Inquisitive bisimulation

Inquisitive modal logic InqML is a generalisation of standard Kripke-style modal logic. In its epistemic incarnation, it extends standard epistemic logic to capture not just the information that agents have, but also the questions that they are interested in. Technically, InqML fits within the family of logics based on team semantics. From a model-theoretic perspective, it takes us a step in the direction of monadic second-order logic, as inquisitive modal operators involve quantification over sets of worlds. We introduce and investigate the natural notion of bisimulation equivalence in the setting of InqML. We compare the expressiveness of InqML and first-order logic in the context of relational structures with two sorts, one for worlds and one for information states. We characterise inquisitive modal logic, as well as its multi-agent epistemic S5-like variant, as the bisimulation invariant fragment of first-order logic over various natural classes of two-sorted structures. These results crucially require non-classical methods in studying bisimulation and first-order expressiveness over non-elementary classes of structures, irrespective of whether we aim for characterisations in the sense of classical or of finite model theory

Erotetic Epistemic Logic

This paper presents a logic of questions developed as an extension of (S5) epistemic logic. We discuss many features that are important for erotetic logic (formalization and semantics of questions, answerhood conditions, and inferential structures with questions). The aim is to introduce an erotetic system which corresponds well with epistemic terms and can form an appropriate background for dynamic approaches in epistemic logic

Geometric Aspects of Multiagent Systems

Recent advances in Multiagent Systems (MAS) and Epistemic Logic within Distributed Systems Theory, have used various combinatorial structures that model both the geometry of the systems and the Kripke model structure of models for the logic. Examining one of the simpler versions of these models, interpreted systems, and the related Kripke semantics of the logic $S5_n$ (an epistemic logic with $n$-agents), the similarities with the geometric / homotopy theoretic structure of groupoid atlases is striking. These latter objects arise in problems within algebraic K-theory, an area of algebra linked to the study of decomposition and normal form theorems in linear algebra. They have a natural well structured notion of path and constructions of path objects, etc., that yield a rich homotopy theory.Comment: 14 pages, 1 eps figure, prepared for GETCO200

Some Remarks on the Model Theory of Epistemic Plausibility Models

Classical logics of knowledge and belief are usually interpreted on Kripke models, for which a mathematically well-developed model theory is available. However, such models are inadequate to capture dynamic phenomena. Therefore, epistemic plausibility models have been introduced. Because these are much richer structures than Kripke models, they do not straightforwardly inherit the model-theoretical results of modal logic. Therefore, while epistemic plausibility structures are well-suited for modeling purposes, an extensive investigation of their model theory has been lacking so far. The aim of the present paper is to fill exactly this gap, by initiating a systematic exploration of the model theory of epistemic plausibility models. Like in 'ordinary' modal logic, the focus will be on the notion of bisimulation. We define various notions of bisimulations (parametrized by a language L) and show that L-bisimilarity implies L-equivalence. We prove a Hennesy-Milner type result, and also two undefinability results. However, our main point is a negative one, viz. that bisimulations cannot straightforwardly be generalized to epistemic plausibility models if conditional belief is taken into account. We present two ways of coping with this issue: (i) adding a modality to the language, and (ii) putting extra constraints on the models. Finally, we make some remarks about the interaction between bisimulation and dynamic model changes.Comment: 19 pages, 3 figure

The Logic of Joint Ability in Two-Player Tacit Games

Logics of joint strategic ability have recently received attention, with arguably the most influential being those in a family that includes Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Notably, both CL and ATL bypass the epistemic issues that underpin Schelling-type coordination problems, by apparently relying on the meta-level assumption of (perfectly reliable) communication between cooperating rational agents. Yet such epistemic issues arise naturally in settings relevant to ATL and CL: these logics are standardly interpreted on structures where agents move simultaneously, opening the possibility that an agent cannot foresee the concurrent choices of other agents. In this paper we introduce a variant of CL we call Two-Player Strategic Coordination Logic (SCL2). The key novelty of this framework is an operator for capturing coalitional ability when the cooperating agents cannot share strategic information. We identify significant differences in the expressive power and validities of SCL2 and CL2, and present a sound and complete axiomatization for SCL2. We briefly address conceptual challenges when shifting attention to games with more than two players and stronger notions of rationality

On formal aspects of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency

This paper reviews the central points and presents some recent developments of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency in terms of the preservation of evidence. Two formal systems are surveyed, the basic logic of evidence (BLE) and the logic of evidence and truth (LET J ), designed to deal, respectively, with evidence and with evidence and truth. While BLE is equivalent to Nelson’s logic N4, it has been conceived for a different purpose. Adequate valuation semantics that provide decidability are given for both BLE and LET J . The meanings of the connectives of BLE and LET J , from the point of view of preservation of evidence, is explained with the aid of an inferential semantics. A formalization of the notion of evidence for BLE as proposed by M. Fitting is also reviewed here. As a novel result, the paper shows that LET J is semantically characterized through the so-called Fidel structures. Some opportunities for further research are also discussed

Symbolic Model Checking for Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) can model complex information scenarios in a way that appeals to logicians. However, existing DEL implementations are ad-hoc, so we do not know how the framework really performs. For this purpose, we want to hook up with the best available model-checking and SAT techniques in computational logic. We do this by first providing a bridge: a new faithful representation of DEL models as so-called knowledge structures that allow for symbolic model checking. Next, we show that we can now solve well-known benchmark problems in epistemic scenarios much faster than with existing DEL methods. Finally, we show that our method is not just a matter of implementation, but that it raises significant issues about logical representation and update

Symbolic Model Checking for Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) can model complex information scenarios in a way that appeals to logicians. However, existing DEL implementations are ad-hoc, so we do not know how the framework really performs. For this purpose, we want to hook up with the best available model-checking and SAT techniques in computational logic. We do this by first providing a bridge: a new faithful representation of DEL models as so-called knowledge structures that allow for symbolic model checking. Next, we show that we can now solve well-known benchmark problems in epistemic scenarios much faster than with existing DEL methods. Finally, we show that our method is not just a matter of implementation, but that it raises significant issues about logical representation and update