The Condorcet paradox revisited

We analyze the Condorcet paradox within a strategic bargaining model with majority voting, exogenous recognition probabilities, and no discounting. Stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) exist whenever the geometric mean of the players' risk coefficients, ratios of utility differences between alternatives, is at most one. SSPEs ensure agreement within finite expected time. For generic parameter values, SSPEs are unique and exclude Condorcet cycles. In an SSPE, at least two players propose their best alternative and at most one player proposes his middle alternative with positive probability. Players never reject best alternatives, may reject middle alternatives with positive probability, and reject worst alternatives. Recognition probabilities represent bargaining power and drive expected delay. Irrespective of utilities, no delay occurs for suitable distributions of bargaining power, whereas expected delay goes to infinity in the limit where one player holds all bargaining power. Contrary to the case with unanimous approval, a player benefits from an increase in his risk aversion

The Condorcet Paradox Revisited

We analyze the Condorcet paradox within a strategic bargaining model with majority voting, exogenous recognition probabilities, and no discounting for the case with three players and three alternatives. Stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) exist whenever the geometric mean of the players' risk coefficients, ratios of utility differences between alternatives, is at most one. SSPEs ensure agreement within finite expected time. For generic parameter values, SSPEs are unique and exclude Condorcet cycles. In an SSPE, at least two players propose their best alternative and at most one player proposes his middle alternative with positive probability. Players never reject best alternatives, may reject middle alternatives with positive probability, and reject worst alternatives. Recognition probabilities represent bargaining power and drive expected delay. Irrespective of utilities, no delay occurs for suitable distributions of bargaining power, whereas expected delay goes to infinity in the limit where one player holds all bargaining power. An increase in the recognition probability of a player may weaken his bargaining position. A player weakly improves his bargaining position when his risk coefficient decreases

Discusión del comportamiento del consumidor bajo un entorno publicitario moderno: revisión y ampliación del modelo de elección neoclásico

La presente disertación teórica analiza y amplia la teoría de la elección neoclásica del consumidor incorporando conceptos psicológicos y del marketing. En primer lugar se revisa literatura sobre la decisión del consumidor dentro de la Economía, la Economía del Comportamiento, la Psicología, la Psicología Económica y el Marketing. En segundo lugar se analiza y comprueba la validez de algunos supuestos de la teoría neoclásica en situaciones reales estudiadas por expertos de algunas disciplinas; además de contextos teóricos basados en una lógica real. En tercer lugar, se desarrolla un modelo de elección que amplía la teoría neoclásica y que puede determinar el efecto del Marketing y la Publicidad en la elección del consumidor. El modelo describe un ser humano que satisface sus necesidades mediante la búsqueda de bienes y servicios que estén a su alcance, y que junto con el entorno emiten información, lo que conduce al consumidor a valorarlos subjetivamente mediante un pronóstico de satisfacción o utilidad de elección constituido por un conjunto de información, que a su vez comprende: la experiencia, variables calificadas por la importancia, y la ponderación del contexto; para finalmente seleccionar la mejor opción a criterio del agente. A este modelo se insertan las variables principales del Marketing y se analiza el efecto que la publicidad tiene en estas. Se concluye que es posible la configuración de una conceptualización que amplíe la teoría neoclásica de la elección del consumidor incluyendo elementos de varias disciplinas, que permitan añadirle un mayor carácter positivista y real a esta teoría

The Condorcet paradox revisited

We analyze the Condorcet paradox within a strategic bargaining model with majority voting, exogenous recognition probabilities, and no discounting. Stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) exist whenever the geometric mean of the players' risk coefficients, ratios of utility differences between alternatives, is at most one. SSPEs ensure agreement within finite expected time. For generic parameter values, SSPEs are unique and exclude Condorcet cycles. In an SSPE, at least two players propose their best alternative and at most one player proposes his middle alternative with positive probability. Players never reject best alternatives, may reject middle alternatives with positive probability, and reject worst alternatives. Recognition probabilities represent bargaining power and drive expected delay. Irrespective of utilities, no delay occurs for suitable distributions of bargaining power, whereas expected delay goes to infinity in the limit where one player holds all bargaining power. Contrary to the case with unanimous approval, a player benefits from an increase in his risk aversion

The Condorcet Paradox Revisited

We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents' risk coefficients, ratios of utility differences between alternatives, is at most one. Equilibria are generically unique, Pareto efficient, and ensure agreement within finite expected time. Agents propose best or second-best alternatives. Agents accept best alternatives, may reject second-best alternatives with positive probability, and reject otherwise. For symmetric recognition probabilities and risk coefficients below one, agreement is immediate and each agent proposes his best alternative.Bargaining, Condorcet Paradox, Consistent Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Risk Aversion, Compromise Prone