1,859 research outputs found
The Mechanics of n-Player Differentiable Games
The cornerstone underpinning deep learning is the
guarantee that gradient descent on an objective
converges to local minima. Unfortunately, this
guarantee fails in settings, such as generative adversarial
nets, where there are multiple interacting
losses. The behavior of gradient-based methods
in games is not well understood – and is becoming
increasingly important as adversarial and multiobjective
architectures proliferate. In this paper,
we develop new techniques to understand and control
the dynamics in general games. The key result
is to decompose the second-order dynamics into
two components. The first is related to potential
games, which reduce to gradient descent on an implicit
function; the second relates to Hamiltonian
games, a new class of games that obey a conservation
law, akin to conservation laws in classical
mechanical systems. The decomposition motivates
Symplectic Gradient Adjustment (SGA), a
new algorithm for finding stable fixed points in
general games. Basic experiments show SGA is
competitive with recently proposed algorithms for
finding stable fixed points in GANs – whilst at
the same time being applicable to – and having
guarantees in – much more general games
Differentiable Game Mechanics
Deep learning is built on the foundational guarantee that gradient descent on
an objective function converges to local minima. Unfortunately, this guarantee
fails in settings, such as generative adversarial nets, that exhibit multiple
interacting losses. The behavior of gradient-based methods in games is not well
understood -- and is becoming increasingly important as adversarial and
multi-objective architectures proliferate. In this paper, we develop new tools
to understand and control the dynamics in n-player differentiable games.
The key result is to decompose the game Jacobian into two components. The
first, symmetric component, is related to potential games, which reduce to
gradient descent on an implicit function. The second, antisymmetric component,
relates to Hamiltonian games, a new class of games that obey a conservation law
akin to conservation laws in classical mechanical systems. The decomposition
motivates Symplectic Gradient Adjustment (SGA), a new algorithm for finding
stable fixed points in differentiable games. Basic experiments show SGA is
competitive with recently proposed algorithms for finding stable fixed points
in GANs -- while at the same time being applicable to, and having guarantees
in, much more general cases.Comment: JMLR 2019, journal version of arXiv:1802.0564
Deflation for semismooth equations
Variational inequalities can in general support distinct solutions. In this
paper we study an algorithm for computing distinct solutions of a variational
inequality, without varying the initial guess supplied to the solver. The
central idea is the combination of a semismooth Newton method with a deflation
operator that eliminates known solutions from consideration. Given one root of
a semismooth residual, deflation constructs a new problem for which a
semismooth Newton method will not converge to the known root, even from the
same initial guess. This enables the discovery of other roots. We prove the
effectiveness of the deflation technique under the same assumptions that
guarantee locally superlinear convergence of a semismooth Newton method. We
demonstrate its utility on various finite- and infinite-dimensional examples
drawn from constrained optimization, game theory, economics and solid
mechanics.Comment: 24 pages, 3 figure
Competitive Gradient Descent
We introduce a new algorithm for the numerical computation of Nash equilibria
of competitive two-player games. Our method is a natural generalization of
gradient descent to the two-player setting where the update is given by the
Nash equilibrium of a regularized bilinear local approximation of the
underlying game. It avoids oscillatory and divergent behaviors seen in
alternating gradient descent. Using numerical experiments and rigorous
analysis, we provide a detailed comparison to methods based on \emph{optimism}
and \emph{consensus} and show that our method avoids making any unnecessary
changes to the gradient dynamics while achieving exponential (local)
convergence for (locally) convex-concave zero sum games. Convergence and
stability properties of our method are robust to strong interactions between
the players, without adapting the stepsize, which is not the case with previous
methods. In our numerical experiments on non-convex-concave problems, existing
methods are prone to divergence and instability due to their sensitivity to
interactions among the players, whereas we never observe divergence of our
algorithm. The ability to choose larger stepsizes furthermore allows our
algorithm to achieve faster convergence, as measured by the number of model
evaluations.Comment: Appeared in NeurIPS 2019. This version corrects an error in theorem
2.2. Source code used for the numerical experiments can be found under
http://github.com/f-t-s/CGD. A high-level overview of this work can be found
under http://f-t-s.github.io/projects/cgd
Open-ended Learning in Symmetric Zero-sum Games
Zero-sum games such as chess and poker are, abstractly, functions that
evaluate pairs of agents, for example labeling them `winner' and `loser'. If
the game is approximately transitive, then self-play generates sequences of
agents of increasing strength. However, nontransitive games, such as
rock-paper-scissors, can exhibit strategic cycles, and there is no longer a
clear objective -- we want agents to increase in strength, but against whom is
unclear. In this paper, we introduce a geometric framework for formulating
agent objectives in zero-sum games, in order to construct adaptive sequences of
objectives that yield open-ended learning. The framework allows us to reason
about population performance in nontransitive games, and enables the
development of a new algorithm (rectified Nash response, PSRO_rN) that uses
game-theoretic niching to construct diverse populations of effective agents,
producing a stronger set of agents than existing algorithms. We apply PSRO_rN
to two highly nontransitive resource allocation games and find that PSRO_rN
consistently outperforms the existing alternatives.Comment: ICML 2019, final versio
Dominant Strategies in Two Qubit Quantum Computations
Nash equilibrium is a solution concept in non-strictly competitive,
non-cooperative game theory that finds applications in various scientific and
engineering disciplines. A non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game model
is presented here for two qubit quantum computations that allows for the
characterization of Nash equilibrium in these computations via the inner
product of their state space. Nash equilibrium outcomes are optimal under given
constraints and therefore offer a game-theoretic measure of constrained
optimization of two qubit quantum computations.Comment: The abstract has been re-written and technical details added to
section 5 in version
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