Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments

The paper elaborates the idea that voting is an instance of the aggregation of judgments, this being a more general concept than the aggregation of preferences. To aggregate judgments one must first measure them. I show that such aggregation has been unproblematic whenever it has been based on an independent and unrestricted scale. The scales analyzed in voting theory are either context dependent or subject to unreasonable restrictions. This is the real source of the diverse 'paradoxes of voting' that would better be termed 'voting pathologies'. The theory leads me to advocate what I term evaluative voting. It can also be called utilitarian voting as it is based on having voters express their cardinal preferences. The alternative that maximizes the sum wins. This proposal operationalizes, in an election context, the abstract cardinal theories of collective choice due to Fleming and Harsanyi. On pragmatic grounds, I argue for a three valued scale for general elections

Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments

The paper elaborates the idea that voting is an instance of the aggregation of judgments, this being a more general concept than the aggregation of preferences. To aggregate judgments one must first measure them. I show that such aggregation has been unproblematic whenever it has been based on an independent and unrestricted scale. The scales analyzed in voting theory are either context dependent or subject to unreasonable restrictions. This is the real source of the diverse 'paradoxes of voting' that would better be termed 'voting pathologies'. The theory leads me to advocate what I term evaluative voting. It can also be called utilitarian voting as it is based on having voters express their cardinal preferences. The alternative that maximizes the sum wins. This proposal operationalizes, in an election context, the abstract cardinal theories of collective choice due to Fleming and Harsanyi. On pragmatic grounds, I argue for a three valued scale for general elections.approval voting; cardinal utility; instant runoff voting; plurality voting; voting paradoxes

Wickedness in social choice

In an article from 1973, Rittel and Webber distinguished between “tame” or “benign” problems on the one hand and “wicked” problems on the other. The authors argued that wicked problems occur in nearly all public policy issues. Since different groups adhere to different value-sets, solutions can only be expressed as better or worse. By no means can they be viewed as definitive or objective. In this paper we shall consider, from this very angle, the theory of social choice which is about the aggregation of individual preferences with the aim to derive a consistent social preference. We shall show that collective choice offers wicked problems of various types which differ in their degree of severity. We shall hereby concentrate on welfare functions and voting schemes of different kinds and shall discuss these in the light of various criteria such as Arrow’s independence condition, Condorcet consistency, monotonicity, manipulability, and other properties

How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games

Democracy resolves conflicts in difficult games like Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken by stabilizing their cooperative outcomes. It does so by transforming these games into games in which voters are presented with a choice between a cooperative outcome and a Pareto-inferior noncooperative outcome. In the transformed game, it is always rational for voters to vote for the cooperative outcome, because cooperation is a weakly dominant strategy independent of the decision rule and the number of voters who choose it. Such games are illustrated by 2-person and n-person public-goods games, in which it is optimal to be a free rider, and a biblical story from the book of Exodus.Democracy; voting; social choice; public goods; game theory; Prisoners' Dilemma; Bible

Aggregation of Rankings in Figure Skating

We scrutinize and compare, from the perspective of modern theory of social choice, two rules that have been used to rank competitors in Figure Skating for the past decades. The first rule has been in use at least from 1982 until 1998, when it was replaced by a new one. We also compare these two rules with the Borda and the Kemeny rules. The four rules are illustrated with examples and with the data of 30 Olympic competitions. The comparisons show that the choice of a rule can have a real impact on the rankings. In these data, we found as many as 19 cycles of the majority relation, involving as many as nine skaters. In this context, the Kemeny rule appears as a natural extension of the Condorcet rule. As a side result, we show that the Copeland rule can be used to partition the skaters in such a way that it suffice to find Kemeny rankings within subsets of the partition that are not singletons and then, to juxtapose these rankings to get a complete Kemeny ranking. We also propose the concept of the mean Kemeny ranking, which when it exists, may obviate the multiplicity of Kemeny rankings. Finally, the fours rules are examined in terms of their manipulability. It appears that the new rule used in Figure Skating may be more difficult to manipulate than the previous one but less so than the Kemeny rule.Figure skating, ranking rules, vote aggregation, cycles, maximum likelihood, Kemeny, Copeland, Borda, manipulation

Multi-Relationship Evaluation Design (MRED): An Interactive Test Plan Designer for Advanced and Emerging Technologies

Ground-breaking technologies are developed for use across a broad range of domains such as manufacturing, military, homeland security and automotive industries. These advanced technologies often include intelligent systems or robotic elements. Evaluations are a critical step in the development of these advanced systems. Evaluation events inform the technology developers of specific needs for enhancement, capture end-user feedback, and verify the extent of the technology's functions. Test exercises are an opportunity to showcase the technology's current abilities and limitations and provide data for future test efforts. The objective of this research is to develop the Multi-Relationship Evaluation Design (MRED) methodology, an interactive test plan blueprint generator. MRED collects multiple inputs, processes them interactively with a test designer and outputs evaluation blueprints, specifying key test-plan characteristics. Drawing from the Systems Engineering Paradigm, MRED models a process that had not been modeled before. The MRED model is consistent with the experience of evaluation designers. This method also captures and handles stakeholder preferences so that they can be accommodated in a meaningful way. The result is the MRED methodology that combines practical evaluation design experience with mathematical methods proven in the literature

Judge: Don't Vote!

This article argues that the traditional model of the theory of social choice is not a good model and does not lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing. It presents a more meaningful and realistic model that leads naturally to a method of ranking and electing—majority judgment—that better meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method. It gives descriptions of its successful use in several different practical situations and compares it with other methods including Condorcet's, Borda's, first-past-the-post, and approval voting

Design and evaluation of a voting tool in a collaborative environment

This dissertation researchdesigned, implemented, and evaluated a Web-based Dynamic Voting Toolfor small group decision-making in a collaborative environment. In this dissertation, theliterature on voting tools in current GDSS research is presented. Variousvoting theories and methods are analyzed, and the advantages and weaknessesare compared, so as to gain a better understanding of how to apply thesedifferent voting methods to diverse decision-making situations. A briefoverview of scaling theories is also given, with an emphasis on Thurstone\u27sLaw. The basic features of someweb-based voting tool implementations are reviewed along with a discussionof the pros and cons of Intemet voting. A discussion of Human DynamicVoting (HDV) follows; HDV allows multiple voting and continuous feedbackin a group process. The Dynamic Voting Tool designed and developed bythe author (i.e., Zheng Li) integrated multiple scaling and voting methods,and supported dynamic voting. Its features, user feedback, and futureimprovements are further discussed. A controlled experiment wasconducted to evaluate the effects of the Dynamic Voting Tool (alongwith the List Gathering Tool by Yuanqiong Wang) interacting with smallgroup process. The design and procedures of the experiment, and thedata analysis results extracted from 187 student subjects from New JerseyInstitute of Technology are reported. While the System Survey yieldedvery positive feedback on the voting tool, the hypotheses tested bythe Post-Questionnaire and expert judgments showed no major positivesignificant results. This was probably due to the complexity of thetask and procedures, lack of motivation of the subjects, bad timing,insufficient training, and uneven distribution of subjects, etc. Several field studies usingthe Social Decision Support System (SDSS) Toolkit (List Gathering Tool+ Dynamic Voting Tool) are presented. The SDSS system worked well whenthe subjects were motivated. The field studies show that the toolkitcan be used in course evaluations, or other practical applications. Finally, it is suggestedthat future research can focus on improving the voting tool with truedynamic features, exploring more issues on SDSS systems design and experimentation,and exploring the relationship of voting and GSS