Kontribusi Perolehan Theory of Mind Terhadap Perkembangan Mental TIME Travel Pada Anak Usia 3-5 Tahun

Berfikir mengenai masa depan merupakan kemampuan kognitif yang mendasar pada manusia dan merupakan kemampuan yang sangat penting. Mental Time Travel (MTT) merupakan kemampuan yang dimiliki manusia untuk me-recall masa lalu dan memprediksi masa depan. Melalui MTT manusia dapat untuk membuat perencanaan, memprediksi masa depan serta mengantisipasi masalah yang akan dihadapi. Salah satu faktor yang diduga memberikan pengaruh terhadap MTT adalah perolehan Theory of Mind (ToM) yaitu kemampuan manusia untuk memprediksi mental state orang lain. Oleh karena itu, diperlukan penelitian lebih jauh untuk melihat bagaimana kontribusi perolehan ToM terhadap perkembangan MTT. Untuk melihat kontribusi perolehan ToM terhadap MTT dilakukan pengukuran MTT melalui 2 eksperimen (Verbal task dan Tool Task) serta pengukuran skala ToM yang dikembangkan oleh Wellman dan Liu (2011) pada anak usia 3-5 tahun. Hasil dari penelitian ini diperoleh usia mulai berkembangnya MTT, urutan perolehan ToM serta kontribusi perolehan ToM terhadap MTT. Penelitian ini juga menunjukkan bahwa Perolehan ToM memiliki kontribusi positif sebesar 28% terhadap perkembangan MTT

Game theory of mind

This paper introduces a model of ‘theory of mind’, namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a ‘game theory of mind’. First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However, if we assume that the degree of recursion is bounded, then players need to estimate the opponent's degree of recursion (i.e., sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inferring the opponent's sophistication, given behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify their sophistication on the basis of choices in sequential games. This rests on comparing generative models of choices with, and without, inference. Model comparison is demonstrated using simulated and real data from a ‘stag-hunt’. Finally, we note that exactly the same sophisticated behaviour can be achieved by optimising the utility function itself (through prosocial utility), producing unsophisticated but apparently altruistic agents. This may be relevant ethologically in hierarchal game theory and coevolution

Link between mindfulness and personality-related factors including empathy, theory of mind, openness, pro-social behaviour and suggestibility

This research investigated a potential linkage between mindfulness and personality characteristics such as openness to experience, empathy (empathic concern and theory of mind), prosocial behavior and suggestibility. A sample of 275 volunteers was recruited. A series of the research questionnaires and scales was employed to measure mindfulness, empathic concern, theory of mind (or perspective taking), prosocial behavior (or altruism) and suggestibility. Based on the quartile scores, participants were divided into two low (first quartile) and high (forth quartile) on mindfulness. Using a two-way MANOVA, the results showed that participants high on mindfulness exhibited increased theory of mind, prosocial behaviour and openness, in addition to decreased suggestibility. Neither main nor interaction effects were found for gender factor. Theoretical models in the field of social cognition will be discussed to explain how enhancement in cognitive functions due to mindfulness practice might alter personality characteristics and, in turn, influence socio-political behaviour

Defending simulation theory against the argument from error

We defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against a challenge from the Theory Theory of Mind. The challenge is that while Simulation Theory can account for Theory of Mind errors, it cannot account for their systematic nature. There are Theory of Mind errors seen in social psychological research with adults where persons are either overly generous or overly cynical in how rational they expect others to be. There are also Theory of Mind errors observable in developmental data drawn from Maxi-type false belief tests. We provide novel responses to several examples showing that Simulation Theory can answer these challenges

Spontaneous theory of mind and its absence in autism spectrum disorders

Theory of mind, the cognitive capacity to infer others' mental states, is crucial for the development of social communication. The impairment of theory of mind may relate to autism spectrum disorder (ASD), which is characterized by profound difficulties in social interaction and communication. In the current article, I summarize recent updates in theory of mind research utilizing the spontaneous false belief test, which assesses participants' spontaneous tendency to attribute belief status to others. These studies reveal that young infants pass the spontaneous false belief test well before they can pass the same task when explicitly asked to answer. By contrast, high-functioning adults with ASD, who can easily pass the false belief task when explicitly asked to, do not show spontaneous false belief attribution. These findings suggest that the capacity for theory of mind develops much earlier than was previously thought, and the absence of spontaneous theory of mind may relate to impairment in social interaction and communication found in ASD

Theory of Mind and its Relation to Psychopathy

Psychopathy is a personality dysfunction wherein an individual is unemotional and has a deficit in empathy (Dolan & Fullam, 2004). Theory of mind is the ability to perceive other’s thoughts, beliefs, emotions, etc. (Vonk, Hill, Mercer & Noser, 2015). This is similar to empathy, and as such is likely to have a relationship with psychopathy, although no such research has been undertaken to date. In this study, I correlated measures of psychopathy with theory of mind, sampling from Butler’s undergraduate population. Due to my combined major in Psychology and Criminology, I then researched and discuss the similarities theory of mind has with the sociological term, role taking, which is the process of viewing oneself from another perspective (Crawford & Novak, 2014). Rather than being an aptitude that varies per person, as is theory of mind, role taking is seen as an innate ability and rather is looked at in terms of the propensity in which one engages in it. While there were no significant relationships between theory of mind and psychopathy detected, the results suggested that a study with more statistical power may be able to find such a relationship. If a relationship does not exist between theory of mind and psychopathy, this can be explained by role taking theory

Disordered Eating Habits and Theory of Mind in Undergraduate Students

Theory of mind, the ability to ascribe mental states to oneself and others, has intimate connections with mental disorders like autism and schizophrenia. Recent research has suggested a connection between eating disorders and theory of mind ability, but these findings have been mixed. The idea that disorders lie along a continuum (Johns & van Os, 2001) leads to the hypothesis that people with disordered eating habits will have a lesser theory of mind ability than those without. Data was collected on 25 undergraduate students at Butler University. Results showed a positive correlation between theory of mind and negative eating attitudes. Although the sample size was small, the present results suggest that individuals with more negative eating attitudes are better at understanding others’ mental states

Theory of Mind and Non-Human Intelligence

Comparative cognition researchers have long been interested in the nature of nonhuman animal social capacities. One capacity has received prolonged attention: mindreading, or “theory of mind” as it’s also called, is often seen to be the ability to attribute mental states to others in the service of predicting and explaining behavior. This attention is garnered in no small measure from interest into what accounts for the distinctive features of human social cognition and what are the evolutionary origins of those features. This entry surveys: (1) main hypotheses concerning the adaptive value of mindreading, (2) theoretical problems complicating our ability to determine whether nonhuman animals mindread, and finally (3) proposals that mindreading is a plural rather than unitary cognitive system