Mathematical Foundations of Consciousness

We employ the Zermelo-Fraenkel Axioms that characterize sets as mathematical primitives. The Anti-foundation Axiom plays a significant role in our development, since among other of its features, its replacement for the Axiom of Foundation in the Zermelo-Fraenkel Axioms motivates Platonic interpretations. These interpretations also depend on such allied notions for sets as pictures, graphs, decorations, labelings and various mappings that we use. A syntax and semantics of operators acting on sets is developed. Such features enable construction of a theory of non-well-founded sets that we use to frame mathematical foundations of consciousness. To do this we introduce a supplementary axiomatic system that characterizes experience and consciousness as primitives. The new axioms proceed through characterization of so- called consciousness operators. The Russell operator plays a central role and is shown to be one example of a consciousness operator. Neural networks supply striking examples of non-well-founded graphs the decorations of which generate associated sets, each with a Platonic aspect. Employing our foundations, we show how the supervening of consciousness on its neural correlates in the brain enables the framing of a theory of consciousness by applying appropriate consciousness operators to the generated sets in question

From Biological to Synthetic Neurorobotics Approaches to Understanding the Structure Essential to Consciousness (Part 3)

This third paper locates the synthetic neurorobotics research reviewed in the second paper in terms of themes introduced in the first paper. It begins with biological non-reductionism as understood by Searle. It emphasizes the role of synthetic neurorobotics studies in accessing the dynamic structure essential to consciousness with a focus on system criticality and self, develops a distinction between simulated and formal consciousness based on this emphasis, reviews Tani and colleagues' work in light of this distinction, and ends by forecasting the increasing importance of synthetic neurorobotics studies for cognitive science and philosophy of mind going forward, finally in regards to most- and myth-consciousness

Synchronous Online Philosophy Courses: An Experiment in Progress

There are two main ways to teach a course online: synchronously or asynchronously. In an asynchronous course, students can log on at their convenience and do the course work. In a synchronous course, there is a requirement that all students be online at specific times, to allow for a shared course environment. In this article, the author discusses the strengths and weaknesses of synchronous online learning for the teaching of undergraduate philosophy courses. The author discusses specific strategies and technologies he uses in the teaching of online philosophy courses. In particular, the author discusses how he uses videoconferencing to create a classroom-like environment in an online class

Analyzing and Interpreting Neural Networks for NLP: A Report on the First BlackboxNLP Workshop

The EMNLP 2018 workshop BlackboxNLP was dedicated to resources and techniques specifically developed for analyzing and understanding the inner-workings and representations acquired by neural models of language. Approaches included: systematic manipulation of input to neural networks and investigating the impact on their performance, testing whether interpretable knowledge can be decoded from intermediate representations acquired by neural networks, proposing modifications to neural network architectures to make their knowledge state or generated output more explainable, and examining the performance of networks on simplified or formal languages. Here we review a number of representative studies in each category

The importance of the observer in science

The concept of {\em complexity} (as a quantity) has been plagued by numerous contradictory and confusing definitions. By explicitly recognising a role for the observer of a system, an observer that attaches meaning to data about the system, these contradictions can be resolved, and the numerous complexity measures that have been proposed can be seen as cases where different observers are relevant, and/or being proxy measures that loosely scale with complexity, but are easy to compute from the available data. Much of the epistemic confusion in the subject can be squarely placed at science's tradition of removing the observer from the description in order to guarantee {\em objectivity}. Explicitly acknowledging the role of the observer helps untangle other confused subject areas. {\em Emergence} is a topic about which much ink has been spilt, but it can be understand easily as an irreducibility between description space and meaning space. Quantum Mechanics can also be understood as a theory of observation. The success in explaining quantum mechanics, leads one to conjecture that all of physics may be reducible to properties of the observer. And indeed, what are the necessary (as opposed to contingent) properties of an observer? This requires a full theory of consciousness, from which we are a long way from obtaining. However where progress does appear to have been made, e.g. Daniel Dennett's {\em Consciousness Explained}, a recurring theme of self-observation is a crucial ingredient.Comment: In Proceedings The Two Cultures: Reconsidering the division between the Sciences and Humanities, UNSW, July 200

Literal Perceptual Inference

In this paper, I argue that theories of perception that appeal to Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inference (“Helmholtzian” theories) should be taken literally, i.e. that the inferences appealed to in such theories are inferences in the full sense of the term, as employed elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary discourse. In the course of the argument, I consider constraints on inference based on the idea that inference is a deliberate acton, and on the idea that inferences depend on the syntactic structure of representations. I argue that inference is a personal-level but sometimes unconscious process that cannot in general be distinguished from association on the basis of the structures of the representations over which it’s defined. I also critique arguments against representationalist interpretations of Helmholtzian theories, and argue against the view that perceptual inference is encapsulated in a module