Model-free and model-based reward prediction errors in EEG

Learning theorists posit two reinforcement learning systems: model-free and model-based. Model-based learning incorporates knowledge about structure and contingencies in the world to assign candidate actions with an expected value. Model-free learning is ignorant of the world’s structure; instead, actions hold a value based on prior reinforcement, with this value updated by expectancy violation in the form of a reward prediction error. Because they use such different learning mechanisms, it has been previously assumed that model-based and model-free learning are computationally dissociated in the brain. However, recent fMRI evidence suggests that the brain may compute reward prediction errors to both model-free and model-based estimates of value, signalling the possibility that these systems interact. Because of its poor temporal resolution, fMRI risks confounding reward prediction errors with other feedback-related neural activity. In the present study, EEG was used to show the presence of both model-based and model-free reward prediction errors and their place in a temporal sequence of events including state prediction errors and action value updates. This demonstration of model-based prediction errors questions a long-held assumption that model-free and model-based learning are dissociated in the brain

The feedback-related negativity codes components of abstract inference during reward-based decision-making

Behavioral control is influenced not only by learning from the choices made and the rewards obtained but also by “what might have happened,” that is, inference about unchosen options and their fictive outcomes. Substantial progress has been made in understanding the neural signatures of direct learning from choices that are actually made and their associated rewards via reward prediction errors (RPEs). However, electrophysiological correlates of abstract inference in decision-making are less clear. One seminal theory suggests that the so-called feedback-related negativity (FRN), an ERP peaking 200–300 msec after a feedback stimulus at frontocentral sites of the scalp, codes RPEs. Hitherto, the FRN has been predominantly related to a so-called “model-free” RPE: The difference between the observed outcome and what had been expected. Here, by means of computational modeling of choice behavior, we show that individuals employ abstract, “double-update” inference on the task structure by concurrently tracking values of chosen stimuli (associated with observed outcomes) and unchosen stimuli (linked to fictive outcomes). In a parametric analysis, model-free RPEs as well as their modification because of abstract inference were regressed against single-trial FRN amplitudes. We demonstrate that components related to abstract inference uniquely explain variance in the FRN beyond model-free RPEs. These findings advance our understanding of the FRN and its role in behavioral adaptation. This might further the investigation of disturbed abstract inference, as proposed, for example, for psychiatric disorders, and its underlying neural correlates