A new perspective on No Miracle Argument

This paper delves into the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism concerning the success of scientific theories. The no miracle argument posits that the ability of theories to make accurate predictions is due to their reflection of the true structure of the world. This argument suggests that mature and well-confirmed scientific theories approximate truth, leading to the existence of unobservable entities, such as electrons, in the world. On the other hand, anti-realists attribute the success of science to natural selection, likening unsuccessful theories to extinct species and successful theories to adaptable survivors. According to this view, success is determined by social consensus and pragmatic considerations, rather than truth. Wray argues in favor of selectionism, emphasizing the relative nature of success and its dependence on changing standards within the research community. While some realists align selectionism with their perspective, Van Fraassen raises skepticism about the connection between truth and success. Wray presents three reasons for the incompatibility of realism and selectionism, although alternative justifications exist. The paper further examines the flawed analogy between scientific evolution and natural selection, highlighting the continuous need for theory-based explanations in experimental successes. Additionally, the process of scientific evolution is shown to involve revolutionary changes rather than a continuous convergence towards truth. Finally, the role of observation in realist explanations is questioned, as observations are theory-laden and influenced by specific conceptual frameworks. The paper concludes that Wray's argument for the incompatibility of anti-realism and realism appears reasonable, considering the complexities of scientific practice and the diverse perspectives within different scientific disciplines

The non-miraculous success of formal analogies in quantum theories

The Higgs model was developed using purely formal analogies to models of superconductivity. This is in contrast to historical case studies such as the development of electromagnetism, which employed physical analogies. As a result, quantum case studies such as the development of the Higgs model carry new lessons for the scientific realism--anti-realism debate. I argue that, by breaking the connection between success and approximate truth, the use of purely formal analogies is a counterexample to two prominent versions of the 'No Miracles' Argument (NMA) for scientific realism, Psillos' refined explanationist defence of realism and the Argument from History of Science for structural realism (Frigg and Votsis 2011). The NMA is undermined, but the success of the Higgs model is not miraculous because there is a naturalistically acceptable explanation for its success that does not invoke approximate truth. I also suggest some possible strategies for adapting to the counterexample for scientific realists who wish to hold on to the NMA in some form

Re-enchanting realism in debate with Kyle Stanford

In this article, against the background of a notion of ‘assembled’ truth, the evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ‘naturalised realism’ is outlined. Naturalised realism is ‘fallibilist’ in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford’s anti-realist ‘new induction’ threats by showing that ‘explanationism’ and his ‘epistemic instrumentalism’ are just two positions among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive- and under-determination- based anti-realist arguments.http://link.springer.com/journal/10838hb2013cp201

Re-enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford

In this article, against the background of a notion of ‘assembled’ truth, the evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ‘naturalised realism’ is outlined. Naturalised realism is ‘fallibilist’ in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford’s anti-realist ‘new induction’ threats by showing that ‘explanationism’ and his ‘epistemic instrumentalism’ are just two positions among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive- and under-determination- based anti-realist arguments.http://link.springer.com/journal/10838hb2013cp201

The Relationship between Scientific Realism and Scientific Progress Accounts

One of the most significant topics in the philosophy of science literature is the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. In recent years, a considerable amount of literature has emerged on scientific progress accounts. The aim of this article is to explore the relationship between scientific realism/anti-realism and scientific progress accounts. Scientific realism, in this article, refers to epistemic realism, which posits that mature and successful scientific theories offer an (approximately) true description of the world. In contrast, advocates of epistemic anti-realism reject the possibility of acquiring knowledge about unobservable entities. Scientific progress accounts fall into four categories based on their intended purpose: epistemic, semantic, problem-solving (functional), and noetic. This article argues that the epistemic and semantic accounts, which rely on the concept of truth, are based on scientific realism. The problem-solving account is considered an anti-realistic approach since it replaces the criterion of truth with the ability to solve problems. The primary argument of this article is that although the noetic account appears to use the concept of truth in its explanation, it prioritizes understanding over truth in determining the preferred theory. This means that the criterion for selecting the preferred theory is not approximation to the truth, but rather understanding. As a result, the noetic account is based on an anti-realistic approach.   Introduction The thesis of epistemic realism posits that successful and mature scientific theories are (approximately) true. Also, various accounts of scientific progress focus on specific objectives within science. This article argues that the epistemic and semantic approaches align with a realist perspective, while the problem-solving (functional) and noetic accounts have anti-realist foundations. Scientific realism Generally, three theses of scientific realism can be identified: the metaphysical (ontological) thesis, the semantic thesis, and the epistemic thesis. The metaphysical thesis asserts that the world exists independently of the mind. The semantic thesis claims that propositions concerning unobservable entities can be evaluated as true or false implying that all scientific propositions have meaning whether they relate to observable or unobservable entities. The epistemic realism thesis argues that we can acquire knowledge about reality including knowledge about unobservable entities. To be more precise, the claims about theoretical entities in scientific theories are not only meaningful but also provide an almost true depiction of reality. In this article, realism refers specifically to epistemic realism, which encompasses three main aspects: 1) the existence of a mind-independent world, 2) the attribution of truth or falsity to scientific propositions concerning unobservable entities, and 3) the claim that the propositions in mature scientific theories regarding theoretical entities are nearly true. On the other hand, one advocate of epistemic anti-realism is Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. According to this perspective, van Fraassen denies the capacity to acquire knowledge about unobservable levels. In this view, the goal of science is not truth but rather empirical adequacy. This means that the objective of scientific endeavor is not to uncover the truth, but rather to construct models that are empirically sufficient. Scientific progress accounts Regarding the concept of scientific progress, four accounts have been presented. In the epistemic account, the goal of science is to increase knowledge or justified true belief. Therefore, scientific progress occurs as we accumulate knowledge. In the semantic account, the objective of science is to approach closer to the truth (verisimilitude). This implies that science progresses when our theories are more truth-like. In the problem-solving (functional) approach, the concept of truth is set aside, and the focus shifts to problem-solving or fulfilling specific functions within science. In this account, scientific progress is marked by the development of new theories that effectively solve more problems compared to previous ones. In the new functional approach, scientific progress is defined in terms of the usefulness of the problem-defining and problem-solving. Advocates of the noetic account consider increased understanding to be the goal of science. In other words, science advances when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world. Scientific progress accounts and scientific realism In both the epistemic and semantic accounts, truth plays a pivotal role. Justified true belief serves as a necessary condition for acquiring knowledge. In the epistemic account, it is possible to acquire knowledge about theoretical entities. Thus, we can infer that the epistemic account is rooted in scientific realism. In the semantic account, the ultimate aim of science is to achieve complete truth. While achieving complete truth in theories may not be certain within this approach, it is possible to demonstrate their approximate truth. Therefore, according to this account, mature scientific theories are considered to be almost true. Consequently, this account aligns with scientific realism. In presenting the problem-solving approach, Laudan explicitly argues against truth being the objective of science, as there is no criterion available to gauge the attainment of truth. In other words, if we define the success of scientific theories based on their ability to solve scientific problems, this success does not necessarily indicate the truth of the theory. While mature scientific theories may demonstrate success and possess the capability to solve numerous problems in comparison to earlier theories, this accomplishment does not directly correlate to the truthfulness of the theory. Consequently, this approach adopts an anti-realist perspective towards science. In the noetic account, priority is given to understanding over approximation to the truth, despite the presence of both criteria. To clarify further, if there are two competing theories, with one being more aligned with reality but the other providing a greater level of understanding, the second theory is considered preferable. Moreover, the concept of the model in the noetic approach resembles the concept of the model in the doctrine of constructive empiricism. This implies that scientific theories do not necessarily provide a true depiction of the world, but rather act as models designed to enhance our understanding. This perspective on scientific theories is anti-realist since it contradicts the thesis of epistemic realism, which asserts that mature scientific theories offer an (almost) true description of the world. Conclusion In summary, this article puts forth the following assertions: l The epistemic and semantic accounts offer explanations for scientific progress within the framework of scientific realism. l The problem-solving (functional) account takes an anti-realist standpoint by explicitly discarding the notion of truth. Although some argue that the new functional approach can be classified as a realistic perspective, the article contends that it still remains anti-realist. l The noetic account inherently embraces an anti-realist position. It considers scientific theories as models that prioritize enhancing understanding rather than providing a relatively accurate description of the world

Modest Surrealism: An Explanation of “Success” in the Sciences

poster abstractThe contemporary scientific realism debate centers around the realist’s claim that successful scientific theories are at least approximately true. Realists, such as Hilary Putnam justify this claim by arguing that it would be a miracle were our successful scientific theories not at least approximately true. Denying the possibility of miracles, the scientific realist must defend a theory’s approximate truth as the only possible explanation for its success. Anti-realist Bas van Fraassen responds to the realist’s argument by offering a Darwinian explanation for the success of scientific theories, an explanation that involves neither truth nor miracles: we have successful theories because we reject those that do not succeed. Realists object that – although van Fraassen’s alternative may explain why we have successful theories – it fails to explain why any particular theory is successful. Striking at realism from another direction, Larry Laudan offers a list of historically successful scientific theories that are not even approximately true. Faced with a list of such false yet successful theories, while nonetheless seeking an explanation for the success of particular theories, one is pressed to find some alternative explanation of success that does not appeal to a theory’s approximate truth. Timothy Lyons presents one such alternative explanation which he terms modest surrealism. In contrast with van Fraassen’s Darwinian explanation, modest surrealism is put forward as an explanation of the success of individual theories. It claims that the mechanisms postulated by the theory would, if actual, bring about all relevant phenomena observed and some yet to be observed at time t; and these phenomena are brought about by actual mechanisms in the world. I critically analyze modest surrealism, exploring its strengths and weaknesses against competing explanations. Doing so, I apply modest surrealism to a host of successful scientific theories, revealing its potential application to the sciences and their history

Should Scientific Realists Embrace Theoretical Conservatism?

A prominent type of scientific realism holds that some important parts of our best current scientific theories are at least approximately true. According to such realists, radically distinct alternatives to these theories or theory-parts are unlikely to be approximately true. Thus one might be tempted to argue, as the prominent anti-realist Kyle Stanford recently did, that realists of this kind have little or no reason to encourage scientists to attempt to identify and develop theoretical alternatives that are radically distinct from currently accepted theories in the relevant respects. In other words, it may seem that realists should recommend that scientists be relatively conservative in their theoretical endeavors. This paper aims to show that this argument is mistaken. While realists should indeed be less optimistic of finding radically distinct alternatives to replace current theories, realists also have greater reasons to value the outcomes of such searches. Interestingly, this holds both for successful and failed attempts to identify and develop such alternatives

Realism and Theories of Truth

The topic of truth has long been thought to be connected to scientific realism and its opposition. In this essay, I discuss the various ways that truth might be related to realism. First, I consider how truth might be of use when defining scientific realism and its opposition. Second, I consider whether various stances regarding realism require specific stances on the nature of truth. I survey "neutralist" views that argue that one's stance on realism is independent of one's view on truth, and partisan positions that claim that one's attitude on realism is, in part, determined by one's theory of truth. Though partisan views have been popular, and defended by seminal figures such as Thomas Kuhn, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, and Arthur Fine, I raise a number of objections for them

Miracles, Trust, and Ennui in Barnes’ Predictivism

Eric Barnes’ The Paradox of Predictivism is concerned primarily with two facts: predictivism and pluralism. In the middle part of the book, he peers through these two lenses at the tired realist scarecrow of the no-miracles argument. He attempts to reanimate this weatherworn realist argument, contra suggestions by people like me that it should be abandoned. In this paper, I want to get clear on Barnes’ contribution to the debate. He focuses on what he calls the miraculous endorsement argument, which explains not the success of a specific theory but instead the history of successes for an entire research program. The history of successes is explained by reliable and improving methods, which are the flipside of approximately true background theories. Yet, as Barnes notes, the whole story must begin with methods that are at least minimally reliable. Barnes demands that the realist explain the origin of the minimally reliable take-off point, and he suggests a way that the realist might do so. I contend that his explanation still relies on contingent developments and so fails to completely explain the development of take-off theories. However, this line of argument digs into familiar details of the no-miracles argument and overlooks what’s new in Barnes’ approach. By calling attention to pluralism, he reminds us that we need an account of scientific expertise. This is important, I suggest, because expertise is not indefinite. We do not trust specific experts for everything, but only for things within the bounds of their expertise. Drawing these boundaries relies on our own background theories and is only likely to be reliable if our background theories are approximately true. I argue, then, that pluralism gives us reason to be realists