11 research outputs found
Stronger Security for Reusable Garbled Circuits, General Definitions and Attacks
We construct a functional encryption scheme for circuits which simultaneously achieves and improves upon the security of the current best known, and incomparable, constructions from
standard assumptions: reusable garbled circuits by Goldwasser, Kalai, Popa, Vaikuntanathan and Zeldovich (STOC 2013) [GKP + 13] and predicate encryption for circuits by Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan and Wee (CRYPTO 2015) [GVW15]. Our scheme is secure based on the learning with errors (LWE) assumption.
Our construction implies:
1. A new construction for reusable garbled circuits that achieves stronger security than the only known prior construction [GKP + 13].
2. A new construction for bounded collusion functional encryption with substantial efficiency benefits: our public parameters and ciphertext size incur an additive growth of O(Q^2),
where Q is the number of permissible queries. Additionally, the ciphertext of our scheme is succinct, in that it does not depend on the size of the circuit. By contrast, the prior best
construction [GKP+13, GVW12] incurred a multiplicative blowup of O (Q^4) in both the public parameters and ciphertext size. However, our scheme is secure in a weaker game than GVW12].
Additionally, we show that existing LWE based predicate encryption schemes [AFV11, GVW15] are completely insecure against a general functional encryption adversary (i.e. in the âstrong attribute hidingâ game). We demonstrate three different attacks, the strongest of which is applicable even to the inner product predicate encryption scheme [AFV11]. Our attacks are practical and allow the attacker to completely recover x from its encryption Enc (x) within a polynomial number of queries. This illustrates that the barrier between predicate and functional encryption is not just a limitation of proof techniques. We believe these attacks shed significant
light on the barriers to achieving full fledged functional encryption from LWE, even for simple functionalities such as inner product zero testing [KSW08, AFV11].
Along the way, we develop a new proof technique that permits the simulator to program public parameters based on keys that will be requested in the future. This technique may be of independent interest
Notes on Reusable Garbling
Garbling is a cryptographic primitive which has many applications. It is mainly used for scenes of limited authority, such as multi-party computation (MPC), attribute-based encryption (ABE), functional encryption (FE), indistinguishability obfuscation (IO), etc. Garbling schemes before 2013 are of one-time garbling. Goldwasser et al and Agrawal presented a reusable garbling scheme, which made use of a symmetric encryption scheme and an FE scheme as the components.
In this paper we discuss the validity and the efficiency of reusable garbling scheme. We present the following three notes on the scheme.
(1) Reusable garbling scheme does not provide new applications, and it is still a one-time garbling scheme.
(2) Even reusable garbling scheme is taken as a one-time garbling scheme, sometimes it is not usable. More detailedly, it can only be used for Basic Scene 2, and cannot be used for Basic Scene 1. For example, it cannot be used for MPC.
(3) Even reusable garbling scheme is taken as a one-time garbling scheme used for Basic Scene 2, there is no evidence to show that its efficiency is better than a former one-time garbling scheme
A Note on P/poly Validity of GVW15 Predicate Encryption Scheme
Predicate encryption (PE) is a cutting-edge research topic in cryptography, and an essential component of a research route: identity-based encryption (IBE)âattribute-based encryption (ABE)âpredicate encryption (PE)âfunctional encryption (FE). GVW15 predicate encryption scheme is a major predicate encryption scheme. The bottom structure is BGG+14 attribute-based encryption scheme, which is combined with a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme. A crucial operation of the scheme is modulus reduction, by which the modulus of the fully homomorphic encryption ciphertext (also referred to as the inner modulus) is scaled down to the modulus of the attribute ciphertext (also referred to as the outer modulus). âThereforeâ, the noise in the fully homomorphic encryption ciphertext (also referred to as the inner noise) is reduced to polynomial size, allowing for the follow-up exhaustion of noise size and hence correct decryption.
We argue in this paper that there is no evidence to support the validity of GVW15 predicate encryption scheme, that is, when addressing functions, there is no evidence to show GVW15 scheme can be implemented. In specific, when addressing functions, there is no indication that the modulus reduction in GVW15 predicate encryption scheme can scale the noise in the fully homomorphic encryption ciphertext (the inner noise) down to polynomial size. Our argument is separated into two parts.
First, under a compact inner modulus , an intuition is that modulus reduction should reduce the inner noise to about the same size as the outer noise (i.e. the noise in the attribute ciphertext), which is super-polynomial in size. Breaking this intuition requires a special proof which GVW15 predicate encryption (PE) scheme does not provide.
Second, under an enlarged inner modulus , the outer modulus is enlarged correspondingly. As a result, the static target of modulus reduction is lost. Even so, the size of inner noise can still be reduced to polynomial size by using proper modulus reduction, as long as it can be proved that the ratio of increments of outer modulus and inner modulus is smaller than the ratio of original outer modulus and original inner modulus . However, GVW15 PE scheme failed to provide such proof. Moreover, it appears hopeless to get such proof, based on our observations
Invalidity of the Agr17 Functional Encryption Scheme
Functional encryption (FE) is an advanced topic in the research of cryptography, and the Agr17 FE scheme is one of the major FE schemes. It took the BGG+14 attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme as a bottom structure, which was upgraded into a `partially hiding predicate encryption\u27 (PHPE) scheme and combined with a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme. However, there is a remaining problem, the implementation of the modulus reduction, in the Agr17 FE scheme. First, a modulus reduction is necessary for the polynomial-time computability of the scheme. Second, the detailed steps of the modulus reduction were absent in the scheme (including its conference version and full version). Instead, the authors only pointed out several reference works. The author\u27s meaning seemed to be that the modulus reduction of the Agr17 FE scheme can be obtained by directly using or simply generalizing these reference works. Third, these reference works only described various modulus reductions of FHE schemes, without the hint of how to generalize them into the modulus reduction of FE schemes. Finally, any modulus reduction of FHE can not be simply generalized into the modulus reduction of the Agr17 FE scheme due to the following two facts: (1) The Agr17 FE scheme has two moduli, which are the modulus of the FHE ciphertext and of the ABE ciphertext, both are originally superpolynomial in size for processing functions. (2) Both moduli need to be scaled down to polynomial size, and both of them need to be reduced to the same new modulus, otherwise, the correctness of the scheme will fail.
In this paper, we demonstrate that the Agr17 FE scheme is invalid. More specifically, we show that, when processing functions, the Agr17 FE scheme cannot be implemented again after its modulus reduction. To show the soundness of our demonstration, we present the statements in two stages. At the first stage, we show that the modulus reduction of the Agr17 FE scheme should be a double modulus reduction, which includes two modulus reductions for the FHE ciphertext and ABE ciphertext, respectively. This double modulus reduction has the following three key points: (1) The modulus reduction for the FHE ciphertext should be seen as a series of Boolean operations, and converted into `attribute quasi-homomorphic operations\u27. (2) The modulus reduction for the ABE ciphertext is a learning-with-errors (LWE) -based modulus reduction, which is an ordinary modulus reduction. (3) The two modulus reductions should obtain the same new modulus, otherwise, the scheme would not be implemented again. At the second stage, we show that the modulus reduction for the ABE ciphertext will destroy the structure of ABE so that the subsequent decryption would not be executed. The reason lies in that the decryption of ABE is an LWE decryption with conditions rather than an ordinary LWE decryption, and the modulus reduction will destroy the conditions of decryption. Besides, to show such invalidity cannot be easily crossed by revising the scheme, we design two revised versions of the Agr17 scheme. The first revised version is a `natural\u27 revised version of the Agr17 scheme. The key point is to change the small modulus inner product into an arithmetic inner product, which can be obtained by the modulus inner product of the ABE ciphertext. The first revised scheme is valid, i.e., the decryption can be implemented correctly. However, the revised scheme is insecure because the decryptor knows much more secret information, and hence the scheme can be broken by collusion attacks with much less cost. The second revised version is an application of the GGH+13b verification circuit technology which transforms a function into an circuit. The second revised scheme is valid, but it is far from the design idea of the Agr17 scheme, and its function class is quite limited, that is, those functions which can be equally transformed from into by equal verification transformation, rather than any functions
Compact Lattice Gadget and Its Applications to Hash-and-Sign Signatures
Lattice gadgets and the associated algorithms are the essential building blocks of lattice-based cryptography. In the past decade, they have been applied to build versatile and powerful cryptosystems. However, the practical optimizations and designs of gadget-based schemes generally lag their theoretical constructions.
For example, the gadget-based signatures have elegant design and capability of extending to more advanced primitives, but they are far less efficient than other lattice-based signatures.
This work aims to improve the practicality of gadget-based cryptosystems, with a focus on hash-and-sign signatures. To this end, we develop a compact gadget framework in which the used gadget is a square matrix instead of the short and fat one used in previous constructions. To work with this compact gadget, we devise a specialized gadget sampler, called semi-random sampler, to compute the approximate preimage. It first deterministically computes the error and then randomly samples the preimage. We show that for uniformly random targets, the preimage and error distributions are simulatable without knowing the trapdoor. This ensures the security of the signature applications. Compared to the Gaussian-distributed errors in previous algorithms, the deterministic errors have a smaller size, which lead to a substantial gain in security and enables a practically working instantiation.
As the applications, we present two practically efficient gadget-based signature schemes based on NTRU and Ring-LWE respectively. The NTRU-based scheme offers comparable efficiency to Falcon and Mitaka and a simple implementation without the need of generating the NTRU trapdoor. The LWE-based scheme also achieves a desirable overall performance. It not only greatly outperforms the state-of-the-art LWE-based hash-and-sign signatures, but also has an even smaller size than the LWE-based Fiat-Shamir signature scheme Dilithium. These results fill the long-term gap in practical gadget-based signatures
Faster Gaussian Sampling for Trapdoor Lattices with Arbitrary Modulus
We present improved algorithms for gaussian preimage sampling using the lattice trapdoors of (Micciancio and Peikert, CRYPTO 2012). The MP12 work only offered a highly optimized algorithm for the on-line stage of the computation in the special case when the lattice modulus is a power of two. For arbitrary modulus , the MP12 preimage sampling procedure resorted to general lattice algorithms with complexity cubic in the bitsize of the modulus (or quadratic, but with substantial preprocessing and storage overheads.) Our new preimage sampling algorithm (for any modulus ) achieves linear complexity, and has very modest storage requirements. As an additional contribution, we give a new off-line quasi-linear time perturbation sampling algorithm, with performance similar to the (expected) running time of an efficient method proposed by (Ducas and Nguyen, Asiacrypt 2012) for power-of-two cyclotomics, but without the (matrix factorization) preprocessing and (lattice rounding) postprocessing required by that algorithm. All our algorithms are fairly simple, with small hidden constants, and offer a practical alternative to use the MP12 trapdoor lattices in a broad range of cryptographic applications
Raziel: Private and Verifiable Smart Contracts on Blockchains
Raziel combines secure multi-party computation and proof-carrying code to
provide privacy, correctness and verifiability guarantees for smart contracts
on blockchains. Effectively solving DAO and Gyges attacks, this paper describes
an implementation and presents examples to demonstrate its practical viability
(e.g., private and verifiable crowdfundings and investment funds).
Additionally, we show how to use Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Proofs (i.e.,
Proof-Carrying Code certificates) to prove the validity of smart contracts to
third parties before their execution without revealing anything else. Finally,
we show how miners could get rewarded for generating pre-processing data for
secure multi-party computation.Comment: Support: cothority/ByzCoin/OmniLedge
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Gadgets and Gaussians in Lattice-Based Cryptography
This dissertation explores optimal algorithms employed in lattice-based cryptographic schemes. Chapter 2 focuses on optimizing discrete gaussian sampling on "gadget" and algebraic lattices. These gaussian sampling algorithms are used in lattice-cryptography's most efficient trapdoor mechanism for the SIS and LWE problems: "MP12" trapdoors. However, this trapdoor mechanism was previously not optimized and inefficient (or not proven to be statistically correct) for structured lattices (ring-SIS/LWE), lattice-cryptography's most efficient form, where the modulus is often a prime. The algorithms in this chapter achieve optimality in this regime and have (already) resulted in drastic efficiency improvement in independent implementations.Chapter 3 digs deeper into the gadget lattice's associated algorithms. Specifically, we explore efficiently sampling a simple subgaussian distribution on gadget lattices, and we optimize LWE decoding on gadget lattices. These subgaussian sampling algorithms correspond to a randomized bit-decomposition needed in lattice-based schemes with homomorphic properties like fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). Next, we introduce a general class of "Chinese Remainder Theorem" (CRT) gadgets. These gadgets allow advanced lattice-based schemes to avoid multi-precision arithmetic when the applications modulus is larger than 64 bits. The algorithms presented in the first two chapters improve the efficiency of many lattice-based cryptosystems: digital signature schemes, identity-based encryption schemes, as well as more advanced schemes like fully-homomorphic encryption and attribute-based encryption. In the final chapter, we take a closer look at the random matrices used in trapdoor lattices. First, we revisit the constants in the concentration bounds of subgaussian random matrices. Then, we provide experimental evidence for a simple heuristic regarding the singular values of matrices with entries drawn from commonly used distributions in cryptography. Though the proofs in this chapter are dense, cryptographers need a strong understanding of the singular values of these matrices since their maximum singular value determines the concrete security of the trapdoor scheme's underlying SIS problem
Adaptively Simulation-Secure Attribute-Hiding Predicate Encryption
This paper demonstrates how to achieve simulation-based strong attribute hiding against adaptive adversaries
for predicate encryption (PE) schemes supporting expressive predicate families under standard
computational assumptions in bilinear groups. Our main result is a simulation-based adaptively strongly
partially-hiding PE (PHPE) scheme for predicates computing arithmetic branching programs (ABP) on
public attributes, followed by an inner-product predicate on private attributes. This simultaneously generalizes
attribute-based encryption (ABE) for boolean formulas and ABPâs as well as strongly attribute-hiding
PE schemes for inner products. The proposed scheme is proven secure for any a priori bounded
number of ciphertexts and an unbounded (polynomial) number of decryption keys, which is the best possible
in the simulation-based adaptive security framework. This directly implies that our construction
also achieves indistinguishability-based strongly partially-hiding security against adversaries requesting an
unbounded (polynomial) number of ciphertexts and decryption keys. The security of the proposed scheme
is derived under (asymmetric version of) the well-studied decisional linear (DLIN) assumption. Our work
resolves an open problem posed by Wee in TCC 2017, where his result was limited to the semi-adaptive
setting. Moreover, our result advances the current state of the art in both the fields of simulation-based
and indistinguishability-based strongly attribute-hiding PE schemes. Our main technical contribution lies
in extending the strong attribute hiding methodology of Okamoto and Takashima [EUROCRYPT 2012,
ASIACRYPT 2012] to the framework of simulation-based security and beyond inner products