Daniel Hannan, Thomas Paine, and the Rhetoric of Outrage

The purpose of this rhetorical study is to examine the textual charisma of Thomas Paine\u27s Common Sense and Daniel Hannan\u27s speech The Devalued Prime Minister of a Devalued Government and how that charisma made these artifacts successful in spreading outrage surrounding the historical and political events of their respective eras. The author uses Weber\u27s theory of charisma filtered through Rosenberg and Hirschberg\u27s expanded theory identifying lexical charisma, or the charisma of messages. The author analyzes Paine\u27s and Hannan\u27s use of persuasiveness, believability, and powerfulness, translating each of these characteristics into specific cues that can be identified in the individual texts. The author argues for a new subdivision of protest rhetoric called outrage rhetoric

ANTIDOTES TO DEISM: A RECEPTION HISTORY OF THOMAS PAINE’S THE AGE OF REASON, 1794-1809

ANTIDOTES TO DEISM: A RECEPTION HISTORY OF THOMAS PAINE’S THE AGE OF REASON, 1794-1809 Patrick Wallace Hughes, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2013 In the Anglo-American world of the late 1790s, Thomas Paine’s The Age of Reason (published in two parts) was not well received, and his volumes of Deistic theology were characterized as extremely dangerous. Over seventy replies to The Age of Reason appeared in Britain and the United States. It was widely criticized in the periodical literature, and it garnered Paine the reputation as a champion of irreligion. This dissertation is a study of the rhetoric of refutation, and I focus on the replies to The Age of Reason that were published during Paine’s lifetime (d. 1809). I pay particular attention to the ways that the replies characterized both Paine and The Age of Reason, and the strategies that his respondents employed to highlight and counteract its “poison.” To effectively refute The Age of Reason, Paine’s respondents had to contend not only with his Deistic arguments, but also with his international reputation, his style of writing, and his intended audience. I argue that much of the driving force behind the controversy over The Age of Reason stems from the concern that it was geared towards the “uneducated masses” or the “lower orders.” Much of the rhetoric of the respondents therefore reflects their preoccupation with Paine’s “vulgar” style, his use of ridicule and low-humor, his notoriety, and the perception that The Age of Reason was being read by common people in cheap editions. For Paine’s critics, when the masses abandon their Christianity for Deism, bloody anarchy is the inevitable result, as proven by the horrors of the French Revolution. This dissertation argues that while Paine’s respondents were concerned about what he wrote in The Age of Reason, they were more concerned about how he wrote it, for whom he wrote it, and that Paine wrote it. Drawing on Jürgen Habermas’s theories of the bourgeois public sphere, I focus on how respondents to The Age of Reason reveal not only their concerns and anxieties over the book, but also what their assumptions about authorial legitimacy and expectations about qualified reading audiences say about late eighteenth century print culture

The Rhetoric of Conflict in Political Theory

The language surrounding the decision to go to war in American political discourse is often very divisive and draws upon numerous rhetorical traditions. Early research on the question of what types of arguments favoring war has been largely inconclusive. Alongside the facts concerning conflict are numerous orators drawing upon various discourses and intellectual traditions seeking to sway their audience either toward or away from conflict. One such study is the work of James Andrews who conducted case studies to develop an “American adolescence” theory suggesting that arguments of honor and principle were the most persuasive in convincing men to take up arms. This research, however, fails to convincingly answer this question. In this dissertation, I use a rhetorical framework to investigate the types of arguments used in early-American history that try to influence the decision to go to war. Primarily, this dissertation examines Andrews’ theory of principled arguments and employs a second variable, that is, arguments of expediency. I argue that principled arguments are not as successful as Andrews concludes and instead arguments of expediency are more commonplace than arguments of principle. Additionally, I argue that expedient rhetoric is a necessary component for mobilizing mass support for a war but expedient rhetoric is not necessary when arguing for inaction. Rather, principled arguments can also serve to motivate audiences toward inaction. To examine whether Andrews’ theory of principled arguments is largely correct, I first demonstrate that Machiavelli used arguments of expediency in an attempt to convince the Medici to go to war. From this example, I conduct three case studies where arguments of principle and arguments of expediency are both present. I find that in arguments prior to the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Mexican-American War are largely a mixed bag. In the American Revolution and the War of 1812, arguments of expediency are often capable in convincing men to take up arms. However, I demonstrate that in the Mexican-American War, arguments of principle may help to limit the severity of conflict

Models of Judgment: Rhetoric and the Public Philosophies of Law

This project responds to a need for new theoretical tools for understanding law as a site for the intersection of rhetoric and philosophy. In advancing the concept of “models of judgment” as a meta-theoretical approach to the philosophical rhetoric of jurisprudence, I argue that it provides a unique perspective on the rhetorical commitments undergirding prominent judicial theories. Paragons of good judgment crafted by Richard Posner, Martha Nussbaum, and Cass Sunstein are examined, foregrounding their rhetorical character and function