Evolution of a supply chain management game for the trading agent competition

TAC SCM is a supply chain management game for the Trading Agent Competition (TAC). The purpose of TAC is to spur high quality research into realistic trading agent problems. We discuss TAC and TAC SCM: game and competition design, scientific impact, and lessons learnt

Designing smart markets

Electronic markets have been a core topic of information systems (IS) research for last three decades. We focus on a more recent phenomenon: smart markets. This phenomenon is starting to draw considerable interdisciplinary attention from the researchers in computer science, operations research, and economics communities. The objective of this commentary is to identify and outline fruitful research areas where IS researchers can provide valuable contributions. The idea of smart markets revolves around using theoretically supported computational tools to both understand the characteristics of complex trading environments and multiechelon markets and help human decision makers make real-time decisions in these complex environments. We outline the research opportunities for complex trading environments primarily from the perspective o

Real-Time Bidding by Reinforcement Learning in Display Advertising

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.Comment: WSDM 201

Economics and Environmental Markets: Lessons from Water-quality Trading

Water-quality trading is an area of active development in environmental markets. Unlike iconic national-scale air-emission trading programs, water-quality trading programs address local or regional water quality and are largely the result of innovations in water-pollution regulation by state or substate authorities rather than by national agencies. This article examines lessons from these innovations about the "real world" meaning of trading and its mechanisms, the economic merits of alternative institutional designs, utilization of economic research in program development, and research needed to improve the success of environmental markets for water quality

Web Auctions in Europe

This paper argues that a better understanding of the business model of web auctions can be reached if we adopt a broader view and provide empirical research from different sites. In this paper the business model of web auctions is refined into four dimensions. These are auction model, motives, exchange processes, and stakeholders. One of the objects of this research is to redefine the blurry concept of the business model by analyzing one business model, the web auction model. We show in this research the complexity and diversity of factors contributing to the success of the web auction model. By generalizing the results to the level of business model we also show how complex and diverse business models can be. Motivated by the lack of empirically grounded justification for the mixed business results of web auctions, this paper adopts a qualitative approach that includes telephone interviews with web auctions developed in different European countries.exchange processes;stakeholders;Web auctions

Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms

There is a wide range of economic problems involving the exchange of indivisible goods without monetary transfers, starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper of Shapley and Scarf [10] and including other problems like the kidney exchange or the school choice problems. For many of these models, the classical solution is the application of an algorithm/mechanism called Top Trading Cycles, attributed to David Gale, which satisfies good properties for the case of strict preferences. In this paper, we propose a family of mechanisms, called Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms, that generalizes the Top Trading Cycles for the general case in which individuals can report indifferences, and preserves all its desirable properties.housing market, indifferences, top trading cycles, absorbing sets

Auction Design without Commitment

We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary equilibria are characterized in the language of vonNeumann-Morgenstern stable sets. This simplifies the analysis remarkably. In the one buyer case, we obtain the Coase conjecture: the buyer obtains all the surplus and efficiency is reached. However, in the multiple buyer case the seller can achieve more: she is able to commit to the English auction. Typically the converse also holds, the English auction is the only stable auction mechanism.Auction theory, commitment, stable sets

A Permit Allocation Contest for a Tradable Pollution Permit Market

In this paper we advocate a new initial allocation mechanism for a tradable pollution permit market. We outline a Permit Allocation Contest (PAC) that distributes permits to firms based on their rank relative to other firms. This ranking is achieved by ordering firms based on an observable 'external action' where the external action is an activity or characteristic of the firm that is independent of their choice of emissions in the tradeable permit market. We show that this mechanism efficiently allocates permits and, as a result, the tradeable permit market is cost-effective. We determine the symmetric equilibrium strategy of each firm in choosing their external action and find the choice is influenced by the firm's cost structure and the regulator's choice of permit allocation schedule (distribution of permits to the market). Furthermore, we investigate the factors that determine the regulator's choice of optimal permit allocation schedules.Rank-order contests, pollution permits, initial allocation

Automated mechanism design for B2B e-commerce models

Business-to-business electronic marketplaces (B2B e-Marketplaces) have been in the limelight since 1999 with the commercialisation of the Internet and subsequent “dot.com” boom [1]. Literature is indicative of the growth of the B2B sectors in all industries, and B2B e-Marketplace is one of the sectors that have witnessed a rapid increase. Consequently, the importance of developing the B2B e-Commerce Model for improved value chain in B2B exchanges is extremely important for SMEs to expose to the world marketplace. There are three research objectives (ROs) in this study; first (RO1) to critical review the concepts of the B2B e-Marketplace including their technologies, operations, business relationships and functionalities; second (RO2) to design an automated mechanism of B2B e-Marketplace for Small to Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs); and third (RO3) to propose a conceptual B2B e-Commerce model for SMEs. The proposed model is constructed by the analytical findings obtained from the contemporary B2B e-Marketplace literature