The evolution of morality and the end of economic man

1871 saw the publication of two major treatises in economics, with self-seeking economic man at their center. In the same year Darwin published The Descent of Man, which emphasized sympathy and cooperation as well as self-interest, and contained a powerful argument that morality has evolved in humans by natural selection. Essentially this stance is supported by modern research. This paper considers the nature of morality and how it has evolved. It reconciles Darwin's notion that a developed morality requires language and deliberation (and is thus unique to humans), with his other view that moral feelings have a long-evolved and biologically-inherited basis. The social role of morality and its difference with altruism is illustrated by an agent-based simulation. The fact that humans combine both moral and selfish dispositions has major implications for the social sciences and obliges us to abandon the pre-eminent notion of selfish economic man. Economic policy must take account of our moral nature.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

When Society Meets the Individual: Marx contra Nietzsche, Antipodal Views on Society, Morality, and Religion

An irony, however, is that although Nietzsche had read extensively important philosophers of his time, and in fact, had been known for his ad hominem criticisms on his predecessors, there is an astonishing silence on Marx in the Nietzsche literature, as if Marx is unheard-of in Nietzsche’s time despite the very close world they lived in as though neighbors, and also despite the growing influence of socialism in Nietzsche’s time. Nietzsche openly utters his strong disgust to the German National Socialist Party which was later commonly referred as the Nazis. In this connection, he never mentioned the name of Marx as though it did not exist in his vocabulary. Although at first glance, they appear similar in the sense that both of them revolted against morality and religion, and made a distinction of society into opposing classes. But, in truth, they are worlds apart. They lived on two opposite worlds. Nietzsche is from the start an antipode of Marx. Aside from presenting a clear contrast of these two thinkers, here I also come up with a Nietzschean critique on the Marxian thought

An Incongruent Amalgamation: John Stuart Mill\u27s Utilitarianism on Naturalism

John Stuart Mill\u27s utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, often surfaces in cultural debates in the contemporary West over the extent and foundations of moral duties. Given the drift from its historical Judeo-Christian moorings, naturalism now provides much of the epistemic grounding in Western culture in relation to moral duties. The amalgamation of Mill’s utilitarianism and naturalism has resulted in a cultural and epistemic disconnect. Naturalism is hard-pressed to provide consistent epistemic support for Mill’s utilitarian principle. This essay provides a number of suggestions as to why Mill’s utilitarianism may be inconsistent on naturalism

Apes with a Moral Code? Primatology, Moral Sentimentalism, and the Evolution of Morality in The Planet of the Apes

This essay examines the recent Planet of the Apes films through the lens of recent research in primatology. The films lend imaginary support to primatologist Frans de Waal’s evolutionary moral sentimentalism; however, the movies also show that truly moral motions outstrip the cognitive capacities of the great apes. The abstract moral principles employed by the ape community in the movie require the ability to understand and apply a common underlying explanation to perceptually disparate situations; in contrast, recent research in comparative psychology demonstrates that the great apes lack this capacity. Since the capacity for abstraction is required on even the most basic version of moral sentimentalism—Shaun Nichols’ sentimental rules account—the lack of the capacity for abstraction reveals a qualitative distinction between primate social behavior and human morality

Finding footing in a postmodern conception of law

Copyright @ 2010 Pace UniversityThe following jurisprudence paper examines the implications of postmodern thought upon our conception of law. In this paper I argue that, despite the absolute, all-consuming moral relativism towards which postmodernism seems to lead in its most extreme form, its acceptance in fact in no way undermines the possibility of finding solid ground for our legal principles. This paper contends that moral objectivity can be found in the individual experience of suffering generated by these very subjective concoctions. Subjective concoctions or not, they are real in that they imbue a sense of value into conditions, and may thus serve as foundational principles for law. While our value systems are stripped of all claim to objective authority, ultimately, all postmodernism does is force us to set aside our larger concepts of “justice,” and instead root our legal conceptions at this far more fundamental level of human experience

Are Big Gods a big deal in the emergence of big groups?

In Big Gods, Norenzayan (2013) presents the most comprehensive treatment yet of the Big Gods question. The book is a commendable attempt to synthesize the rapidly growing body of survey and experimental research on prosocial effects of religious primes together with cross-cultural data on the distribution of Big Gods. There are, however, a number of problems with the current cross-cultural evidence that weaken support for a causal link between big societies and certain types of Big Gods. Here we attempt to clarify these problems and, in so doing, correct any potential misinterpretation of the cross-cultural findings, provide new insight into the processes generating the patterns observed, and flag directions for future research