Ars vel scientia rationalis. A natureza ambivalente da lógica segundo Tomás de Aquino

Tomás de Aquino classifica a lógica simultaneamente como arte e ciência. Essa ambiguidade foi interpretada por alguns scholars como uma contradição prima facie que deveria ser eliminada para que a posição de Tomás fizesse sentido. No presente artigo, tentaremos, primeiramente, sugerir que a mesma ambiguidade estava presente em diversos autores do período e ilustraremos esse ponto citando como exemplo a classificação proposta por Rogério Bacon. Em segundo lugar, analisaremos uma outra classificação importante da lógica como ciência do discurso e da razão, visão compartilhada, por exemplo, por Roberto Kilwadby. Em terceiro lugar, mostraremos que Tomás não segue essa tradição e propõe entender a lógica apenas como ciência da razão, posição essa que é consistente com a divisão da lógica como ciência e arte AbstractThomas Aquinas classifies logic simultaneously as art and science. This ambiguity was interpreted by some scholars as a prima facie contradiction that should be eliminated if we want to make sense of Thomas' position. In this paper, we will, firstly, try to suggest that the same ambiguity was present in different authors of the period and we will illustrate this point quoting Roger Bacon's classification of logic as an example. Secondly, we will analyze another important classification of logic as a science of discourse and a science of reason, a view shared, among others, by Robert Kilwardby. Thirdly, we will see that Aquinas does not follow this tradition and proposes an understanding of logic only as a science of reason, a position that is consistent with the division of logic as science and art. Recebido em 08/2014 Aprovado em 09/201

Thomas Aquinas on the Apprehension of Being: The Role of Judgement in Light of Thirteenth-Century Semantics

Aquinas’ famous comments in his early Scriptum on the Sentences (In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3) regarding the intellect’s apprehension of essence and esse have traditionally been interpreted as grounding Aquinas’ doctrine on the judgment of esse. For Aquinas, it appears, what the intellect apprehends in a simple concept is essence. Since esse, for him, is not an essence, it cannot, on the received view, be the object of conceptualization. Therefore, esse is grasped by the intellect only in judgment. The claim that no genuine concept of esse is possible, however, is inconsistent with Aquinas’ theory of signification. A term’s signification is constituted, at least in part, in its “signing relation” with some “concept” in the mind. If, as on the traditional reading, there is no concept of esse, the term ‘esse’ is left without signification. To respond that the term ‘esse’ signs, not a concept, but the judgment in which esse is apprehended is in direct conflict with Aquinas’ claim elsewhere that no term, including ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, signifies a judgment. I propose an alternative interpretation to In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, one that allows for the possibility of a conceptual apprehension of esse. The alternative reading explains Aquinas’ remarks there in light of the theoretical context of the discussion, in particular the theory of propositions and their objects. I show how and why Aquinas develops a distinctive theory of the object of the proposition, that it is concerned with “the esse of a thing” as a complex. Although this complex includes the simple act of being, as for the traditional position (contrary to its major critics), it cannot be reduced to anything simple. Despite the Sentences’ affirmation of a real distinction between a thing’s esse and essence, to which correspond two different operations of the intellect, it does not follow that the human intellect cannot conceive esse, just as it conceives essences, in a simple conception

Tomás de Aquino sobre la aprehensión del ser: el papel del juicio a la luz de la semántica del siglo trece

Demuestra la posibilidad de una simple concepción del ser en la filosofía de Tomás de Aquino. Se demuestra la posibilidad de una aprehensión conceptual del ser a través de una nueva lectura de In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3., a la luz del contexto teórico del texto, en particular la teoría de la proposición y sus objetos. La afirmación de una distinción real entre esencia y existencia a la cual se corresponden las dos operaciones del intelecto, no elimina la posibilidad de una simple concepción del ser.Aquinas’ famous comments in his early Scriptum on the Sentences (In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3) regarding the intellect’s apprehension of essence and esse have traditionally been interpreted as grounding Aquinas’ doctrine on the judgment of esse. For Aquinas, it appears, what the intellect apprehends in a simple concept is essence. Since esse, for him, is not an essence, it cannot, on the received view, be the object of conceptualization. Therefore, esse is grasped by the intellect only in judgment. The claim that no genuine concept of esse is possible, however, is inconsistent with Aquinas’ theory of signification. A term’s signification is constituted, at least in part, in its “signing relation” with some “concept” in the mind. If, as on the traditional reading, there is no concept of esse, the term ‘esse’ is left without signification. To respond that the term ‘esse’ signs, not a concept, but the judgment in which esse is apprehended is in direct conflict with Aquinas’ claim elsewhere that no term, including ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, signifies a judgment. I propose an alternative interpretation to In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, one that allows for the possibility of a conceptual apprehension of esse. The alternative reading explains Aquinas’ remarks there in light of the theoretical context of the discussion, in particular the theory of propositions and their objects. I show how and why Aquinas develops a distinctive theory of the object of the proposition, that it is concerned with “the esse of a thing” as a complex. Although this complex includes the simple act of being, as for the traditional position (contrary to its major critics), it cannot be reduced to anything simple. Despite the Sentences’ affirmation of a real distinction between a thing’s esse and essence, to which correspond two different operations of the intellect, it does not follow that the human intellect cannot conceive esse, just as it conceives essences, in a simple conception.Tesi

Logica laurentiana. Studio sui libri II e III della dialettica di Lorenzo Valla

2015 - 2016My PhD thesis is concerned with logic developed by Lorenzo Valla in the second and third book of the Dialectica, his main philosophical work. Valla’s logic, by himself named «logica laurentiana», aim to reform aristotelian and medieval logic introducing a series of principles borrowed by rhetoric and grammar. The purpose of my thesis is to show the deep influence of this principles on the aristotelian paradigm, at least on moments that Valla is concerned with. Far from separate rhetoric from logic, or the oratorical point of view from the philosophical/logical point of view, Valla intends to give birth to a new course of logic through a refoundation of old method. In light of that, it must be reviewed another exegetical topos widespread among Dialectica’s scholars: the reduction of dialectic to rhetoric. Valla mantains the autonomy (but not the indipendence) of dialectic from rhetoric, and he grants to the first a separate space from second because the obiect of these two artes is different. [edited by Author]XXIX n.s