Grounds and Structural Realism: A Possible Metaphysical Framework

This article discusses the proposal of accommodating grounding theories and structural realism, with the aim to provide a metaphysical framework for structural realism. Ontic structural realism, one of the most accepted metaphysical versions for structural realism, is taken into account here, with the intention of analyzing the framework in which GT and OSR are compatible, and to what extent

Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism?

Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the so-called pessimistic meta-induction on the history of science. Some authors, however, suggested that the preservation of structure across theory-change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. While the possibility of this latter, „ontic‟ form of structural realism has been extensively debated, though, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this paper, I distinguish between two arguments in favour of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature, and find both of them wanting

Aristotle, The Pythagoreans, and Structural Realism

Aristotle’s main objection to Pythagorean number ontology is that it posits as a basic subject what can exist only as inherent in a subject. I then show how contemporary structural realists posit an ontology much like that of Aristotle’s Pythagoreans. Both take the objects of knowledge to be structure, not the subject of structure. I discuss both how pancomputationalists such as Edward Fredkin approach the Pythagorean account insofar as on their account all reality can in principle be expressed as one (very big) number, made up of discrete units, and even more moderate varieties of structural realism, like that of Floridi, share with pancomputationalism the aspect of “Pythagorean” ontology that Aristotle finds so objectionable: positing structure or form with no substrate. I conclude by arguing that Aristotle himself is drawn to something close or (identical) to a structural realist ontology in Metaphysics 7.3

Structural realism versus deployment realism: A comparative evaluation

In this paper I challenge and adjudicate between the two positions that have come to prominence in the scientific realism debate: deployment realism and structural realism. I discuss a set of cases from the history of celestial mechanics, including some of the most important successes in the history of science. To the surprise of the deployment realist, these are novel predictive successes toward which theoretical constituents that are now seen to be patently false were genuinely deployed. Exploring the implications for structural realism, I show that the need to accommodate these cases forces our notion of “structure” toward a dramatic depletion of logical content, threatening to render it explanatorily vacuous: the better structuralism fares against these historical examples, in terms of retention, the worse it fares in content and explanatory strength. I conclude by considering recent restrictions that serve to make “structure” more specific. I show however that these refinements will not suffice: the better structuralism fares in specificity and explanatory strength, the worse it fares against history. In light of these case studies, both deployment realism and structural realism are significantly threatened by the very historical challenge they were introduced to answer

Ontic Structural Realism

Ontic structural realism (OSR) is at its core the view that structure is ontologically fundamental. Informed from its inception by the revolutions of 20th century science, it is claimed to provide the perspective on ontology most befitting of modern physics. But what precisely its core claim that ‘structure is fundamental’ amounts to is difficult to articulate, as is what its purported naturalistic credentials should ultimately be taken to be. It is also difficult to sustain OSR’s core claim on the basis of our best current physics. What is clear, however, is that OSR has brought swathes of relevant material from the sciences to the table of contemporary metaphysics, and that metaphysicians ignore this rich seam of material to their own analytical loss. This article aims to identify different positions within OSR and the connections between them, and examine the warrant provided by our best current physics for the claim that structure is ontologically fundamental. It will be argued that kind properties continue to pose a challenge to OSR – something that has perhaps been obscured by the fact that ontological priority has primarily been conceived of in terms of ontological dependence and not a relation of ontological determination (or ‘grounding’). As such, it is argued, it seems difficult to maintain the fundamentality of structure on the basis of present physics. But another hope is to convey that OSR must incorporate both the fine details of contemporary physics and tools from a priori metaphysics in the course of its development, and as such that metaphysicians of all stripes have not only a stake in the standing of its claims but a role to play in the argument behind them

Generalism and the Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism

Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that all there is to the world is structure. But how can this slogan be turned into a worked-out metaphysics? Here I consider one potential answer: a metaphysical framework known as generalism (Dasgupta, 2009, 2016). According to the generalist, the most fundamental description of the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which states of affairs obtain. However, I contend that despite several apparent similarities between the positions, generalism is unable to capture the two main motivations for OSR. I suggest instead that OSR should be construed as a meta-metaphysical position

Moderate structural realism about space-time

This paper sets out a moderate version of metaphysical structural realism that stands in contrast to both the epistemic structural realism of Worrall and the—radical—ontic structural realism of French and Ladyman. According to moderate structural realism, objects and relations (structure) are on the same ontological footing, with the objects being characterized only by the relations in which they stand. We show how this position fares well as regards philosophical arguments, avoiding the objections against the other two versions of structural realism. In particular, we set out how this position can be applied to space-time, providing for a convincing understanding of space-time points in the standard tensor formulation of general relativity as well as in the fibre bundle formulatio

Ontic Structural Realism

Ontic structural realism (OSR) is at its core the view that structure is ontologically fundamental. Informed from its inception by the revolutions of 20th century science, it is claimed to provide the perspective on ontology most befitting of modern physics. But what precisely its core claim that ‘structure is fundamental’ amounts to is difficult to articulate, as is what its purported naturalistic credentials should ultimately be taken to be. It is also difficult to sustain OSR’s core claim on the basis of our best current physics. What is clear, however, is that OSR has brought swathes of relevant material from the sciences to the table of contemporary metaphysics, and that metaphysicians ignore this rich seam of material to their own analytical loss. This article aims to identify different positions within OSR and the connections between them, and examine the warrant provided by our best current physics for the claim that structure is ontologically fundamental. It will be argued that kind properties continue to pose a challenge to OSR – something that has perhaps been obscured by the fact that ontological priority has primarily been conceived of in terms of ontological dependence and not a relation of ontological determination (or ‘grounding’). As such, it is argued, it seems difficult to maintain the fundamentality of structure on the basis of present physics. But another hope is to convey that OSR must incorporate both the fine details of contemporary physics and tools from a priori metaphysics in the course of its development, and as such that metaphysicians of all stripes have not only a stake in the standing of its claims but a role to play in the argument behind them

Structural Realism, Again

The paper defends a view of structural realism similar to that of French and Ladyman, although it differs from theirs in an important respect: I do not take indistinguishabiity of particles in quantum mechanics to have the significance they think it has. It also differs from Cao's view of structural realism, criticized in my "Critical Notice: Cao's `The Conceptual Development of 20th Century Field Theories"

A possible Answer to Newman’s Objection from the perspective of informational structural realism

This paper aims to reconstruct a possible answer to the classical Newman’s objection which has been used countless times to argue against structural realism. The reconstruction starts from the new strand of structural realism – informational structural realism – authored by Luciano Floridi. Newman’s objection had previously stated that all propositions which comprise the mathematical structures are merely trivial truths and can be instantiated by multiple models. This paper examines whether informational structural realism can overcome this objection by analysing the previous attempts to answer this objection, attempts which either try to save the Ramseyfication of mathematical propositions or give up on it. The informational structural realism way is to attempt a third way, the neo-Kantian way inspired by the work of Ernst Cassirer, but also to change the formalism from a mathematical to an informational one. This paper shows how this original combination of neo-Kantianism, informational formalism and the method of levels of abstraction provide the tools to overcome Newman’s objection