Mechanism Design of Fashion Virtual Enterprise under Monitoring Strategy

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Effects of self-esteem on supply chain decisions

We study the effects of self-esteem on supply chain decisions and profits. To this end, the data obtained in computerized decision-making experiments in which human subjects participated as manufacturers (who offer a contract) and retailers (who either reject the contract, or accept and set the order quantity from the manufacturer) that engage in a long run relationship is used. Rosenberg scale survey data is used to categorize the manufacturers and retailers into high and low self-esteem classes. We find low selfesteem manufacturers to offer more attractive contracts to retailers, obtain lower profits themselves and cause higher supply chain total profit. Contrary to our expectations, we find high self-esteem retailers to end up accepting less favorable contracts compared to low self-esteem retailers, though the difference is not statistically significant. We explain this phenomena with the overordering tendency of the high self-esteem retailers: They overorder more frequently, and make larger overorders. We observe manufacturers to increase the attractiveness of their contract offer in the next period following a rejection. Finally, we develop a regression model to explain retailer order quantity decisions based on the retailer self-esteem score, lost demand in the previous period, number of contract rejections in the relationship, and the optimal order quantity. Our results indicate the importance of self-esteem as a significant factor in supply chain decisions and firms’ profit performance

Analysis of the Project Supply Chains: Coordination and Fair Allocation

This research investigates how project contracts can coordinate the supply chain between a project manager and contractor and if the solutions can be ensured as equitable. The main features of this type of supply chain are the trade-offs between the selection of a higher rate of resource consumption with a consequent higher cost to the contractor and a lower rate of resource consumption leading to later delivery and a reduction of the project-reward to the project manager. This broader problem could lead to a coordination problem for the overall supply chain. This research proposed a solution to this broader problem in two different scenarios: Take it or leave it scenario and negotiation scenario. Finally, the fair allocation of the risks and benefits and the related decision-making issues are addressed as one of the behavioural barriers to the supply chain coordination. The coordination issues in a take it or leave it scenario are addressed using time-based and fixed price project contracts using Stackelberg games. Models of coordination were proposed with time-based contracts, but the fixed price contracts failed to coordinate. The coordination problems in negotiation scenario are addressed with the Nash's bargaining, the Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining, and the utilitarian approach. A cost plus contract has been found to dominate the solutions over any cost sharing contract and fixed price contract for Nash's bargaining and Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining cases. Finally, the issues of fairness of allocation of risks and benefits as one of the challenges of supply chain coordination, have been investigated. The fixed price contracts were found to coordinate the supply chain under consideration alongside the time-based contracts if the members had fairness concern. Some of the key features of this research include the incorporation of various probability distributions for the project completion time and cost, the inclusion of various forms of risk preference, and addressing the challenges of fair allocation in project supply chains

Effectiveness of bonus and penalty incentive contracts in supply chain exchanges: Does national culture matter?

In this study, we investigate the impact of national culture on the effectiveness of bonus and penalty incentive contracts in supply chain exchanges. We conducted laboratory experiments in Canada, China, and South Korea, involving transactional exchanges in which suppliers were presented with either bonus or penalty contracts. Then we compared suppliers’ contract acceptance, level of effort, and shirking across national cultures. Our findings reveal critical cultural influences on contract effectiveness. We show that although acceptance of bonus contracts is comparable across cultures, suppliers from Canada, a national culture considered low in power distance and high in humane orientation, exhibit lower acceptance rates of penalty contracts. In addition, we find evidence that suppliers associated with collectivist cultures exert more effort and shirk less in bonus contracts but these relationships also are more complex. When we compare contract effectiveness across bonus and penalty contracts within a given cultural setting, we find in all three countries greater acceptance of bonus contracts than penalty contracts. Also, after contracts are accepted, bonus contracts are more successful in China because suppliers exert greater effort and shirk less under bonus contracts than penalty contracts. However, in Canada and South Korea, the results of accepted contracts for both penalty and bonus contracts are nearly indistinguishable

Preface: sustainable operations in manufacturing enterprise

It is indeed a real pleasure to announce the publication of this special issue, Sustainable Operations in Manufacturing Enterprise (SOME), for Annals of Operations Research. Overall, many papers were received for this special issue, and based on reviewer reports the best papers are included in this issue. This special issue is focused primarily on the three sustainable aspects, 3Ps of sustainability: profit, planet, and people. The accepted papers focus on sustainability, circular economy, mutli-criteria decision making (MCDM), optimization modelling using mixed integer linear/non-linear program (MLP/MINLP), and data envelopment analysis (DEA) having some applications to industry and society were considered

Three essays on product management : how to offer the right products at the right time and in the right quantity

Across virtually all industries, firms share one common objective: they strive to match their supply with customer demand. To achieve this goal, firms need to offer the right products at the right time and in the right quantity. Only firms that excel in all three dimensions can provide products with a high customer value and achieve extraordinary profits. This thesis investigates specific challenges that a firm has to overcome on its way to a good match between supply and demand. The first essay investigates how a firm can already select the right products during the product development phase. To make good resource allocation decisions, the firm needs to collect valuable information, and incentivize information sharing across the entire organization. The key result is that the firm needs to balance individual and shared incentives to achieve this goal. However, such compensation schemes come at the cost of overly broad product portfolios. The second essay examines how uncertain customer demand patterns affect seasonal products. Specifically, the timing of the product’s availability is crucial. Too early, and high opportunity and inventory costs may devour profits. Too late, and the firm loses its customers. In short, the firm has to balance a product’s market potential with the costly market time. This tradeoff may induce a firm to stock more inventories to satisfy a smaller market potential. Lastly, the third essay investigates how customer substitution influences the inventory decisions of different supply chain members in the presence of upstream competition. We find that customer substitution has a non-monotonic effect on the supply chain members’ decisions, and that left-over inventories may decline even when initial inventories are raised

Can Trustworthiness in a Supply Chain Be Signaled?

The relationship between a buyer and its suppliers is important and often relies on factors beyond the terms of a contractual agreement. Buyers can therefore benefit from identifying trustworthy suppliers. We argue that pre-contractual actions by the supplier, for example making costly buyer-specific investments without a long-term contract, can signal a supplier's trustworthiness. We develop a theoretical model to reflect supplier trustworthiness, and identify when a buyer can benefit from identifying trustworthy suppliers. We show that costly relationship-specific investments can serve as a signal of trustworthiness, and that supply chain profits increase when trustworthy suppliers are able to identify themselves in this fashion. We demonstrate the importance of the signaling mechanism using laboratory experiments. The experimental results show that relationship-specific investments lead to more collaborative transactions, with buyers offering higher prices and suppliers reciprocating with higher quality goods. This results in increased profits for both buyers and suppliers. Additionally, we show that the benefit of the relationship-specific investment depends directly on the signaling mechanism. Finally, we show that the benefits of buyer-specific investments for both suppliers and buyers are strengthened when firms interact repeatedly.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/108713/1/1251_RBeer.pd

Blockchain for supply chain traceability and anticounterfeiting: the oracles’ enabling role

Blockchain and physical oracles in the Collectible Industry. Supply chain fairness and bargaining power in agriculture supply chain: the blockchain effect. Unlocking the Blockchain Potentials through Oracles: Empirical Evidences on Supply Chain Challenges and Performance