On what powers cannot do

Dispositionalism is the view that the world is, ultimately, just a world of objects and their irreducible dispositions, and that such dispositions are, ultimately, the sole explanatory ground for the occurrence of events. This view is motivated, partly, by arguing that it affords, while non-necessitarian views of laws of nature do not afford, an adequate account of our intuitions about which regularities are non-accidental. I, however, argue that dispositionalism cannot adequately account for our intuitions about which regularities are non-accidental. Further, I argue that, intuitions aside, if we suppose that our world contains objects along with their irreducible dispositions, we must suppose, on pain of logical incoherence, that it contains laws of nature that are incompatible with a dispositionalist ontology. Indeed, if we sup ose a world of objects and irreducible dispositions, we will have to suppose that the most prominent views of laws of nature currently on offer are all inadequate

Multiple axiomatization in information management

Information management is essentially multidisciplinary, requiring multiple axiomatization.Types of causality provide grounds for a productive framework. After developing a framework formultiple axiomatization in information management, Maes\u27s framework is introduced. From theordering of the so-called disciplinary types in the multiple axiomatization framework, a suggestion ismade to modify the framework of Maes. An attempt follows to match both frameworks. The concept ofsignifics is presented as the disciplinary type for researching motivational phenomena

The Qualification Problem: A solution to the problem of anomalous models

AbstractIntelligent agents in open environments inevitably face the Qualification Problem: The executability of an action can never be predicted with absolute certainty; unexpected circumstances, albeit unlikely, may at any time prevent the successful performance of an action. Reasoning agents in real-world environments rely on a solution to the Qualification Problem in order to make useful predictions but also to explain and recover from unexpected action failures. Yet the main theoretical result known today in this context is a negative one: While a solution to the Qualification Problem requires to assume away by default abnormal qualifications of actions, straightforward minimization of abnormality falls prey to the production of anomalous models. We present an approach to the Qualification Problem which resolves this anomaly. Anomalous models are shown to arise from ignoring causality, and they are avoided by appealing to just this concept. Our theory builds on the established predicate logic formalism of the Fluent Calculus as a solution to the Frame Problem and to the Ramification Problem in reasoning about actions. The monotonic Fluent Calculus is enhanced by a default theory in order to obtain the nonmonotonic approach called for by the Qualification Problem. The approach has been implemented in an action programming language based on the Fluent Calculus and successfully applied to the high-level control of robots

The rhetoric of failure: a hyper-dialog about method in economics and how to get things going

All are agreed that orthodox economics is unsatisfactory but there is wide disagreement, especially among heterodox critics, whether the problems lie at the level of substantive theory or at the level of methodology. This paper gives first an overview of the methodological questions at issue. The frame of reference includes J. S. Mill, Jevons, Popper, Keynes, and Lawson. Drawing on the conclusions, the domain of economics is subsequently refocused. Human behavior is moved from the center to the periphery. From elementary systemic properties the relation of income and profit is then consistently derived. This solves the profit conundrum

In search of the person. Towards a real revolution

The discussion about a difference between brain and soul or mind is now at the center of the anthropological debate. It seems that the pioneers in this current polemic have a reductionistic view of human nature, inherited from the Cartesian solution to mind-body problem and the modern materialistic explanation of reality. This view – dualistic or monistic – about the opposition between material and immaterial structure of the person, claims that as a consequence of scientific progress, the human brain in the future could be completely explained in naturalistic terms. On the other hand, according to the new results of scientific research, this situation reveals the possibility to develop a new, more adequate paradigm of man as an incarnated person. This change was called by many researchers “the passage from the mind-body problem to the person-body problem”. It seems that the Aristotelian-Thomistic approach is the most suitable to describe this “paradigm shift”. Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy undoubtedly encourages lively dialogue between philosophy and contemporary sciences through its dual ontology. Thus, it can give suitable answers for questions about the nature of human reason (intentionality); unity of composition of the human brain and the role of causality in natural processes