Limits and opportunities of risk analysis application in railway systems

Risk Analysis is a collection of methods widely used in many industrial sectors. In the transport sector it has been particularly used for air transport applications. The reasons for this wide use are well-known: risk analysis allows to approach the safety theme in a stochastic - rather than deterministic - way, it forces to break down the system in sub-components, last but not least it allows a comparison between solutions with different costs, introducing de facto an element of economic feasibility of the project alternatives in the safety field. Apart from the United Kingdom, in Europe the application of this tool in the railway sector is relatively recent. In particular Directive 2004/49/EC (the "railway safety directive") provides for compulsory risk assessment in relation to the activities of railway Infrastructure Managers (IMs) and of Railway Undertakings (RUs). Nevertheless the peculiarity of the railway system - in which human, procedural, environmental and technological components have a continuous interchange and in which human responsibilities and technological functions often overlap - induced the EC to allow wide margins of subjectivity in the interpretation of risk assessment. When enacting Commission Regulation (EC) No 352/2009 which further regulates this subject, a risk assessment is considered positive also if the IM or RU declare to take safety measures widely used in normal practice. The paper shows the results of a structured comparative analysis of the rail sector and other industrial sectors, which illustrate the difficulties, but also the opportunities, of a transfer towards the railway system of the risk analysis methods currently in use for the other systems

Exploring rail futures using scenarios: experience and potential

In 1995 the author of this paper undertook a scenario exercise for British Rail to identify priorities for rail science and technology developments under the new privatised regime. Four marketbased 2010 scenarios were developed for UK rail transport: 1) cost driven; 2) quality driven, 3)technology driven and 4) environmentally driven. These helped to identify areas of strategic R&D that were needed to improve rail’s competitiveness. It is now over a decade since this scenario exercise took place. This paper, updating an earlier review (Potter and Roy, 2000), revisits the 1995 scenarios and compares them to what actual market strategies emerged within the privatised railway industry. It explores whether the four scenarios did succeed in capturing the range of market responses that emerged from rail privatisation and what lessons this contains for the use of scenarios transport research

How secure is ERTMS?

This paper reports on the results of a security analysis of the European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS) specifications. ERTMS is designed to be fail-safe and the general philosophy of ‘if in doubt, stop the train’ makes it difficult to engineer a train accident. However, it is possible to exploit the fail-safe behaviour of ERTMS and create a situation that causes a train to halt. Thus, denial of service attacks are possible, and could be launched at a time and place of the attacker’s choosing, perhaps designed to cause maximum disruption or passenger discomfort. Causing an accident is more difficult but not impossible

Better safe than sorry? Reliability policy in network industries

This report develops a roadmap for reliability policy in network industries. Based on economic theory, we analyse the relationship between reliability and various types of government policy: privatisation, liberalisation, regulation, unbundling, and 'commitment policy'. We let government policy depend on (1) the feasibility of competition between networks, (2) contractibility of reliability, and (3) the relation between profit maximisation and public interests. We test this roadmap on the basis of the empirical literature and case studies on electricity, natural gas, drinking water, wastewater, and railways.

Methodology for a security audit of ERTMS

In this paper we discuss the methodology we used for a security audit of the European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS) specifications. ERTMS is a major industrial project that aims at replacing the many different national train control and command systems in Europe. We discuss the stages of the audit, threat model used, and the output of each stage of the audit