application via an Internet transaction. The data is thus validated by the web application before being transferred- as Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 attribute assertion- to the myIdP service. The myIdP service comes in two flavors with different trust relations: the attribute provider and the claim proxy. The attribute provider unites several claims for a given attribute and provides an optional quality assessment before sending it to a requesting web application. A trust relationship must consist between myIdP and the web application. The claim proxy only collects the received claims for a given attribute and transfers them with all details to the requesting application. The application can evaluate the confidence in the data based on the claim details. The model to assess the quality and trustworthiness of the data is based mainly on three factors: freshness of information, quality of the attribute issuer and recurrence of information. The myIdP service is evaluated in a scenario of prefilling e-forms in an eGovernment application. Keywords-electronic identity, SuisseID, attribute authority, e-form, quality assessment. I

The role of trust in the adoption of cooperative arrangements of e-credential markets

The interest in digital identities has increased considerably in academia and practice in recent years. This can be seen by the many electronic identity projects worldwide and the numerous published studies that provide insightful narratives and descriptive case findings about success factors and barriers to the adoption of national authentication infrastructures. In this paper, we take a closer look to the role of trust on the design and implementation of a nation-wide e-credential market. We argue that trust in political and economic institutions can be an important factor to explain differences in the chosen cooperative arrangement which can range from monopolistic, purely state-controlled e-credential markets, to polypolistic, decentralized e-credential markets where also private vendors offer state recognized e-ID on their own or in partnership with the government. Following an inductive reasoning process, we develop three testable propositions which may inspire further empirical research and offer practitioners a new angle to rethink e-credential markets in the light of citizen trust in political and economic institutions

National Identity Card: The Dilemma between Social Opportunities and Threats

Biometric national identity card schemes are increasingly becoming common around the world and considered as an essential social component of our time. It is assumed that providing national identity cards to all the citizens will help governments to combat various social malice such as terrorism, illegal immigration, fraudulent activities, and accelerate social service delivery. Nevertheless, the introduction of national identity card has been a matter of academic and policy debate. This paper, based on a review of the literature, portrays a general overview and the current state of knowledge and understanding about the issues and concerns associated with national identity schemes. Although the use of biometric technology-based national identity schemes need not or do not face refusals, the unintended, unwelcome and unanticipated consequences on society of such a high-tech scheme must be critically considered to ensure utmost benefits to the society. It is also suggested that in order to combat or control social threats and vices, social resistance is more important than the introduction and use of high technology.KEYWORDS: Identify cards, Biometric, Security, Cost, Opportunity, Threa

Sistemi elektronskih osebnih dokumentov in uporaba e-storitev v izbranih evropskih državah

Elektronski osebni (e-osebni) dokumenti, ki se že uporabljajo v nekaterih državah Evropske unije, so osrednji predmet obravnave tega prispevka. Po uvodnih definicijah osnovnih pojmov ponujamo primerjalni pregled sistemov e-osebnih dokumentov v izbranih evropskih državah. Primerjava se osredotoča na uporabnost e-osebnih dokumentov v različnih državah glede storitev, ki jih lahko državljani z njimi opravljajo, oziroma v kolikšni meri so posamezne države izkoristile prednosti, ki jih lahko ti dokumenti prinesejo. V drugem delu članka raziskujemo, v kolikšni meri vpeljani sistemi e-osebnih dokumentov spodbujajo državljane k uporabi e-storitev, tako tistih, ki jih ponuja javni sektor, kot tudi tistih, ki jih ponuja zasebni sektor. Rezultati raziskave kažejo, da državljani v državah z vpeljanim sistemom e-osebnih dokumentov bolj pogosto uporabljajo storitve e-uprave ter e-storitve zasebnega sektorja kot pa v državah, kjer sistema e-osebnih dokumentov ne uporabljajo

Bringing data minimization to digital wallets at scale with general-purpose zero-knowledge proofs

Today, digital identity management for individuals is either inconvenient and error-prone or creates undesirable lock-in effects and violates privacy and security expectations. These shortcomings inhibit the digital transformation in general and seem particularly concerning in the context of novel applications such as access control for decentralized autonomous organizations and identification in the Metaverse. Decentralized or self-sovereign identity (SSI) aims to offer a solution to this dilemma by empowering individuals to manage their digital identity through machine-verifiable attestations stored in a "digital wallet" application on their edge devices. However, when presented to a relying party, these attestations typically reveal more attributes than required and allow tracking end users' activities. Several academic works and practical solutions exist to reduce or avoid such excessive information disclosure, from simple selective disclosure to data-minimizing anonymous credentials based on zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs). We first demonstrate that the SSI solutions that are currently built with anonymous credentials still lack essential features such as scalable revocation, certificate chaining, and integration with secure elements. We then argue that general-purpose ZKPs in the form of zk-SNARKs can appropriately address these pressing challenges. We describe our implementation and conduct performance tests on different edge devices to illustrate that the performance of zk-SNARK-based anonymous credentials is already practical. We also discuss further advantages that general-purpose ZKPs can easily provide for digital wallets, for instance, to create "designated verifier presentations" that facilitate new design options for digital identity infrastructures that previously were not accessible because of the threat of man-in-the-middle attacks