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Recent Legal Literature
Daniel: The Elements of the Law of Negotiable Instruments; Tiffany: The Law of Real Property and Other Interests in Land; Stearns: The Law of Suretyship. Covering Personal Suretyship, Commercial Guaranties, Suretyship as Related to Negotiable Instruments, Bonds to Secure Private Obligations, Official and Judicial Bonds Surety Companies
āļŠāļąāļāļāļēāļāđāļģāļāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāđāļāđāļāļĄāļĢāļāļāļāļāļāļāļāđāļāđāļāļēāļĒāļēāļāļŦāļĢāļ·āļāđāļĄāđ
Dose Suretyship Redeem the Successor?āļāļāļāļąāļāļĒāđāļāļŠāļąāļāļāļēāļāđāļģāļāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļ āđāļāđāļāļāļēāļĢāļāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāļāđāļ§āļĒāļāļąāļ§āļāļļāļāļāļĨāđāļāļĒāļāļđāđāļāđāļģāļāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāļāļģāļŠāļąāļāļāļēāļāļąāļāđāļāđāļēāļŦāļāļĩāđāļ§āđāļēāļŦāļēāļāļĨāļđāļāļŦāļāļĩāđāļāļīāļāļāļąāļāļāđāļāđāļāđāļēāļŦāļāļĩāđ āļāļđāđāļāđāļģāļāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāļāļ°āļāļģāļĢāļ°āļŦāļāļĩāđāđāļāļāļĨāļđāļāļŦāļāļĩāđ āļāļķāđāļāđāļāļāļāđāļēāļāļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāļŦāļāļĩāđāđāļāļĨāļąāļāļĐāļāļ°āļāļ·āđāļ āđāļāđāļ āļāļģāļāļāļāļŦāļĢāļ·āļāļāļģāļāļģ āđāļāļĒāļāļĢāļāļĩāļāļģāļāļāļāļŦāļĢāļ·āļāļāļģāļāļģāļāļąāđāļāļāļđāđāļāļģāļāļāļāļŦāļĢāļ·āļāļāļđāđāļāļģāļāļģāļāļ°āļāļģāļāļĢāļąāļāļĒāđāļŠāļīāļāđāļāđāļāđāļāļāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāļŦāļāļĩāđ āļāļķāđāļāļāļĢāļāļĩāļŠāļąāļāļāļēāļāđāļģāļāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāļāļąāđāļāļāļāļŦāļĄāļēāļĒāđāļĄāđāđāļāđāļāļģāļŦāļāļāđāļāļāđāļ§āđāđāļāđāļāļĒāđāļēāļāđāļ 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āđāļĄāļ·āđāļāļāļđāđāļāđāļģāļāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāļāļķāļāđāļāđāļāļ§āļēāļĄāļāļēāļĒāļāđāļāļāļāļĩāđāļāļ§āļēāļĄāļĢāļąāļāļāļīāļāļāļāļāļāļđāđāļāđāļģāļāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāļāļ°āđāļāļīāļāļāļķāđāļ āļāļēāļĒāļēāļāļāļāļāļāļđāđāļāđāļģāļāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāļāļķāļāļŦāļēāļāļģāļāđāļāļāļĢāļąāļāļāļīāļāļāđāļāđāļāđāļēāļŦāļāļĩāđāđāļāđāļāļĒāđāļēāļāđāļāđāļĄāđABSTRACTSuretyship is a guarantee by person whereby the surety has entered into a contract with creditor and binds himself to satisfy an obligation in lieu of a debtor if debtor fails to perform such obligation. The contract of suretyship is different from mortgage and pledge as it requires no registration or consignment of properties. Neither has its form, suretyship requires merely written evidence unilaterally signed by the surety for purpose of enforcement. Such the document requires no even affixture of duty stamps. The case is different when it bears signature of the creditor together with the one of the surety. With two signatures of the parties, the contract is treated by law as a written instrument of which requires affixture of duty stamps in order to be enforced by creditor.As the matter of fact that suretyship is a guarantee by person, there is thus a legal issue subject to attention of this research and that is regarding the death of the surety. Whereas the Supreme Court, in its decision No. 1268/2555 (2012), has previously ruled that though the surety had passed away before the debtor was in default, such death will not redeem his successor from suretyship liability, its discretion is yet problematic in view of the author and that hence brought this article to analyze and discuss on this problematic issue.This research is of an opinion that where the surety passes away before the debtor be in default, suretyship liability shall then become dissolved provided that suretyship by its nature is purely personal to the surety. Successor shall not then be liable unless such death happens to take place after debtor is in default and that, according to the law of succession, successor shall inherit both rights and duties of the deceased, including this liability of suretyship
An Essay on Independence, Interdependence, and the Suretyship Principle
In this article, Professor Peter A. Alces investigates the tension that exists between the independent and interdependent nature of contractual relations arising in suretyship agreements and letter of credit transactions. This discussion is particularly timely as the American Law Institute is currently revising both the Restatement of the Law of Suretyship and Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Letters of Credit. This article discerns a basic incongruity between the two revisions\u27 treatment of interrelated multiple party rights and discusses the consequences that this incongruity can be expected to have upon commercial transactions
Personal Guarantees and Sureties between Commercial Law and Consumers in the United States
Guaranties and suretyships reduce the risk of default and today remain essential arrangements in many commercial and consumer transactions. A guarantor or surety promises to pay for the debt of a third party and may become primarily liable on that debt. Despite the significance of such a promise and the resulting obligation, U.S. law does not clearly distinguish between a guarantor and surety in a consumer or commercial context. This is of particular relevance, because in a consumer context a guaranty often has a gratuitous or sentimental element and a guarantor may not always be fully aware of the risks and liabilities involved with a guarantee promise. U.S. law generally considers guaranties and suretyships simply as third-party beneficiary contracts to which common law contract principles apply. This, in turn, makes guaranties and suretyships primarily a state law concern, resulting in significant differences of suretyship laws among all U.S. jurisdictions. As such, the U.S. lacks a uniform body of law in this area and makes consumer protection in a guaranty and suretyship context perfunctory at best
Responsibility for Anotherâs Debt: Suretyship, Solidarity, and Imperfect Delegation
Legal evolution is often achieved by taking a fresh look at venerable institutions whose interpretation has become thwarted, constricted, or stale. Presumptions established to protect debtors and sureties at articles 1525 and 2335 of the Civil Code of QuÃĐbec have prevented jurists from borrowing freely from the rules of solidarity and suretyship. Where one person is undoubtedly responsible for the debt of another, even in the absence of a suretyship agreement, the author argues it should be possible to apply the law of suretyship by analogy. Where two persons are each liable to perform the same obligation in full, it is likewise appropriate to apply the rules of solidarity.The authorâs analysis proceeds in three parts: an introduction of the basic structure of suretyship and solidarity (Part I), a discussion of important differences in the law of suretyship and solidarity (Part II), and an argument that the solidarity and suretyship models should be used to illuminate analogous complex relations where multiple persons are responsible for the same debt (Part III). More specifically, in the situation of imperfect delegation, where a person assumes liability to a creditor for payment of a debt owed by another, but the original debtor is not discharged and remains liable in case of non-payment by the new debtor, it is appropriate to apply by analogy the law of suretyship.LâÃĐvolution du droit est souvent rendue possible grÃĒce à lâÃĐtude attentive de rÃĻgles anciennes, quâune interprÃĐtation trop rigide, maintes fois rÃĐpÃĐtÃĐe, a fait dÃĐvier de leur sens premier. Ainsi, les prÃĐsomptions mises en place aux articles 1525 et 2335 du Code civil du QuÃĐbec pour protÃĐger les dÃĐbiteurs et les cautions ont empÊchÃĐ les juristes de puiser librement dans les rÃĻgles de la solidaritÃĐ et du cautionnement à titre de droit commun. Selon lâauteure, dÃĻs lors quâil est ÃĐtabli quâune personne est responsable pour la dette dâautrui, il devrait Être possible, mÊme en lâabsence dâun contrat de cautionnement, dâappliquer par analogie le droit du cautionnement. Il devrait en Être de mÊme de lâapplication du rÃĐgime juridique des obligations solidaires, lorsque deux personnes sont tenues dâexÃĐcuter une mÊme obligation dans son intÃĐgralitÃĐ.Lâanalyse de lâauteure se dÃĐroule en trois temps : la mise en ÃĐvidence de la structure de base du cautionnement et de la solidaritÃĐ, lâanalyse des principales diffÃĐrences de rÃĐgime entre le cautionnement et la solidaritÃĐ et, finalement, lâargument selon lequel les modÃĻles du cautionnement et de la solidaritÃĐ peuvent Être exploitÃĐs afin de clarifier les relations juridiques complexes qui leur sont analogues, dans lesquelles plusieurs personnes sont responsables pour la mÊme dette. Sâagissant enfin de la dÃĐlÃĐgation imparfaite, à savoir la reprise dâune dette sans libÃĐration du dÃĐbiteur dâorigine, lâauteure dÃĐmontre quâil convient dâappliquer par analogie les rÃĻgles du cautionnement aux relations juridiques entre les parties
The National Credit Act Regarding Suretyships and Reckless Lending
In terms of the National Credit Act a credit provider may conclude a credit agreement with a consumer only after he has made a proper financial assessment and concludes that the consumer will be able to satisfy all of his obligations under all his credit agreements. However, a practice of not conducting this affordability assessment has evolved amongst certain credit providers where the credit agreement involved is a suretyship agreement. This article investigates whether or not a suretyship agreement is indeed a credit agreement in terms of the National Credit Act, and if a financial assessment should be conducted in the case of a suretyship agreement. The main aim of the article is to try to identify what the concept of a âcredit guaranteeâ, as defined in the Act, encompasses and ultimately if the common-law contract of suretyship falls under this definition. Our conclusion is that âcredit guaranteeâ is as vague and problematic as many of the other definitions in the Act. If one reads the Act in its entirety (including the regulations to the Act), it seems unlikely that the legislature intended not to regulate common-law suretyships also.  Â
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