IPv6 Network Mobility

Network Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting has been used since before the days of the Internet as we know it today. Authentication asks the question, “Who or what are you?” Authorization asks, “What are you allowed to do?” And fi nally, accounting wants to know, “What did you do?” These fundamental security building blocks are being used in expanded ways today. The fi rst part of this two-part series focused on the overall concepts of AAA, the elements involved in AAA communications, and highlevel approaches to achieving specifi c AAA goals. It was published in IPJ Volume 10, No. 1[0]. This second part of the series discusses the protocols involved, specifi c applications of AAA, and considerations for the future of AAA

Techniques for the dynamic randomization of network attributes

Critical infrastructure control systems continue to foster predictable communication paths and static configurations that allow easy access to our networked critical infrastructure around the world. This makes them attractive and easy targets for cyber-attack. We have developed technologies that address these attack vectors by automatically reconfiguring network settings. Applying these protective measures will convert control systems into «moving targets» that proactively defend themselves against attack. This «Moving Target Defense» (MTD) revolves about the movement of network reconfiguration, securely communicating reconfiguration specifications to other network nodes as required, and ensuring that connectivity between nodes is uninterrupted. Software-defined Networking (SDN) is leveraged to meet many of these goals. Our MTD approach eliminates adversaries targeting known static attributes of network devices and systems, and consists of the following three techniques: (1) Network Randomization for TCP/UDP Ports; (2) Network Randomization for IP Addresses; (3) Network Randomization for Network Paths In this paper, we describe the implementation of the aforementioned technologies. We also discuss the individual and collective successes for the techniques, challenges for deployment, constraints and assumptions, and the performance implications for each technique

Description and Experience of the Clinical Testbeds

This deliverable describes the up-to-date technical environment at three clinical testbed demonstrator sites of the 6WINIT Project, including the adapted clinical applications, project components and network transition technologies in use at these sites after 18 months of the Project. It also provides an interim description of early experiences with deployment and usage of these applications, components and technologies, and their clinical service impact

Providing guaranteed QoS in the hose-modeled VPN

With the development of the Internet, Internet service providers (ISPs) are required to offer revenue-generating and value-added services instead of only providing bandwidth and access services. Virtual Private Network (VPN) is one of the most important value-added services for ISPs. The classical VPN service is provided by implementing layer 2 technologies, either Frame Relay (FR) or Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM). With FR or ATM, virtual circuits are created before data delivery. Since the bandwidth and buffers are reserved, the QoS requirements can be naturally guaranteed. In the past few years, layer 3 VPN technologies are widely deployed due to the desirable performance in terms of flexibility, scalability and simplicity. Layer 3 VPNs are built upon IP tunnels, e.g., by using PPTP, L2TP or IPSec. Since IP is best-of-effort in nature, the QoS requirement cannot be guaranteed in layer 3 VPNs. Actually, layer 3 VPN service can only provide secure connectivity, i.e., protecting and authenticating IP packets between gateways or hosts in a VPN. Without doubt, with more applications on voice, audio and video being used in the Internet, the provision of QoS is one of the most important parts of the emerging services provided by ISPs. An intriguing question is: Is it possible to obtain the best of both layer 2 and 3 VPN? Is it possible to provide guaranteed or predictable QoS, as in layer 2 VPNs, while maintaining the flexibility and simplicity in layer 3 VPN? This question is the starting point of this study. The recently proposed hose model for VPN possesses desirable properties in terms of flexibility, scalability and multiplexing gain. However, the classic fair bandwidth allocation schemes and weighted fair queuing schemes raise the issue of low overall utilization in this model. A new fluid model for provider-provisioned virtual private network (PPVPN) is proposed in this dissertation. Based on the proposed model, an idealized fluid bandwidth allocation scheme is developed. This scheme is proven, analytically, to have the following properties: 1) maximize the overall throughput of the VPN without compromising fairness; 2) provide a mechanism that enables the VPN customers to allocate the bandwidth according to their requirements by assigning different weights to different hose flows, and thus obtain the predictable QoS performance; and 3) improve the overall throughput of the ISPs\u27 network. To approximate the idealized fluid scheme in the real world, the 2-dimensional deficit round robin (2-D DRR and 2-D DRR+) schemes are proposed. The integration of the proposed schemes with the best-effort traffic within the framework of virtual-router-based VPN is also investigated. The 2-D DRR and 2-D DER-+ schemes can be extended to multi-dimensional schemes to be employed in those applications which require a hierarchical scheduling architecture. To enhance the scalability, a more scalable non-per-flow-based scheme for output queued switches is developed as well, and the integration of this scheme within the framework of the MPLS VPN and applications for multicasting traffics is discussed. The performance and properties of these schemes are analyzed

Network Access Control: Disruptive Technology?

Network Access Control (NAC) implements policy-based access control to the trusted network. It regulates entry to the network by the use of health verifiers and policy control points to mitigate the introduction of malicious software. However the current versions of NAC may not be the universal remedy to endpoint security that many vendors tout. Many organizations that are evaluating the technology, but that have not yet deployed a solution, believe that NAC presents an opportunity for severe disruption of their networks. A cursory examination of the technologies used and how they are deployed in the network appears to support this argument. The addition of NAC components can make the network architecture even more complex and subject to failure. However, one recent survey of organizations that have deployed a NAC solution indicates that the \u27common wisdom\u27 about NAC may not be correct