680 research outputs found
The Influence of Social Norms and Social Consciousness on Intention Reconciliation
Research on resource-bounded agents has established that rational agents need to be able to revise their commitments in light of new opportunities. In the context of collaborative activities, rational agents must be able to reconcile their intentions to do team-related actions with other, conflicting intentions. The SPIRE experimental system allows the process of intention reconciliation in team contexts to be simulated and studied. Initial work with SPIRE examined the impact of environmental factors and agent utility functions on individual and group outcomes in the context of one set of social norms governing collaboration. This paper extends those results by further studying the effect of environmental factors and the agents' level of social consciousness and by comparing the impact of two different types of social norms on agent behavior and outcomes. The results show that the choice of social norms influences the accuracy of the agents' responses to varying environmental factors, as well as the effectiveness of social consciousness and other aspects of agents' utility functions. In experiments using heterogeneous groups of agents, both sets of norms were susceptible to the free-rider effect. However, the gains of the less responsible agents were minimal, suggesting that agent designers would have little incentive to design agents that deviate from the standard level of responsibility to the group.Engineering and Applied Science
Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law
Despite the fact that compensation is the governing principle in contract law remedies, it has tenuous historical, economic and empirical support. A promisor's right to breach and pay damages (which is subject to the compensation principle) is only a subset of a larger family of termination rights that do not purport to compensate the promisee for losses suffered when the promisor walks away from the contemplated exchange. These termination rights can be characterized as embedded options that serve important risk management functions. We show that sellers often sell insurance to their buyers in the form of these embedded options. We explain why compensation is of little relevance to the option price agreed to by the parties, which is a function of the value of the option to the buyer, its cost to the seller and the market in which they transact. We thus propose a novel justification for why penalty liquidated damages may be higher than seller's costs: they are option prices that reflect the value of the options to the buyer. The regulation of liquidated damages is thus tantamount to price regulation, which is outside the realm of contract law. Moreover, in light of the heterogeneity among optimal option prices, we also make the case against having an expectation damages default rule to begin with. In thick markets, we argue for enforcing the parties ex ante risk allocation with market damages. In thin markets, we propose that parties be induced to agree explicitly with respect to all termination rights, including breach damages, by the threat of specific performance of their contemplated exchange or, in the case of consumers, by a default rule that provides them a termination option at no cost.
Essays in optimal auction design
Auctions are an ancient economic institution. Since Vickrey (1961), the development of auction theory has lead to an extremely detailed description of the often desirable characteristics of these simple selling procedures, in the process explaining their enduring popularity. Given the pervasiveness of auctions, the question of how a seller should engineer the rules of these mechanisms to maximize her own profits is a central issue in the organization of markets. The seminal paper of Myerson (1981) shows that when facing buyers with Independent Private Values (IPVs) a standard auction with a specifically selected reserve price (or prices) is optimal, that is, maximizes a seller's expected profits among all conceivable selling mechanisms. In this model, it is assumed that the buyers have perfect information as to the existence of gains from trade. We shall argue that the consequences of this assumption for the design of the optimal auction are not well understood, which motivates our analysis. The three essays of this thesis relax the `known seller valuation' assumption by examining the optimal auction program when the seller (and principal) holds private information representing her reservation value for the good. In the first essay we provide an original technique for comparing ex ante expected profits across mechanisms for a seller facing N>1 potential buyers when all traders hold private information. Our technique addresses mechanisms that cannot be ranked point-by-point through their allocation rules using the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. We find conditions such that the seller's expected profits increase in the slope of each buyer's allocation probability function. This provides new intuition for the fact that a principal does not benefit from holding private information under risk neutrality. Monopoly pricing induces steep probability functions so the seller/principal benefits from announcing a fixed price, and implicitly her private information. An application is presented for the well known k double auction of the bilateral trade literature. In the second and third essays of this thesis, we extend the above framework to allow for informational externalities. Specifically, we allow for the situation in which the seller's private information represents a common value component in buyers' valuations. Thus the seller's private information (say regarding the quality of the good) is of interest to bidders independently of any strategic effects. In recent work Cai, Riley and Ye (2007) have demonstrated that a seller who holds private information about the quality of a good faces an extra consideration in designing an auction; the reserve price signals information to bidders. In a separating equilibrium signalling is costly in the sense that reserves are higher than would be optimal under complete information. We examine the returns to the seller in an English auction from using different types of secret reserve regimes. We find that immediate disclosure of a reserve is preferable to announcement after the auction in the form of a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the winning bidder. Sale occurs less often during the auction for a given reserve price strategy under secret reserve regimes, which increases the incentive for the seller to report more favourable information though the reserve price offer. Separating equilibria involving later announcement therefore generate even lower expected profits to the seller (signalling is more costly) than under immediate disclosure. In the third essay we compare the benchmark signalling equilibrium of immediate disclosure to a screening regime which we call the Right of Refusal. In this extreme form of a secret reserve the seller never announces the reserve price, she simply accepts or rejects the auction price. We find that the Right of Refusal dominates immediate disclosure if the seller's valuation is a sufficient statistic for the private information of interest. Thus a seller with market-relevant private preference information can benefit from not exercising monopoly price setting power. The result also provides conditions under which a competitive screening equilibrium is more efficient than a signalling mechanism. Broadly speaking, screening is better when the common value aspect in the preferences of the informed and uninformed parties are `aligned', and potential gains from trade to the uninformed party are significant. We believe this conclusion to be of particular interest to the design of privatization schemes
Essays in optimal auction design
Auctions are an ancient economic institution. Since Vickrey (1961), the development of auction theory has lead to an extremely detailed description of the often desirable characteristics of these simple selling procedures, in the process explaining their enduring popularity. Given the pervasiveness of auctions, the question of how a seller should engineer the rules of these mechanisms to maximize her own profits is a central issue in the organization of markets. The seminal paper of Myerson (1981) shows that when facing buyers with Independent Private Values (IPVs) a standard auction with a specifically selected reserve price (or prices) is optimal, that is, maximizes a seller's expected profits among all conceivable selling mechanisms. In this model, it is assumed that the buyers have perfect information as to the existence of gains from trade. We shall argue that the consequences of this assumption for the design of the optimal auction are not well understood, which motivates our analysis. The three essays of this thesis relax the `known seller valuation' assumption by examining the optimal auction program when the seller (and principal) holds private information representing her reservation value for the good. In the first essay we provide an original technique for comparing ex ante expected profits across mechanisms for a seller facing N>1 potential buyers when all traders hold private information. Our technique addresses mechanisms that cannot be ranked point-by-point through their allocation rules using the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. We find conditions such that the seller's expected profits increase in the slope of each buyer's allocation probability function. This provides new intuition for the fact that a principal does not benefit from holding private information under risk neutrality. Monopoly pricing induces steep probability functions so the seller/principal benefits from announcing a fixed price, and implicitly her private information. An application is presented for the well known k double auction of the bilateral trade literature. In the second and third essays of this thesis, we extend the above framework to allow for informational externalities. Specifically, we allow for the situation in which the seller's private information represents a common value component in buyers' valuations. Thus the seller's private information (say regarding the quality of the good) is of interest to bidders independently of any strategic effects. In recent work Cai, Riley and Ye (2007) have demonstrated that a seller who holds private information about the quality of a good faces an extra consideration in designing an auction; the reserve price signals information to bidders. In a separating equilibrium signalling is costly in the sense that reserves are higher than would be optimal under complete information. We examine the returns to the seller in an English auction from using different types of secret reserve regimes. We find that immediate disclosure of a reserve is preferable to announcement after the auction in the form of a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the winning bidder. Sale occurs less often during the auction for a given reserve price strategy under secret reserve regimes, which increases the incentive for the seller to report more favourable information though the reserve price offer. Separating equilibria involving later announcement therefore generate even lower expected profits to the seller (signalling is more costly) than under immediate disclosure. In the third essay we compare the benchmark signalling equilibrium of immediate disclosure to a screening regime which we call the Right of Refusal. In this extreme form of a secret reserve the seller never announces the reserve price, she simply accepts or rejects the auction price. We find that the Right of Refusal dominates immediate disclosure if the seller's valuation is a sufficient statistic for the private information of interest. Thus a seller with market-relevant private preference information can benefit from not exercising monopoly price setting power. The result also provides conditions under which a competitive screening equilibrium is more efficient than a signalling mechanism. Broadly speaking, screening is better when the common value aspect in the preferences of the informed and uninformed parties are `aligned', and potential gains from trade to the uninformed party are significant. We believe this conclusion to be of particular interest to the design of privatization schemes
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Automated Negotiation for Complex Multi-Agent Resource Allocation
The problem of constructing and analyzing systems of intelligent, autonomous agents is becoming more and more important. These agents may include people, physical robots, virtual humans, software programs acting on behalf of human beings, or sensors. In a large class of multi-agent scenarios, agents may have different capabilities, preferences, objectives, and constraints. Therefore, efficient allocation of resources among multiple agents is often difficult to achieve. Automated negotiation (bargaining) is the most widely used approach for multi-agent resource allocation and it has received increasing attention in the recent years. However, information uncertainty, existence of multiple contracting partners and competitors, agents\u27 incentive to maximize individual utilities, and market dynamics make it difficult to calculate agents\u27 rational equilibrium negotiation strategies and develop successful negotiation agents behaving well in practice. To this end, this thesis is concerned with analyzing agents\u27 rational behavior and developing negotiation strategies for a range of complex negotiation contexts. First, we consider the problem of finding agents\u27 rational strategies in bargaining with incomplete information. We focus on the principal alternating-offers finite horizon bargaining protocol with one-sided uncertainty regarding agents\u27 reserve prices. We provide an algorithm based on the combination of game theoretic analysis and search techniques which finds agents\u27 equilibrium in pure strategies when they exist. Our approach is sound, complete and, in principle, can be applied to other uncertainty settings. Simulation results show that there is at least one pure strategy sequential equilibrium in 99.7% of various scenarios. In addition, agents with equilibrium strategies achieved higher utilities than agents with heuristic strategies. Next, we extend the alternating-offers protocol to handle concurrent negotiations in which each agent has multiple trading opportunities and faces market competition. We provide an algorithm based on backward induction to compute the subgame perfect equilibrium of concurrent negotiation. We observe that agents\u27 bargaining power are affected by the proposing ordering and market competition and for a large subset of the space of the parameters, agents\u27 equilibrium strategies depend on the values of a small number of parameters. We also extend our algorithm to find a pure strategy sequential equilibrium in concurrent negotiations where there is one-sided uncertainty regarding the reserve price of one agent. Third, we present the design and implementation of agents that concurrently negotiate with other entities for acquiring multiple resources. Negotiation agents are designed to adjust 1) the number of tentative agreements and 2) the amount of concession they are willing to make in response to changing market conditions and negotiation situations. In our approach, agents utilize a time-dependent negotiation strategy in which the reserve price of each resource is dynamically determined by 1) the likelihood that negotiation will not be successfully completed, 2) the expected agreement price of the resource, and 3) the expected number of final agreements. The negotiation deadline of each resource is determined by its relative scarcity. Since agents are permitted to decommit from agreements, a buyer may make more than one tentative agreement for each resource and the maximum number of tentative agreements is constrained by the market situation. Experimental results show that our negotiation strategy achieved significantly higher utilities than simpler strategies. Finally, we consider the problem of allocating networked resources in dynamic environment, such as cloud computing platforms, where providers strategically price resources to maximize their utility. While numerous auction-based approaches have been proposed in the literature, our work explores an alternative approach where providers and consumers negotiate resource leasing contracts. We propose a distributed negotiation mechanism where agents negotiate over both a contract price and a decommitment penalty, which allows agents to decommit from contracts at a cost. We compare our approach experimentally, using representative scenarios and workloads, to both combinatorial auctions and the fixed-price model, and show that the negotiation model achieves a higher social welfare
Construir el diálogo cientĂfico en la Matemática: la bĂşsqueda del equilibrio entre sĂmbolos y palabras en artĂculos de investigaciĂłn sobre TeorĂa de Juegos
MaestrĂa en InglĂ©s con OrientaciĂłn en LingĂĽĂstica AplicadaMost scientific communication is conducted in English, which may be a difficult task and a source of
obstacles for researchers whose primary language is not English (Bitchenera & Basturkmen, 2006;
Borlogan, 2009; Duff, 2010; Matsuda & Matsuda, 2010). As a matter of concern for language scholars, this
situation requires at least two actions: (1) the development of research focused on the problems faced by
researchers when writing in a foreign language, and (2) the design and implementation of pedagogical and
didactic programmes or services aimed at providing researchers with the tools to enhance their linguistic
and rhetorical skills. In both cases, the ultimate objective of these lines of action is to help researchers
integrate into and interact with their knowledge communities in an independent, active and successful way.
Considering those needs and the emerging interest in English as a lingua franca or as an international
language, many scholars have devoted to studying the features of writing and language use across the world
and across disciplines (Hyland, 2004; Matsuda & Matsuda, 2010; Mercado, 2010). However, few have
explored the case of Mathematics (Lemke, 2002; Morgan, 2008; O’Halloran, 2005; Schleppegrell, 2007),
and even fewer have investigated the discourse of scientific research articles (SRA) in this discipline (Graves
& Moghadassi, 2013, 2014). In view of this situation, investigation of the discourse of science in the field of
Mathematics (Game Theory - GT) as used in the Institute of Applied Mathematics (IMASL), at the National
University of San Luis (UNSL), becomes both an answer to local researchers’ needs and an attempt to
contribute to current research in writing, evaluative discourse and use of English as an international language
for the communication of science. Thus, the main objective of this work is to conduct a comparative
description between unpublished GT SRAs written in English by IMASL researchers and published GT
SRAs written in English by international authors, in terms of linguistic features used to build authorship and
authorial stance. The exploration of the genre is made from the perspective of the system of Appraisal
(Hood, 2010; Martin & White, 2005; White, 2000), with the aid of Corpus Linguistics (CL) tools (Cheng,
2012; Meyer, 2002; Tognini-Bonelli, 2001). The results of this research are expected to be useful for the
enhancement of knowledge of language professionals devoted to the teaching of writing as well as
translation, proofreading, editing and reviewing services. A further goal is to lay the foundations for the
production of didactic material which can potentially be incorporated into writing courses or professional
writing, translation, reviewing and proofreading training programmes.Fil: Lucero Arrua, Graciela Beatriz. Universidad Nacional de CĂłrdoba. Facultad de Lenguas; Argentina
Emerging green innovation platforms. A comparative study on bioenergy policies in Emilia-Romagna and Norway
Bioenergy and rural development are increasingly under political focus. Bioenergy development is considered as a tool to deal with the climate change and rural areas crisis. The European Directive 2009/28/CE has set the goals for bioenergy production, and the Regulation 1698/2005 on rural development links the improving of conditions in rural areas to renewable energy production. Rural areas are the source of raw materials and the place to set bioenergy installations, while the new activity could provide rural citizens with new jobs and green energy. This policy context is understood in the view of other three main European policies, namely the regional, climate change and green growth and the innovation policies. Rural development is deeply tied to the former that points at rural regions as the ones to be stronger supported. The innovation policy engages regions in an effort to strengthen innovation policies and learning by interacting throughout the European Area. The focus of the thesis is on Italy and further on Emilia-Romagna, as one of the most developed Italian regions. Emilia-Romagna is compared with Norway, a non- European Union country that has a different administrative and policy structure, but one that is nevertheless influenced by EU policies through the ETA. Within the two main case studies, I considered individual case studies to find out the practices and the links between the two core policy areas. The results have been framed and assessed through the regional innovation systems theory, in order to explain how the bioenergy system and rural development are fostered in Emilia-Romagna and Norway. The main findings show two different policy frameworks and how they affect the development of the bioenergy and rural areas. Emilia-Romagna has a confused situation and a difficult confrontation between rural citizens, bioenergy investors and local governments, but the sector is still more developed than in Norway. Moreover the feed in tariff is fostering single random investments. By contrast, Norwegian policy framework is more easily accessible, the investments are more locally-based and there is no national feed-in-tariff. Thus, the actors cooperate more in order to invest in a bioenergy activity, while rural communities seem to experience positive local return in terms of new jobs and energy prices
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Sanitizing Sociality: Owned Livelihoods, Embedded Economies and Social Wealth Among Delhi's Sanitation Workers
Low-income and socially marginalized people around the world regularly engage in anti-competitive practices. Often illegal and always offensive to those with faith in free markets, these practices rarely help the poor in general. They are, however, often tied to violence against other marginalized people and the obstruction of efficient public services, which can, in many cases, exacerbate the problems of the poor even further. How should we interpret such anti-market behavior? In this dissertation, I address this question through a case study of Delhi’s Balmiki community, a caste that is traditionally associated with sanitation-related work in northern India. Members of this caste, who are frequently referred to as “sweepers” or safai karamcharis, make up the vast majority of Delhi’s sanitation workforce. I show that the social life of this community is deeply permeated by anti-market social practices. Sometimes invisible to the state and sometimes a direct challenge to its authority, these practices help the Balmikis secure a sense of security in an otherwise precarious socio-economic landscape. Most salient among these practices is what I call “proprietary livelihood:” a system in which people effectively own their jobs rather than sell their labor on a market. In the first three chapters of this dissertation, I show how both informal and formal sector sanitation workers own their livelihoods, how their practices are similar to older forms of social organization in India and elsewhere, how their owned livelihoods constitute embedded and transparently social forms of wealth, and also how they use proprietary livelihood to protect themselves from the otherwise prevailing condition of expropriated freedom – a fundamentally modern/capitalist condition in which people’s material sustenance is separated from other aspects of their social lives. In the fourth chapter, I show how the practices of proprietary livelihood are intertwined with the anti-market practices of other members of the Balmiki community, specifically, a leader of organized crime and his political associates. In Chapter 5, I show how the practices of proprietary livelihood come into direct conflict with the bourgeois desires of upper-middle class homeowners to have “neat and clean” neighborhoods. In that same chapter, I also show how homeowner associations act as agents of proletarianization by subjecting the informal sanitation workers to the disciplinary processes of wage labor – processes that simultaneously destroy the transparently social nature of the sanitation workers’ wealth. In the final chapter of this dissertation, I critically engage the language that mainstream economists would use to conceptualize proprietary livelihood and the other forms of transparently social wealth found among Delhi’s Balmiki community. Mainstream economists would categorize these practices as forms of “rent extraction” and “rent seeking,” and they would argue that they introduce inefficiencies into Delhi’s sanitation system. I point out that this view would indeed be consistent with their neo-classical framework, but I go on to argue that the concept of rent itself – in both its classical and neo-classical formulations – is used to designate and domesticate transparently social forms of work and wealth that would otherwise disturb the economists’ worldview in which rational actors seek utility. I pursue this line of inquiry as part of a broader belief that we anthropologists should engage the terms and concepts of neoclassical economists more directly than we have thus far, not because they are correct, but because their dominance in the public sphere reflects the real-world dominance of the commodity form. In the process of making these arguments, I suggest three lines of further inquiry for anthropologists: (1) that we explore the possible existence of proprietary livelihood and similar forms of transparently social wealth in other contexts; (2) that we should pay a little less attention to wages, capital and commodities and consider for a while the role of rent in the everyday lives of people around the world (how they pay it, avoid it, extract it, and seek it); (3) that we should frame our inquiries in light of the condition of expropriated freedom, a condition that now prevails in almost every corner of the world
The market for retirement products in Sweden
Far-reaching changes in the regulation of financial markets and the organization of public pensions in the 1980s and 1990s transformed the landscape for retirement products in Sweden. First, banking and insurance were extensively deregulated in the 1980s, while the securities markets experienced major expansion. Insurance received a large boost from the authorization of unit-linked products in the early 1990s. Second, the public pension system was reformed. Survivor benefits for widows were eliminated from the public pillar in the late 1980s, leading to a large increase in demand for term life insurance. The old defined benefit public pension system was replaced by a notional or nonfinancial defined contribution (NDC) scheme, while a funded defined contribution (FDC) component was also created in the public pillar. The four occupational pension funds that cover the majority of Swedish workers were also converted into FDC schemes. This paper reviews the implications of these changes for the Swedish annuity market. It discusses the regulation of payout options in Sweden, highlighting the compulsory use of life annuities in the public pillar and the preference for term annuities in the occupational funds. It examines the performance of providers of retirement products, including the PPM, and reviews the increasing focus on risk-based regulation and supervision. The paper also emphasizes Sweden's success in moving in the direction of increased funding and privatization of old age insurance, while maintaining its basic character as a highly developed welfare state.,Debt Markets,Emerging Markets,Pensions&Retirement Systems,Insurance Law
Arbitrage: A Critique of the Political Economy of Finance
In the wake of the 2007-09 financial crisis and growing economic inequality fueled by financial activity, it cannot be left to mainstream economists to define and explain finance. This dissertation reexamines finance and the political, social and cultural foundations ignored by economists. In the first chapter, I argue for the importance of arbitrage, a trading strategy defined by buying low priced securities and selling the same securities for higher prices in two different markets. Arbitrage is the conceptual linchpin of modern financial economics but that discipline fails to explain the source of arbitrage profit. In the second chapter, I explore whether Marxist economics can offer a theorization of arbitrage profit. While much of Marxist scholarship too quickly dismisses the significance of finance, there is room for considering arbitrage to be a form of exploitation. In line with innovative Marxist work on finance, I apply a new framework for understanding value to arbitrage in the third chapter. I suggest that arbitrage can be understood as an apparatus of capture in which value founded on social mattering is captured in uneven relations of power. In the fourth chapter, I review the history of arbitrage and suggest that arbitrage is most successful when arbitrageurs can use advantageous differentials in communication networks and/or price stabilizing derivatives contracts to simulate instantaneous trading. A special form of arbitrage I call money machine arbitrage takes place when structural inequalities of price allow for continuous profit making. In the fifth chapter, I offer a final concept necessary for understanding arbitrage as an apparatus of capture: the axiomatic. The axiomatic is the complex system of regulative statements and social relations that enable capture. In the final substantive chapter, I detail the arbitrage in subprime mortgage backed securities in the run up to the 2007-09 financial crisis and sketch some aspects of the axiomatic that can be gleaned from that story. I conclude that the taken-for-granted notion of “risk,” as a necessary way of making wealth and the correlate of return in financial economics, is central to the axiomatic of finance and thus financial profit making.Doctor of Philosoph
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