903 research outputs found
Weak and Strong Necessity Modals: On Linguistic Means of Expressing "A Primitive Concept OUGHT"
This paper develops an account of the meaning of `ought', and the distinction between weak necessity modals (`ought', `should') and strong necessity modals (`must', `have to'). I argue that there is nothing specially ``strong'' about strong necessity modals per se: uses of `Must p' predicate the (deontic/epistemic/etc.) necessity of the prejacent p of the actual world (evaluation world). The apparent ``weakness'' of weak necessity modals derives from their bracketing whether the necessity of the prejacent is verified in the actual world. `Ought p' can be accepted without needing to settle that the relevant considerations (norms, expectations, etc.) that actually apply verify the necessity of p. I call the basic account a modal-past approach to the weak/strong necessity modal distinction (for reasons that become evident). Several ways of implementing the approach in the formal semantics/pragmatics are critically examined. The account systematizes a wide range of linguistic phenomena: it generalizes across flavors of modality; it elucidates a special role that weak necessity modals play in discourse and planning; it captures contrasting logical, expressive, and illocutionary properties of weak and strong necessity modals; and it sheds light on how a notion of `ought' is often expressed in other languages. These phenomena have resisted systematic explanation. In closing I briefly consider how linguistic inquiry into differences among necessity modals may improve theorizing on broader philosophical issues
Modeling of Phenomena and Dynamic Logic of Phenomena
Modeling of complex phenomena such as the mind presents tremendous
computational complexity challenges. Modeling field theory (MFT) addresses
these challenges in a non-traditional way. The main idea behind MFT is to match
levels of uncertainty of the model (also, problem or theory) with levels of
uncertainty of the evaluation criterion used to identify that model. When a
model becomes more certain, then the evaluation criterion is adjusted
dynamically to match that change to the model. This process is called the
Dynamic Logic of Phenomena (DLP) for model construction and it mimics processes
of the mind and natural evolution. This paper provides a formal description of
DLP by specifying its syntax, semantics, and reasoning system. We also outline
links between DLP and other logical approaches. Computational complexity issues
that motivate this work are presented using an example of polynomial models
Deontic Logic and Natural Language
There has been a recent surge of work on deontic modality within philosophy of language. This work has put the deontic logic tradition in contact with natural language semantics, resulting in significant increase in sophistication on both ends. This chapter surveys the main motivations, achievements, and prospects of this work
Soft Contract Verification
Behavioral software contracts are a widely used mechanism for governing the
flow of values between components. However, run-time monitoring and enforcement
of contracts imposes significant overhead and delays discovery of faulty
components to run-time.
To overcome these issues, we present soft contract verification, which aims
to statically prove either complete or partial contract correctness of
components, written in an untyped, higher-order language with first-class
contracts. Our approach uses higher-order symbolic execution, leveraging
contracts as a source of symbolic values including unknown behavioral values,
and employs an updatable heap of contract invariants to reason about
flow-sensitive facts. We prove the symbolic execution soundly approximates the
dynamic semantics and that verified programs can't be blamed.
The approach is able to analyze first-class contracts, recursive data
structures, unknown functions, and control-flow-sensitive refinements of
values, which are all idiomatic in dynamic languages. It makes effective use of
an off-the-shelf solver to decide problems without heavy encodings. The
approach is competitive with a wide range of existing tools---including type
systems, flow analyzers, and model checkers---on their own benchmarks.Comment: ICFP '14, September 1-6, 2014, Gothenburg, Swede
Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism
Hope, in its propositional construction "I hope that p," is compatible with a stated chance for the speaker that not-p. On fallibilist construals of knowledge, knowledge is compatible with a chance of being wrong, such that one can know that p even though there is an epistemic chance for one that not-p. But self-ascriptions of propositional hope that p seem to be incompatible, in some sense, with self-ascriptions of knowing whether p. Data from conjoining hope self-ascription with outright assertions, with first- and third-person knowledge ascriptions, and with factive predicates suggest a problem: when combined with a plausible principle on the rationality of hope, they suggest that fallibilism is false. By contrast, the infallibilist about knowledge can straightforwardly explain why knowledge would be incompatible with hope, and can offer a simple and unified explanation of all the linguistic data introduced here. This suggests that fallibilists bear an explanatory burden which has been hitherto overlooked
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