64 research outputs found
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Mirage: A Microeconomic Resource Allocation System for Sensornet Testbeds
In this paper, we argue that a microeconomic resource allocation scheme, specifically the combinatorial auction, is well suited to testbed resource management. To demonstrate this, we present the Mirage resource allocation system. In Mirage, testbed resources are allocated using a repeated combinatorial auction within a closed virtual currency environment. Users compete for testbed resources by submitting bids which specify resource combinations of interest in space/time (e.g., "any 32 MICA2 motes for 8 hours anytime in the next three days") along with a maximum value amount the user is willing to pay. A combinatorial auction is then periodically run to determine the winning bids based on supply and demand while maximizing aggregate utility delivered to users. We have implemented a fully functional and secure prototype of Mirage and have been operating it in daily use for approximately four months on Intel Research Berkeley's 148-mote sensornet testbed.Engineering and Applied Science
Truthful Interval Covering
We initiate the study of a novel problem in mechanism design without money,
which we term Truthful Interval Covering (TIC). An instance of TIC consists of
a set of agents each associated with an individual interval on a line, and the
objective is to decide where to place a covering interval to minimize the total
social cost of the agents, which is determined by the intersection of this
interval with their individual ones. This fundamental problem can model
situations of provisioning a public good, such as the use of power generators
to prevent or mitigate load shedding in developing countries. In the strategic
version of the problem, the agents wish to minimize their individual costs, and
might misreport the position and/or length of their intervals to achieve that.
Our goal is to design truthful mechanisms to prevent such strategic misreports
and achieve good approximations to the best possible social cost. We consider
the fundamental setting of known intervals with equal lengths and provide tight
bounds on the approximation ratios achieved by truthful deterministic
mechanisms. We also design a randomized truthful mechanism that outperforms all
possible deterministic ones. Finally, we highlight a plethora of natural
extensions of our model for future work, as well as some natural limitations of
those settings
Nash Welfare and Facility Location
We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents
located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the
product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between
fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare
notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to
utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare.
We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility
location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of
fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and
propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash
welfare
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Egg: An Extensible and Economics-Inspired Open Grid Computing Platform
The Egg project provides a vision and implementation of how heterogeneous computational requirements will be supported within a single grid and a compelling reason to explain why computational grids will thrive. Environment computing, which allows a user to specify properties that a compute environment must satisfy in order to support the user’s computation, provides a how. Economic principles, allowing resource owners, users, and other stakeholders to make value and policy statements, provides a why. The Egg project introduces a language for defining software environments (egg shell), a general type for grid objects (the cache), and a currency (the egg). The Egg platform resembles an economically driven Internetwide Unix system with egg shell playing the role of a scripting language and caches playing the role of a global file system, including an initial collection of devices.Engineering and Applied Science
Truthful Interval Covering
We initiate the study of a novel problem in mechanism design without money, which we term Truthful Interval Covering (TIC). An instance of TIC consists of a set of agents each associated with an individual interval on a line, and the objective is to decide where to place a covering interval to minimize the total social or egalitarian cost of the agents, which is determined by the intersection of this interval with their individual ones. This fundamental problem can model situations of provisioning a public good, such as the use of power generators to prevent or mitigate load shedding in developing countries. In the strategic version of the problem, the agents wish to minimize their individual costs, and might misreport the position and/or length of their intervals to achieve that. Our goal is to design truthful mechanisms to prevent such strategic misreports and achieve good approximations to the best possible social or egalitarian cost. We consider the fundamental setting of known intervals with equal lengths and provide tight bounds on the approximation ratios achieved by truthful deterministic mechanisms. For the social cost, we also design a randomized truthful mechanism that outperforms all possible deterministic ones. Finally, we highlight a plethora of natural extensions of our model for future work, as well as some natural limitations of those settings
07271 Abstracts Collection -- Computational Social Systems and the Internet
From 01.07. to 06.07.2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07271 ``Computational Social Systems and the Internet\u27\u27 was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl.
During the seminar, several participants presented their current
research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of
the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of
seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section
describes the seminar topics and goals in general.
Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available
Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Price-Collecting Problems
We consider the problem of designing efficient mechanisms to share the cost of providing some service to a set of self-interested customers. In this paper, we mainly focus on cost functions that are induced by prize-collecting optimization problems. Such cost functions arise naturally whenever customers can be served in two different ways: either by being part of a common service solution or by being served individually. One of our main contributions is a general lifting technique that allows us to extend the social cost approximation guarantee of a Moulin mechanism for the respective non-prize-collecting problem to its prize-collecting counterpart. Our lifting technique also suggests a generic design template to derive Moulin mechanisms for prize-collecting problems. The approach is particularly suited for cost-sharing methods that are based on primal-dual algorithms. We illustrate the applicability of our approach by deriving Moulin mechanisms for prize-collecting variants of submodular cost-sharing, facility location and Steiner forest problems. All our mechanisms are essentially best possible with respect to budget balance and social cost approximation guarantees. Finally, we show that the Moulin mechanism by Könemann et al. (SIAM J Comput 37(5):1319–1341, 2008) for the Steiner forest problem is O(log3k)-approximate. Our approach adds a novel methodological contribution to existing techniques by showing that such a result can be proved by embedding the graph distances into random hierarchically separated trees
Dealing With Misbehavior In Distributed Systems: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Most distributed systems comprise autonomous entities interacting with each other to achieve their objectives. These entities behave selfishly when making decisions. This behavior may result in strategical manipulation of the protocols thus jeopardizing the system wide goals. Micro-economics and game theory provides suitable tools to model such interactions. We use game theory to model and study three specific problems in distributed systems. We study the problem of sharing the cost of multicast transmissions and develop mechanisms to prevent cheating in such settings. We study the problem of antisocial behavior in a scheduling mechanism based on the second price sealed bid auction. We also build models using extensive form games to analyze the interactions of the attackers and the defender in a security game involving honeypots.
Multicast cost sharing is an important problem and very few distributed strategyproof mechanisms exist to calculate the costs shares of the users. These mechanisms are susceptible to manipulation by rational nodes. We propose a faithful mechanism which uses digital signatures and auditing to catch and punish the cheating nodes. Such mechanism will incur some overhead. We deployed the proposed and existing mechanisms on planet-lab to experimentally analyze the overhead and other relevant economic properties of the proposed and existing mechanisms.
In a second price sealed bid auction, even though the bids are sealed, an agent can infer the private values of the winning bidders, if the auction is repeated for related items. We study this problem from the perspective of a scheduling mechanism and develop an antisocial strategy which can be used by an agent to inflict losses on the other agents.
In a security system attackers and defender(s) interact with each other. Examples of such systems are the honeynets which are used to map the activities of the attackers to gain valuable insight about their behavior. The attackers want to evade the honeypots while the defenders want them to attack the honeypots. These interesting interactions form the basis of our research where we develop a model used to analyze the interactions of an attacker and a honeynet system
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