The Economics of Healthcare Rationing

This article examines the economics of healthcare rationing. We begin with an overview of the various dimensions across which healthcare rationing operates, or at least has the potential to operate, in the first place. We then describe the types of economic analyses used in healthcare rationing decision-making, with particular reference to cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. We also discuss healthcare rationing in practice, such as how economic analyses inform decisions regarding which services to cover, and conclude by discussing various practical and conceptual challenges that may arise with economic analyses and that span both economics and ethics

Conservation laws in interacting networks

U diplomskom radu proučavat će se međudjelujuće kompetitivne mreže. Primjer takvih mreža možemo naći u biološkim sustavima (kompetitivnost malignog i zdravog tkiva kod organa), odnos predator-lovina, države pod sankcijama te napadi na računalno mrežnu infrastrukturu. Osnovni model izradit će se na međudjelovanju dvije mreže, jedne više, a druge manje otporne na napade. Definirat ćemo zakon očuvanja koji povezuje mehanizam povratne sprege napada i preuzimanja čvorova medu mrežama. Tako definirani zakon odredit će dužinu trajanja napada i njegov trošak, što se koristi kao inicijalna procjena rizika.The graduate thesis will explore the interaction of competing networks. An example of such networks we can find in biological systems (the competitiveness of malignant and healthy tissue of organs), predator-prey relationship, economic sanctions and attacks on computer network infrastructure. The basic model will be constructed on the interaction of two networks. One network is more resilient, and the other less resistant to attacks. We will define the law of conservation that links the feedback mechanism of the attack and takeover of the nodes between networks. The law so defined will determine the duration of the attack and its cost, which is used as an initial risk assessment

Building Damage-Resilient Dominating Sets in Complex Networks against Random and Targeted Attacks

We study the vulnerability of dominating sets against random and targeted node removals in complex networks. While small, cost-efficient dominating sets play a significant role in controllability and observability of these networks, a fixed and intact network structure is always implicitly assumed. We find that cost-efficiency of dominating sets optimized for small size alone comes at a price of being vulnerable to damage; domination in the remaining network can be severely disrupted, even if a small fraction of dominator nodes are lost. We develop two new methods for finding flexible dominating sets, allowing either adjustable overall resilience, or dominating set size, while maximizing the dominated fraction of the remaining network after the attack. We analyze the efficiency of each method on synthetic scale-free networks, as well as real complex networks