Why Just Boogie? Translating Between Intermediate Verification Languages

The verification systems Boogie and Why3 use their respective intermediate languages to generate verification conditions from high-level programs. Since the two systems support different back-end provers (such as Z3 and Alt-Ergo) and are used to encode different high-level languages (such as C# and Java), being able to translate between their intermediate languages would provide a way to reuse one system's features to verify programs meant for the other. This paper describes a translation of Boogie into WhyML (Why3's intermediate language) that preserves semantics, verifiability, and program structure to a large degree. We implemented the translation as a tool and applied it to 194 Boogie-verified programs of various sources and sizes; Why3 verified 83% of the translated programs with the same outcome as Boogie. These results indicate that the translation is often effective and practically applicable

Using formal methods to support testing

Formal methods and testing are two important approaches that assist in the development of high quality software. While traditionally these approaches have been seen as rivals, in recent years a new consensus has developed in which they are seen as complementary. This article reviews the state of the art regarding ways in which the presence of a formal specification can be used to assist testing

Hennessy-Milner Logic with Greatest Fixed Points as a Complete Behavioural Specification Theory

There are two fundamentally different approaches to specifying and verifying properties of systems. The logical approach makes use of specifications given as formulae of temporal or modal logics and relies on efficient model checking algorithms; the behavioural approach exploits various equivalence or refinement checking methods, provided the specifications are given in the same formalism as implementations. In this paper we provide translations between the logical formalism of Hennessy-Milner logic with greatest fixed points and the behavioural formalism of disjunctive modal transition systems. We also introduce a new operation of quotient for the above equivalent formalisms, which is adjoint to structural composition and allows synthesis of missing specifications from partial implementations. This is a substantial generalisation of the quotient for deterministic modal transition systems defined in earlier papers

Introduction to the ISO specification language LOTOS

LOTOS is a specification language that has been specifically developed for the formal description of the OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) architecture, although it is applicable to distributed, concurrent systems in general. In LOTOS a system is seen as a set of processes which interact and exchange data with each other and with their environment. LOTOS is expected to become an ISO international standard by 1988

The Paths to Choreography Extraction

Choreographies are global descriptions of interactions among concurrent components, most notably used in the settings of verification (e.g., Multiparty Session Types) and synthesis of correct-by-construction software (Choreographic Programming). They require a top-down approach: programmers first write choreographies, and then use them to verify or synthesize their programs. However, most existing software does not come with choreographies yet, which prevents their application. To attack this problem, we propose a novel methodology (called choreography extraction) that, given a set of programs or protocol specifications, automatically constructs a choreography that describes their behavior. The key to our extraction is identifying a set of paths in a graph that represents the symbolic execution of the programs of interest. Our method improves on previous work in several directions: we can now deal with programs that are equipped with a state and internal computation capabilities; time complexity is dramatically better; we capture programs that are correct but not necessarily synchronizable, i.e., they work because they exploit asynchronous communication