Rani Lill Anjum & Stephen Mumford What Tends to Be: the Philosophy of Dispositional Modality. London & New York: Routledge, hbk pp. x+193

There seems to be widespread agreement that there are two modal values: necessity and possibility. X is necessary if it is not possible that not-X; and Y is possible if it is not necessary that not-Y. In their path-breaking book, Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford defend the radical idea that there is a third modal value, weaker than necessity and stronger than possibility. This third value is dubbed 'dispositional modality' (DM) or 'tendency' and is taken to be an irreducible and sui generis worldly modality: "the modality that's everywhere" (5). The source of DM is the causal powers of particulars; hence, DM is constitutively involved in causation: "a cause tends or disposes towards its effect, and can sometimes succeed in producing it" (9). Accordingly, DM is involved in all causal processes, from fundamental physics to the social and moral realm. This "deeply tendential view" (11) of the metaphysics of nature is advanced as distinct from both extant neo-Aristotelian and Humean views. Its key feature is that there is neither pure contingency nor necessitation in nature

Introduction to Nietzsche on Mind and Nature

This chapter provides summaries of the chapter of this book and introduces the major themes and debates addressed in the volume. Discussed are Nietzsche’s metaphysics; his philosophy of mind in light of contemporary views; the question of panpsychism of Beyond Good and Evil 36; the rejection of dualism in favour of monism, in particular a monism of value; Nietzsche’s positions on consciousness and embodied cognition in light of recent cognitive science; a conception of freedom and agency based on an intrinsically motivating; embodied sense of self-efficacy; a Nietzschean account of valuing understood as drive-induced affective orientations of which an agent approves; the idea of ressentiment conceived as a process of intentional, not reflectively strategic, self-deception about one’s own conscious mental states; and a defence of a Nietzschean naturalism

Forty Years Later: Naming Without Necessity, Necessity Without Naming

The essay examines the proper treament of (i) naming (ii) necessity. (A) It argues their mutual independence (B) provides a treatment of naming separately from any idea of "designation" (C) gives treatment of de re modality without any use of possible worlds, essences, concepts, rigid designators (D) it argues an ultimate asymmetry-naming/referring is a key real notion of semantics; necessity should not be the central idea in the metaphysics of nature

On Kant's first insight into the problem of space dimensionality and its physical foundations

In this article it is shown that a careful analysis of Kant's "Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces" leads to a conclusion that does not match the usually accepted interpretation of Kant's reasoning in 1747, according to which the Young Kant supposedly establishes a relationship between the tridimensionality of space and Newton's law of universal gravitation. Indeed, it is argued that this text does not yield a satisfactory explanation of space dimensionality, actually restricting itself to justify the tridimensionality of extension.Comment: 14 page

Schopenhauer e as duas ordens de finalidade no mundo

In this paper, I intend to argue that the emergence of the material conditions for the suppression and denial of the will in the human organism (the extraordinary and to some extent “unnatural” development of the brain) is not something like an “accident on the way” of will's manifestation in the world. It is rather, as it were, an intentional result of the whole process of objectivation of the will, a result that emerges from a teleological order. This teleological order is primary and more fundamental than the teleological order of nature that produces each phenomenon and each organic structure according to its ability to promote the emergence, conservation and expansion of life. This means that we have to understand the problematic principle of nature's purposiveness in Schopenhauer's thought as containing two distinct and largely contradictory orders of purpose. We can call these two orders of purposiveness “order of nature” and “order of salvation” (in analogy to Schopenhauer’s “kingdom of nature” and “kingdom of grace”). These two orders of purpose correspond to what I understand to be two forms of teleology that coexist in constant tension in his system: a functional and an ethical-soteriological teleology.Neste artigo, pretendo argumentar que o surgimento das condições materiais para a supressão e a negação da vontade no organismo humano (o desenvolvimento extraordinário e em certa medida “antinatural” do cérebro) não é algo como um “acidente de percurso” no processo de manifestação da vontade no mundo. Trata-se, antes, de um resultado intencional de todo o processo de objetivação da vontade, um resultado que emerge de uma ordenação teleológica. Essa ordem teleológica é primária e mais fundamental do que a ordem teleológica da natureza que produz cada fenômeno e cada estrutura orgânica em função de sua capacidade de promover o surgimento, a conservação e a expansão da vida. Isso faz com que tenhamos de encarar o problemático princípio de finalidade da natureza no pensamento de Schopenhauer como contendo duas ordens distintas e em grande medida contraditórias. Podemos denominar essas duas ordens de finalidade “ordem da natureza” e “ordem da salvação” (em analogia com o “reino da natureza” e o “reino da graça” de Schopenhauer). Essas duas ordens de finalidade no mundo correspondem àquilo que entendo serem duas formas de teleologia que convivem em constante tensão em seu sistema: uma teleologia funcional e uma teleologia ético-soteriológica

Meaning, moral realism, and the importance of morality

Many philosophers have suspected that the normative importance of morality depends on moral realism. In this paper, I defend a version of this suspicion: I argue that if teleological forms of moral realism, those that posit an objective purpose to human life, are true, then we gain a distinctive kind of reason to do what is morally required. I argue for this by showing that if these forms of realism are true, then doing what is morally required can provide a life with meaning, which is a widespread human need. I also argue that rival meta-ethical views, like anti-realism or non-naturalist realism, cannot make morality meaning-conferring in this way

No Laws and (Thin) Powers In, No (Governing) Laws Out

Non-Humean accounts of the metaphysics of nature posit either laws or powers in order to account for natural necessity and world-order. We argue that such monistic views face fundamental problems. On the one hand, neo-Aristotelians cannot give unproblematic power-based accounts of the functional laws among quantities offered by physical theories, as well as of the place of conservation laws and symmetries in a lawless ontology; in order to capture these characteristics, commitment to governing laws is indispensable. On the other hand, ontologies that entirely exclude some kind of power ascription to worldly entities (such as primitivism) face what we call the Governing Problem: such ontologies do not have the resources to give an adequate account of how laws play their governing role. We propose a novel dualist model, which, we argue, has the resources to solve the difficulties encountered by its two dominant competitors, without inheriting the problems of either view. According to the dualist model, both laws and powers (suitably conceived) are equally fundamental and irreducible to each other, and both are needed in order to give a satisfactory account of the nomological structure of the world. The dualist model constitutes thus a promising alternative to current monistic views in the metaphysics of science

Lines of Flight: Everyday Resistance along England’s Backbone

The visual and the cultural impact of ‘social industry’ has made a permanent impression on the landscape and on individual minds, whether for ill or for good, particularly in the Peak and Pennines region of northern England. In the current research we examine this impact and consider how both its visible and less apparent effects took hold and how they set in motion an ongoing process of productive/consumptive estrangement from life’s primordial forces, which continue to be alien and obscure, or else appear arcane and overly nostalgic to present-day life. Drawing on the methodology of a short film (incorporating narrative and verse) and using rock climbing as an illustration, we will invoke several, radically dynamic ‘lines of flight’ to open up and articulate an aesthetic appreciation of concrete experience in the fight against coding and to engender a call for action and passion so that we might come to a renewed belief in free activity, which can prompt us, in turn, to think about how we live and work and how we might change things

The Relevance of an Existential Conception of Nature

It is often assumed that science provides the most accurate knowledge about nature. This view not only collapses distinctions between different forms of knowing but also results in a paradox whereby understanding what it means to exist in the world is dictated by practioners of science. In this essay I argue for the relevance of an existential conception of nature via the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and how his notions of thrownness and phusis enable us to recognize a certain ethical bond to nature. I conclude with a critical analysis of liability insurance and actuarial science to demonstrate my points

Analogy: the universal switch of Schopenhauerian thought

Often perceived by its contradictors as the main fragility of its system, analogy constitutes however a driving element of the development of Schopenhauerian metaphysics, and makes it possible to avoid the pitfall of theoretical egoism in which any idealistic philosophy can sink. We will try to show, in accordance with the indications of paragraph 19 of The World as Will and Representation, how Schopenhauer understands the totality of the phenomena "by analogy with our body" and establishes the structure of his masterpiece from this analogical dynamic that puts in motion the primitive intuition of his thought.Often perceived by its contradictors as the main fragility of its system, analogy constitutes however a driving element of the development of Schopenhauerian metaphysics, and makes it possible to avoid the pitfall of theoretical egoism in which any idealistic philosophy can sink. We will try to show, in accordance with the indications of paragraph 19 of The World as Will and Representation, how Schopenhauer understands the totality of the phenomena "by analogy with our body" and establishes the structure of his masterpiece from this analogical dynamic that puts in motion the primitive intuition of his thought